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ABSTRACT 
Assembling the Plebeian Republic 
Popular Institutions against Systemic Corruption & Oligarchic Domination 
Camila Vergara Gonzalez 
 
Democracy seems to be in crisis and scholars have started to consider the possibility that 
“the only game in town” might be rigged. This dissertation theorizes the crisis of 
democracy from a structural point of view, arguing that liberal representative 
governments suffer from systemic corruption, a form of political decay that should be 
understood as the oligarchization of society, and proposes an anti-oligarchic institutional 
solution based on a radical interpretation of republican constitutional thought.  
If one agrees that the minimal normative expectation of liberal democracies is that 
governments should advance the welfare of the majority within constitutional safeguards, 
increasing income inequality and the relative immiseration of the majority of citizens 
would be in itself a deviation from good rule, a sign of corruption. As a way to 
understand how we could revert the current patterns of political corruption, the book 
provides an in-depth analysis of the institutional, procedural, and normative innovations 
to protect political liberty proposed by Niccolò Machiavelli, Nicolas de Condorcet, Rosa 
Luxemburg, and Hannah Arendt. Because their ideas to institutionalize popular power 
have consistently been misunderstood, instrumentalized, demonized, or neglected, part of 
what this project wants to accomplish is to offer a serious engagement with their 
proposals through a plebeian interpretative lens that renders them as part of the same 
intellectual tradition. In this way, the book assembles a “B side” of constitutional thought 
composed of the apparent misfits in a tradition that has been dominated by the impulse to 
suppress conflict instead of harnessing its liberty-producing properties.  
As a way to effectively deal with systemic corruption and oligarchic domination, 
the book proposes to follow this plebeian constitutionalism and instituionalize popular 
collective power. A proposed plebeian branch would be autonomous and aimed not at 
achieving self-government or direct democracy, but rather at an effort to both judge and 
censor elites who rule. The plebeian branch would consist of two institutions: a 
decentralized network of radically inclusive local assemblies, empowered to initiate and 
veto legislation as well as to exercise periodic constituent power, and a delegate, 
surveillance office able to enforce decisions and impeach public officials. The 
establishment of primary assemblies at the local level would not only allow ordinary 
people to push back against oligarchic domination through the political system but also 
inaugurate an institutional conception of the people as the many assembled locally: a 
political collective agent operating as a network of political judgment in permanent flow. 
The people as network would be a political subject with as many brains as assemblies, in 
which collective learning, reaction against domination, and social change would occur 
organically and independently from representative government and political parties. 
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Even if only a decade ago, when Barack Obama had just been elected President of 
the United States, and there was still hope that, with the right leadership, the political 
system could work for the many instead of the few, today the idea that democracy is in 
crisis has become ubiquitous. The project I present here, which offers a hypothesis for the 
crisis of our political systems and analyzes structural solutions, is not the result of 
academic opportunism, but rather of a deep-seated constitutional skepticism1 that begun 
taking institutional form, against the current, in the years of Obama cool. Even if it was 
only after Donald Trump was elected President that the “crisis of democracy” narrative 
went mainstream, this particular cycle of political decay in our constitutional regimes 
appears to have begun in the 1970s and 80s with the first neoliberal experiments led by 
Augusto Pinochet in Chile, Margaret Thatcher in the United Kingdom, and Ronald 
Reagan in the United States.2 Increasing income inequality and immiseration of the 
working classes was effectively de-politicized and naturalized to the point that today it is 
considered legitimate that three individuals in the U.S. own more wealth than the bottom 
50% —while their wealth grew 6,000% since 1982, median household wealth went down 
3% over the same period, and now one out of five children lives in poverty in the richest 
                                                
1 Rooted in the experience of having lived under an illegitimate constitution in Chile.   
2 For a historical account of neoliberalism see Quinn Slobodian, Globalists. the End of Empire and the 
Birth of Neoliberalism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2018). Slobodian misses the illiberal origins 
of neoliberalism, first implemented in Chile under Pinochet with the help of the so-called Chicago Boys, 




country in the world.3  Because patterns of accumulation and dispossession are far from 
natural, part of what I want to accomplish here is to extend the horizon of analysis so we 
can better appreciate our political regime as an experiment in need of review, an artificial 
political infrastructure that we have designed for ourselves, and that the same as it was 
first established, it can be overhauled. It has been done before, and there is no reason to 
believe it cannot be done again. 
 This dissertation theorizes the crisis of democracy from a structural point of view, 
arguing that liberal representative governments suffer from systemic corruption, a form 
of political decay that should be understood as the oligarchization of society, and 
proposes a plebeian institutional solution based on a radical interpretation of republican 
constitutional thought.4 If one agrees that the minimal normative expectation of liberal 
democracies is that governments should advance the welfare of the majority within 
constitutional safeguards, increasing income inequality and the relative immiseration of 
the majority of citizens would be in itself a deviation from good rule, a sign of corruption. 
Through an in-depth analysis of the institutional, procedural, and normative innovations 
proposed by modern and contemporary plebeian thinkers, I propose to constitutionalize 
popular collective power to establish a mixed constitution as the most effective way to 
deal with systemic corruption and oligarchic domination.  
Since the mixed constitution necessarily entails the opposing institutional powers 
of the few and the many, this project takes as a premise that representative democracies 
are not mixed orders but monocratic regimes with separation of functions,5 a form of 
government in which the democratic element does not have a collective institutional 
form, but in which it is atomized, and its power has been reduced to selecting 
representatives and proposing and voting referenda through the aggregation of individual 
                                                
3 Chuck Collins “The wealth of America's three richest families grew by 6,000% since 1982” The Guardian 
October 31, 2018 < https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/oct/31/us-wealthiest-families-
dynasties-governed-by-rich> 
4  I approach the decay of constitutional democracies and possible institutional solutions from the 
perspective of radical republican thought, and therefore I will not engage with other diagnoses and 
solutions offered from within democratic theory —most prominently coming out of participatory and 
deliberative democratic theory— but rather focus only on the republican tradition and its model of mixed 
constitution. 
5 Pasquale Pasquino, "Classifying Constitutions: Preliminary Conceptual Analysis," Cardozo Law Review, 




preferences. While legislative, executive, and judicial powers are the virtual monopoly6 
of the selected few —who exert legitimate power based on citizens’ consent— the many 
—common citizens who do not effectively govern— do not have a collective institutional 
role in the political decisionmaking process, 7  and therefore there is no effective 
counterpower to an increasingly corrupt representative government. I argue the most 
effective way to deal with domination stemming from systemic corruption is to introduce 
an institutional counterweight by constitutionally empowering ordinary citizens through 
the establishment of popular institutions able to articulate a political will close to the 
reasoned opinion of the majority.  
The proposed plebeian branch of a non-corrupt republican constitution would be 
autonomous and aimed not at achieving self-government or direct democracy, but rather 
at an effort to both judge and censor elites who rule. To accomplish this, the dissertation 
proposes a decentralized network of radically inclusive local assemblies, empowered to 
initiate and veto legislation as well as to exercise periodic constituent power, and a 
delegate, surveillance office able to enforce decisions and impeach public officials. The 
establishment of primary assemblies at the local level would not only allow ordinary 
people to push back against oligarchic domination through the political system but would 
also inaugurate an institutional conception of ‘the people’ as the many assembled locally: 
a collectivity which is not a homogeneous, bounded subject but rather a political agent 
that operates as a network of political judgment in permanent flow. The people-as-
network would be a political subject with as many brains as assemblies, in which 
collective learning, reaction against domination, and social change would occur 
organically and independently from representative government and political parties.  
In Chapter 1 I provide a diagnosis for the crisis of democracy and argue 
representative democracies suffer from systemic corruption, understood as the 
                                                
6 All modern constitutions today lack a popular institution in which citizens can collectively participate in 
the decisionmaking process by proposing, deliberating, and deciding on law, except for the Swiss “cantonal 
assembly” system (Landsgemeinde), one of the oldest surviving forms of direct democracy, which is only 
practiced in 2 of the 25 Swiss cantons. They are nevertheless subject to Swiss federal law. 
7 Elections, recalls, referenda and popular initiatives are powers of the individual, not the many as 
collective subject. In addition to being weak, in my view, these political instruments (or ‘methods’ as 
Machiavelli calls them) have already been (ab)used as weapons of domination by the better-organized parts 




oligarchization of the political system. The chapter first surveys different conceptions of 
corruption in the history of political thought, and retrieves from that history a systemic 
conception of political corruption. I first reconstruct from the works of Plato, Aristotle, 
Polybius, and Machiavelli a notion of political corruption particular to popular 
governments, and then I engage with recent neo-republican and institutionalist attempts at 
redefining political corruption. I argue that we moderns still lack a proper conception of 
systemic corruption comparable in sophistication to the one offered by the ancients 
because we are as yet unable to account for the role that procedures and institutions play 
in fostering corruption through their normal functioning. The chapter concludes by 
proposing a definition of systemic corruption as the oligarchization of power within a 
general respect for the rule of law. This conception of corruption appears as intrinsically 
connected to increasing socio-economic inequality because it enables inequality of 
political influence and the drift toward oligarchic democracy: a regime in which citizens 
empower, through their ballots, the power elites who enable their own dispossession and 
oppression.  
The recognition of systemic corruption as a relentless process of political decay 
prompted ancient and modern political thinkers to study existing constitutions and engage 
in efforts to design the perfect regime: a political order that would be immune to the 
degradation of its institutions and procedures, and thus insulated from social decay and 
regime decline. Chapter 2 traces the intellectual history and institutional iterations of the 
theory of the mixed constitution, which originated as a critique of pure, mono-archic 
constitutions and a realist redress for systemic corruption based on the institutionalization 
of different forms of social power. I offer a genealogy of two main strands of 
interpretation: 1) an elitist-proceduralist strand commenced by Polybius and Cicero, 
reinterpreted by Montesquieu, constitutionalized by Madison, and recently brought 
perhaps to its highest level of philosophical sophistication by Philip Pettit; and 2) a 
plebeian-materialist strand originating in the political experience of the plebs within the 
ancient Roman republic and Machiavelli’s interpretation of this experience in light of the 
political praxis of the popolo during the Florentine republic. I make the distinction 




given constitution: the selected few or the common people. This chapter provides an in-
depth analysis of the elitist-proceduralist strand, engaging with Polybius, Cicero, the 
English constitutional tradition, Harrington, Montesquieu, the American founding, and 
the recent neo-republican interpretation of the mixed constitution provided by Pettit.  
To rethink the republic from a structural perspective implies not only the need to 
theorize the crisis of democracy at the systemic level, and to find adequate institutional 
solutions, but also the necessity of approaching constitutionalism from a point of view 
that allows us to acknowledge ever-expanding systemic corruption and oligarchic 
domination. Chapter 3 proposes a novel methodological approach to the study of 
constitutions that goes beyond the written text and jurisprudence, to incorporate the 
material structure of society. This materialist interpretation originates in the factual 
organization and exercise of power that is allowed and enabled by foundational 
institutions, rules, and procedures —or lack thereof. What I term materialist 
constitutionalism is premised on the idea that the organization of political power cannot 
be analyzed without taking into account socio-economic power structures, and therefore 
establishes a constitutional ideology that stands opposed to legal positivism, formalism, 
and proceduralism. The chapter begins by putting forward this materialist approach, 
which I trace back to Machiavelli, and distinguishing two strands: one “institutionalist” 
developed by Jefferson, Condorcet, and Arendt, and more recently by John McCormick 
and Lawrence Hamilton, and another “critical,” developed by Karl Marx, Evgeni 
Pashukanis, and Antonio Negri, and more recently by Marco Goldoni and Michael 
Wilkinson. Within this taxonomy, Rosa Luxemburg’s materialist critique of law and her 
proposal for institutionalizing workers councils is positioned as a bridge between the 
critical and institutionalist traditions. 
I dedicate the second part of the dissertation to reviewing the constitutional 
thought of four thinkers that have made contributions to plebeian thought in the 16th, 18th 
and 20th centuries. All those who dared propose the institutionalization of popular power 
and endowed it with supreme authority to protect political liberty, have suffered 
reactionary backlashes from those in power. Their work has consistently been 




want to accomplish in this section is to offer a serious engagement with their ideas and 
proposals under a plebeian interpretative lens under which they fit together. In this way, I 
am assembling a “B side” of constitutional thought composed of the misfits in a tradition 
dominated by the impulse to suppress conflict in the favor of harmony, stability, and 
security.  
I begin Chapter 4 by presenting Machiavelli’s constitutional thought as the 
foundation of a type of constitutionalism that is materialist in its analysis of law and 
procedures, and anti-oligarchic in its institutional design. Recognizing the influence that 
socio-economic inequalities exert over political power, Machiavelli it embraces conflict 
as the effective cause of free government and strives to empower and channel 
emancipatory, plebeian energies through the constitutional order. The chapter focuses on 
Machiavelli’s most important contribution to materialist constitutionalism: the plebeian 
nature of constituent power. I argue that the constituent power in Machiavelli serves not 
as a bridge between basic principles and politics, but rather as the power to resist 
oppression by restraining oligarchic power. While in democratic theory the constituent 
power has been conceived as the autopoietic power of the community, a republican 
theory of constituent power would be defined functionally, that is, determined by the goal 
of achieving liberty as non-domination. Because for Machiavelli liberty is attained 
through the realization of a plebeian desire not to be dominated —a situation that is 
gained through conflict and tumults— the preservative power of free government would 
be the power of the people to periodically redraw the boundaries of what is considered 
permissible and what is deemed oppressive. Only the many —who desire not to be 
oppressed and do not partake in ruling— should be the guardians of liberty. I analyze 
Machiavelli’s proposal for reforming Florence through his theory of institutional renewal 
aimed at redeeming corrupt republics, focusing on his proposal to normalize instances of 
constituent creation and punishment in ten-year intervals as the antidote for systemic 
corruption.  
Chapter 5 is devoted to the constitutional thought of Nicolas de Condorcet, the 
challenge of representing the sovereign demos, and his proposal for considering the 




never be made fully present and therefore properly represented. As an alternative to the 
liberal constitution established in the American colonies, Condorcet proposed a 
republican framework in which the ruling power of making laws and decisions about 
administration is concentrated in a representative assembly, which is legally responsive to 
an institutionalized popular power —a network of primary assemblies— aimed at 
checking its laws, policies, and abuses. The chapter presents an in-depth analysis of the 
1793 constitutional plan for the French republic proposed by Condorcet, read through the 
lens of his egalitarian tracts on education, slavery, and the rights of women.  
While Condorcet was writing at the birth of modern representative government 
and was concerned with preserving the revolutionary spirit to protect the republic from 
corruption, Rosa Luxemburg proposes to embrace workers’ councils as a political 
infrastructure of emancipation at a moment when the modern party system had begun to 
consolidate.  It is when the Social Democratic party —a party in support of the interests 
of the working class— had gained control of the German government that she realized 
that the liberty of the working class demanded a different political infrastructure. The 
betrayal of the revolutionary party proved to her the truth of Marx’s argument that the 
“working class cannot simply lay hold of the ready-made state machinery and wield it for 
its own purposes,” and therefore she proposed to alter “the foundation and base of the 
social constitution” from below by institutionalizing workers, soldiers, and peasant 
councils and establishing a national council of workers as part of a revolutionary 
constitutional order. 
 The final chapter in this section analyzes Hannah Arendt’s critique of the 
American founding and her proposal for establishing a council system. According to 
Arendt the moment the founders focused on representation and neglected “to incorporate 
the township and the town-hall meeting into the Constitution,” the revolutionary spirit 
was lost and government became mere administration. Despite the potentiality for 
inclusion exhibited by the constitutional document, which allowed for revolutionary legal 
reforms that ultimately extended citizenship to the majority of the population, freedom as 
spaces for action remained lost in the American polity. Following Jefferson’s plan of 




representative government, Arendt puts forward the council system as an alternative form 
of government aimed at the continual reintroduction of freedom as action and expansion 
of the public sphere. I argue that we should understand Arendt’s proposal as a novel 
interpretation of the mixed constitution, one in which the division between the few and 
the many is replaced by that of parties dedicated to administration, and councils dedicated 
to political judgment.  
 In the third part of the dissertation I survey the development of plebeian thought 
in the 21st century, its philosophical foundations and institutional proposals. In Chapter 8 
I analyze plebeianism as a political philosophy in the works of Martin Breaugh and 
Jeffrey Green, and provide and in-depth analysis of two recent attempts by John 
McCormick and Lawrence Hamilton at retrieving the mixed constitution and proposing 
institutional innovations. I first engage with McCormick’s proposals to revive the office 
of the Tribunate of the Plebs and bring back plebeian power to exert extraordinary 
punishment against agents of corruption, and argue that his radical republican 
interpretation of Machiavelli has placed class struggle, the threat of plutocracy, and the 
need for popular institutions to control the rich at the center of material constitutionalism. 
I then problematize the illiberal nature of his proposals and the legitimacy problems 
arising from lottery as mode of selection. The chapter then analyzes Hamilton’s proposal 
to combine consulting participatory institutions with an “updated tribune of the plebs” 
and a plebeian electoral procedure, and discuss the challenge of proliferating sites of 
popular participation and competing authorities arising in such a scheme. 
 Finally, in Chapter 9 I make my own contribution to plebeian constitutional 
theory by proposing to constitutionalize popular power in a “plebeian branch” that is 
thought through Arendt’s model of parties and councils, and incorporates features of all 
the proposals for establishing a plebeian republic analyzed in the previous sections. I first 
analyze a way to separate the few from the many that would in principle conform to the 
current liberal constitutional framework, and then describe the two institutions that would 
make up the proposed plebeian branch: a network of primary assemblies with the power 
to initiate and veto/repeal any governmental action as well as to update the constitution, 




assemblies and fighting political corruption. Finally I offer a tentative juridical 
framework for this plebeian branch, which is meant to be incorporated into any existing 
set of representative democratic regime and is aimed at empowering plebeians —
common people who only enjoy second-class citizenship within the current constitutional 
structure— and offering a more enduring solution to the systemic corruption of 














I begin this project from the premise that liberal democracy, as any other political 
regime throughout history, is flawed and perfectible, a product of fallible human 
thinking. Of the many deficiencies of our current regime form perhaps the most 
problematic is its inability to effectively deal with corruption. According to Transparency 
International corruption is a serious problem. In 2016 only two countries —Denmark and 
New Zealand— out of 176 states surveyed scored above percentile 90 (equivalent to an A 
in political cleanliness) and over two thirds scored below 50%, which indicates that the 
majority of representative governments1 suffer from “endemic corruption,” a kind of  
“systemic grand corruption [that] violates human rights, prevents sustainable 
development and fuels social exclusion.”2 Even if the Corruption Perceptions Index 
attempts to explicitly account for systemic corruption —as opposed to mere cash for 
votes, quid pro quo corruption— the current definition of political corruption does not yet 
allow for an accurate measurement of its structural layer because it remains blind to the 
role procedures and political institutions play in fostering corruption through their normal 
functioning. In this article I argue that we are working with an imperfect, reductionist 
explanation of political corruption that, even if it allows for quantitative research and 
generalizations based on discreet observable variables, it does not capture the broader, 
                                                
1 According to the Democracy Index, 69% of the 167 countries surveyed are considered a type of 
democracy (full, flawed, or hybrid). 




more intractable and pernicious form of systemic corruption that ancient and modern 
political thinkers wanted to avoid.  
The predominant definition of corruption as “illegal actions concerning public 
officials” is narrower and departs in significant ways from the meaning that was attached 
to corruption in earlier periods of Western thought.3 Our current understanding of 
political corruption is positivist and individualistic, which has served well the research 
model that became hegemonic in the social sciences in the 1990s, which demanded the 
development of concepts that could be easily measured and plugged into large N-models. 
Corruption has thus been conveniently reduced to its most visible and clear expressions: 
illegal acts involving public officials (e.g. bribery, fraud, nepotism). But even if the 
reduction of political corruption to a discreet set of expressions serves the reliable 
measurement of the phenomenon, this account can only be partial since it is clear that 
political corruption is a slow-moving process, where meaningful change in the 
independent variable occurs only over the long run, tending then, in practice, to fall off 
the radar within this type of quantitative methodology.4  
Despite a recent renewed empirical interest on systemic corruption and the most 
effective ways to deal with it, 5  the concept is yet to be adequately defined and 
understood. The bulk of research done on corruption is policy-oriented, aimed at 
ameliorating the negative economic consequences associated with corruption, especially 
in the developing world.6 “Corruption is thus presented as if it were a matter of 
misconduct on the part of public officials who are seen, especially in poor countries, as 
pursuing their own private interests and likely to act corruptly in return for money and 
other favours, thereby undermining economic development.”7  
                                                
3 Manuhuia Barcham, Barry Hindess and Peter Larmour, eds., Corruption: Expanding the Focus (Acton, 
A.C.T: Australian National University Press, 2012), 8. 
4 Paul Pierson, “Big, Slow-Moving, and… Invisible: Macrosocial Processes in the Study of Comparative 
Politics,” in James Mahoney and Dietrich Rueschemeyer, eds., Comparative Historical Analysis in the 
Social Sciences (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003). 
5 Michael Johnston, Syndromes of Corruption: Wealth, Power, and Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2010); Alina Mungiu-Pippidi, The Quest for Good Governance. How Societies Develop 
Control of Corruption (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015);  
6 Susan Rose-Ackerman and Bonnie J. Palifka, Corruption and Government: Causes, Consequences, and 
Reform (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016). 




In conformity with the individualistic model that undergirds the current 
conception of corruption but acknowledging the limitations of analyzing corruption only 
through its narrow definition, the different organisms aimed at combating corruption have 
relied on individuals’ perception of corruption as a way to complement the tallying of 
individual illegal acts as proxy for the rate of corruption in society. This is of course very 
problematic. If there is no working definition of corruption beyond the legal, on what 
evidence are respondents of these surveys basing their perceptions? Corruption conceived 
in this way is guilty of moral relativism and legal positivism because it does not consider 
an independent standard to judge the law and thus could even end up legalizing the most 
prominent means of corruption (e.g. campaign finance, donations, lobby).8 In our current 
juridical conception of corruption, for example, there is no way to account for legal 
corruption, for laws and policies that promote the interests of a few against the common 
good, what the Ancients would understand as the gradual decay of good government. 
The few attempts at engaging with the concept at a theoretical level fall short 
from fully conceiving the fundamentally systemic nature of political corruption9 or 
adequately grounding it on intellectual history and its contexts,10 and thus potentially 
liable to anachronism through “mythologies of doctrines.”11 This chapter contributes to 
this emerging theoretical literature by providing a contextualized theoretical analysis of a 
type of political corruption that seems a systemic feature of all constitutional popular 
governments. Systemic corruption, which encompasses structural forms of corruption 
such as legal and institutional corruption, is not only different from the actor-based 
meanings of the term —the bending and breaking of the law by a clan or class for their 
                                                
8 While lobbying was illegal for much of US history, today it dominates politics. For a historical account 
see Zephyr Teachout, Corruption in America: From Benjamin Franklin's Snuff Box to Citizens United 
(Harvard University Press, 2014). 
9 Peter DeLeon, Thinking About Political Corruption (New York: Routledge, 1993); Paul Heywood, ed., 
Political Corruption (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997); Dennis Thompson, Ethics in Congress: From Individual 
to Institutional Corruption (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1995). 
10 See Patrick Dobel’s gathering of “scattered insights” by Thucydides, Plato, Aristotle, Machiavelli, and 
Rousseau. “The Corruption of a State,” American Political Science Review 72.3 (Sep., 1978), 958-973. A 
notable exception is An Intellectual History of Political Corruption (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2014) edited by Lisa Hill and Bruce Buchan, even if it centers on tracing the current individual, juridical 
concept of corruption, devoting only few pages to systemic corruption. 
11 Coherence, prolepsis, and parochialism. “Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas,” History 




own benefit, or the buying of political influences by private interest12— but also differs 
from definitions of corruption as the undermining of the rule of law.13  Systemic 
corruption is a term that seems to directly address the nature of the superstructure itself, 
and not the manipulation or dismantling of a structure that is seen as the normative 
ground for neutrality. 
Through a historical conjunctural analysis I connect ideas about corruption to the 
specific political form and contingency in which they developed, and show how systemic 
corruption was consider in the history of ideas as regime-specific. I divide this 
exploration in three parts. In the first section I begin with an analysis of the ancient Greek 
concept of corruption (φθορά) in pre-Socratic thought and then focus on Plato and 
Aristotle in the context of the consolidated Athenian democratic regime of 4th century 
BC, and on Polybius who argued, based on the structure of the popular Roman republic 
of the 2nd century BC, that a mixed constitution was necessary to escape the cycle of 
corruption. In the second section I provide an in-depth analysis of Machiavelli’s 
understanding of corruption in republican Florence as a systemic problem rooted on laws, 
procedures, and institutions. Then I engage with two recent strands of thought —neo-
republican and institutionalist— that attempt to redefine political corruption, and argue 
that neither of them offers a satisfactory definition of systemic corruption because they 
miss the current drift into increasingly oligarchic systems of rule in the majority of 
countries around the world. I conclude by proposing to embrace the Machiavellian 
approach to corruption, and therefore to understand it systemically, as determined by the 
constitution of the state, which forces us not only to measure corruption at the level of 
rules, procedures, institutions, and their outcomes, but also to see it as intrinsically 
connected to the current drift into increasingly oligarchic systems of rule in the majority 
of countries around the world. 
 
 
                                                
12 In his taxonomy of corruption Michael Johnston identified the corruption of “influenced markets” in 
which private interests seek political influence as the most pervasive in advanced market 
democracies. Syndromes of Corruption: Wealth, Power, and Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2010). 
13 Bo Rothstein, The Quality of Government: Corruption, Social Trust, and Inequality in International 




I.  Systemic Political Corruption in Ancient Thought 
Even though today we associate corruption with illegal action, the etymological 
origin of the word has a far more complex meaning. The Greek ancestor of the word 
corruption has been traced to phthora (φθορά), which meant destruction, decay, and 
“passing away” as correlative to genesis —the beginning of a process.14 While in early 
pre-Socratic texts the word was used only to denote the moral degradation of women and 
youth, and the ruining of crops due to bad weather, the concept appears to acquire a 
decisively abstract meaning in 6th century BC. The theoretical conception of phthora was 
first developed, according to Aristotle, by Thales of Miletus, the founder of the school of 
philosophy that identifies unchangeable elements in nature, principles that are “neither 
generated nor destroyed, but persist eternally.”15 The Physicists —as Aristotle called this 
school of thought— attempted to understand how could plurality in the cosmos be 
generated from matter as a “single underlying substance.” Anaximander argued matter 
was governed by a “diversifying antithesis” in which matter is constantly being generated 
through “condensation and rarefication,” and that phthora was the natural process 
through which things returned to the original, indefinite principle.16 Empedocles and 
Anaxagoras assigned a direction to this poietic process of generation. While for 
Empedocles generation of matter was circular, always coming back to its starting point, 
for Anaxagoras this movement was spiral, never repeating itself.17  
The concept of corruption acquired a political meaning when it was first attached 
to the constitution of the state by Plato, and then furthered analyzed by Aristotle in the 
Politics —work explicitly dedicated to the analysis of the corruption (φθορᾶ) and 
preservation of constitutions. I would argue both authors developed their conception of 
corruption responding to their own socio-political context, and thus we should analyze 
their ideas on political corruption as inherently tied to a stable democratic regime in a 
diminished, post-imperial Athens. Through a contextual analysis of their ideas, in what 
follows I show that while for Plato the source of corruption in democracy was the 
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constitutive principle of liberty, which gradually eroded hierarchies and rule, for Aristotle 
corruption sprung from the full realization of the principle of equal share in government.  
Since the series of constitutional reforms begun by Cleisthenes (508/7 BC) based 
on the principle of isonomia (ἰσονοµία), right up to Pericles’s pro-democratic policies, the 
popular sectors in Ancient Athens were gradually empowered until acquiring 
preeminence. By the 4th century almost all magistrates were selected by lottery from a 
broad pool of citizens18 who enjoyed isegoria (ἰσηγορία) —the equal right to speak to the 
assembly— and were paid by the state to exercise political power.19 The empowerment of 
non-elite citizens came hand in hand with Athens’ increased naval power and state 
revenue, and with the diminishing of the elite’s institutional power. While during Athens 
golden years the increased participation of the masses in political power was financed 
through colonial tributes and high production of state silver mines, after Athens lost its 
empire and the production of mines begun to decrease, equal share in government was 
mostly financed through indirect taxation on the leisured classes, whose political 
influence decreased especially after the aristocratic Areopagus was stripped from its veto 
power.20  
 An Athenian citizen of high status, Plato came of age in the midst of the 
Peloponnesian War (431–404 BC), in which Athens was ultimately defeated, and the 
long-time brewing 411 oligarchic coup.21 After the restoration of democracy shortly after, 
Plato witnessed the execution of his mentor, Socrates, condemned to death by the 
Athenian assembly for corrupting the youth and religion. Pay for assembly goers and 
jurors, and the establishment of the nomothetai (νοµοθέται) selected by lot, 22 had 
effectively made the popular sectors the judges of behavior and the interpreters of law, 
and in Plato’s eyes the death of Socrates came to evidence the hubris the multitude was 
capable of when drunk with liberty. Dēmokratiā was certainly not a perfect form of 
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government, and its consolidation (or radicalization) was seen by Plato as only one more 
phase in the relentless decay of political organizations. In Republic he envisioned the best 
form of government as that of the philosopher kings, an aristocracy of the guardians of 
virtue, who are able organize society in the best way possible because they lack a stake in 
it; guardians would live communally, separated from other classes and barred from 
owning property. However, even this seemly perfect constitution maintained by the most 
virtuous elite would not be able to escape corruption, because “phthora (φθορά) awaits 
everything that has come to be, [and] even a foundation of this kind will not survive for 
the whole of time.”23 
Even if in later writings Plato further explores phthora only as a process of 
degradation that is proper to physis, since there is no strict separation between the natural 
and the political in his thought, this process of decay would also rule the political realm 
created by men.24 In Timaeus Plato puts forward a basic intuition about the decay of 
bodies, which would later be validated by the discovery of the second law of 
thermodynamics25 as revealing an inherent process of degradation through the transfer of 
energy: 
For when any one element suffers a change of condition that is contrary to 
nature, all its particles that formerly were being cooled become heated, 
and the dry presently become moist, and the light heavy, and they undergo 
every variety of change in every respect. For, as we maintain, it is only the 
addition or subtraction of the same substance from the same substance in 
the same order and in the same manner and in due proportion which will 
allow the latter to remain safe and sound in its sameness with itself. But 
whatsoever oversteps any of these conditions in its going out or its coming 
in will produce alterations of every variety and countless diseases and 
corruptions. (Timaeus 82a–b) 
 
What Plato depicts as the extremely difficult process to preserve the nature of 
things is what the second law of thermodynamics explains as the inevitable transfer of 
heat energy and the resulting increase of entropy (disorder) in closed systems. 
Degradation occurs because internal energy is transferred within different bodies in a 
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given system, and in this inevitable transfer process, energy is transformed and wasted 
until the process ends at a certain temperature in which there is no difference of heat 
between the inside and outside of a body. The only way to reverse this process of decay is 
by applying ‘work’ through an external energy source. So, if the system is for instance an 
ice cube with tight molecules, the natural process according to the second law is for these 
molecules to move more and more, and for energy to be transferred from the warmer 
parts to the colder ones, until the molecules have separated and spread out and the cube 
has completely melted. The only way to preserve the ice cube is to artificially keep the 
molecules tight by creating an environment below freezing level through the use of 
external energy. 
The same as an ice cube will inevitably melt at room temperature and cease to be 
an ice cube and become water, the constitution of a given state would be completely 
ruined by the entropy inevitably produced by its normal functioning, and turn into a 
different political order. From Kallipolis’ utopian aristocracy, according to Plato political 
forms would gradually degrade first into the lesser form of timocracy (the regime by the 
honorable), then into oligarchy (rule by the wealthy), then into democracy (based on 
equal share in political power and liberty) and finally into tyranny, the worst form of 
government that imposes “the harshest and most complete slavery.”26 Tyranny is for him 
an order that is the complete opposite of the virtuous aristocracy of the guardians, in 
which all citizens are virtuous and contribute in their particular roles to the harmony of 
the polis. Tyranny is for Plato anarchy, the transgression of natural hierarchies and the 
absence of rule. 
When developing his idea of political decay Plato’s target was the democracy of 
his own time. While he recognizes that liberty is the principle of democracy, he argues 
that liberty is itself a liability, a source of disorder because it results in individuals living 
according to “their own constitution,” having their own rules, pursuing only their own 
interests, and respecting no other authority but their own will.27 For Plato, corruption in a 
democracy would be the inevitable result of the equal distribution of liberty, which 
allows for the pursuit of individual interest and the consequent increase of “entropy” 
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within the constitutional framework. In other words, liberty as constitutive to the 
democratic regime is for Plato a liability that contaminates the public realm, weakening 
the possibility of arche and virtue, permanently undermining hierarchies, tradition, and 
rules, and making government prone to hubris and destined to injustice and tyranny.28  
Departing from Plato’s linear pattern of corruption as a gradual process of decay 
from aristocracy to tyranny, Aristotle argues for a typology of regimes based on the 
fundamental “diversifying antithesis” of genesis and phthora that exists in everything. 
Since “all things that come into existence in the course of nature are either opposites 
themselves or are compounded of opposites,” corruption can be analyzed as a movement 
“along the determined line between the terms of contrast; or (if we start from some 
intermediate state) the movement towards one of the extremes.”29 On this premise of the 
generative nature of opposites Aristotle bases one of his most original observations, with 
far-reaching political implications: that change comes about through the corruption of 
nature, that “change (µεταβολή) is primarily a ‘passing away’ (φθορᾶς).”30 Phthora, 
therefore, is an inevitable, natural force driving change in the physical world, working 
within bounded spheres determined by the opposition implied in the “coming into being” 
of a thing; each thing has a principle (or mixture of them) and it is its realization what 
brings about corruption. Every thing begins to corrupt the moment it is fully realized, and 
metabole occurs when that realization is fully negated.    
Since “all things arose out of what existed, and so must be there already,”31 
according to Aristotle every constitution would have constitutive principles that would 
become fully realized, enabling its demise. The degree of corruption of constitutions 
would relate to the movement within its extremes. Following this idea, Aristotle 
conceived of three good constitutions (kingship, aristocracy, and politeia) based on the 
nature of the sovereign (one, few, or many) and their final cause (ruling for the common 
interest, eudaimonia), and their corresponding perverted forms brought about by 
corruption (tyranny, oligarchy, and democracy) aimed not at advancing the common 
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good but at satisfying the personal interests of the rulers.32 There is much debate about 
the fundamental feature of the ideal politeia in Aristotle’s thought. While some define 
politeia as a combination of democracy and oligarchy, and thus a mixed government in 
which the interest of the few and the many keep each other in check,33 others emphasize 
its “constitutional” character given that the ultimate authority would reside on 
fundamental law and not on the will of the majority.34 I would argue these interpretations 
are not mutually exclusive. 
As Aristotle described in On the Constitution of Athens and the Politics, Athenian 
democracy during his time corresponded to the most extreme and corrupt form of 
democracy —the absolute rule of the many for their own benefit. In his classification of 
regimes, he identified four types of democracy based on the social basis of the sovereign, 
the degree of participation in government, and the supremacy of the law. The first three 
types of democracy, in which the masses share equally in constitutional rights but are 
unable, due to material constrains, to actually exercise their sovereign power, the rule of 
law is supreme and thus Aristotle considered them as ‘good,’ constitutional forms of 
government. The fourth type of democracy, however, which he identifies with the 
Athenian democracy of his time, is inherently corrupt since the “mass of the poor,” 
thanks to a system of state-payment for attending the assembly, are “the sovereign power 
instead of the law.”35 This ‘extreme’ form of democracy is brought about by “leaders of 
the demagogue type,” who arrive precisely because decrees and not laws are sovereign, 
enabling the transformation of the sovereign demos into a type of despotic autocrat.36 
This form of government has no proper constitution, since the people are sovereign in all 
matters,37 and is easily influenced by demagogues who have no official position other 
than the one conferred by the contingent favor of the masses. Demagogues educate the 
poor on how to advance their own interests, increasing their power,38 and thus are the 
agents of corruption, enabling interest to be made into law. The full realization of equal 
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share in government appears then to inevitably produce regime change since such a 
regime, in which “everything is managed merely by decrees, is not even a democracy.”39 
In Aristotle’s particular historical account of Athens’ history, demagoguery 
plagued the state since the rise of Pericles, who not only “took powers away from the 
Areopagites” but also “impelled the state toward naval power [and] as a result of this 
power it befell that the masses took confidence and began in greater degree to draw the 
whole constitution into their hands.”40 Thus, departing from Thucydides’ account of 
Athenian history, which puts total control of government in the masses after Pericles’ 
death in 429 BC, Aristotle argues that the extreme form of democracy begun three 
decades earlier with the reforms of the Areopagus, which enabled a regime change 
(metabole).41 While the absolute liberty the assembly gained after the last aristocratic 
constraints were removed would mark the beginning of regime change, the complete 
realization of democracy occurs only when the principle of equal access to political 
power is fully applied.  
Even though a corrupt state implies for Aristotle a loss of virtue both by rulers 
and common citizens, he is very clear that virtue depends on the appropriate legal 
structure to thrive. Because virtue is not natural to human beings, but needs to be 
acquired by habit and action, the degree of virtue and corruption in the polis is 
determined by the law and its effects on the members of the state.42 In Aristotle’s 
account, good character —desire in accord with right reason— cannot exist without 
habituation. Moral virtue is difficult to acquire because it is concerned with pleasures and 
pains, the discipline of the appetites, and the internalization of social norms. Therefore, 
the right habituation must be learned from others and exercised constantly to create a sort 
of second, moral nature.  
For pleasure causes us to do base actions, and pain causes 
us to abstain from fine ones. That is why we need to have 
had the appropriate upbringing—right from early youth, as 
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Plato says—to make us find enjoyment or pain in the right 
things; for this is the correct education.43  
 
At the political level, it is the legislator who, grasping the principles of the 
common good, creates a constitution that can make “the citizens good by habituating 
them.”44 Good laws make good citizens by providing them with the principles of virtuous 
action, the form to which they should shape their character; the legal framework 
materializes the universal principles guiding action toward the common good, providing 
both the limits and the opportunities to engage in virtuous action. The same can be said 
for corrupt action (preferring individual/sectional interest against that of the polis), as 
being enabled by the legal structure, with the crucial difference that corruption is a 
natural tendency that will exist regardless of laws. Therefore, each regime needs to 
habituate their citizens appropriately through good laws aimed at fostering moral and 
civic virtue against relentless, unavoidable corruption. If they fail to do this and laws 
become inadequate, allowing and even fostering greed and the thirst for domination in the 
sovereign, citizens become habituated in this way and the polis inevitably becomes a 
corrupt state. Democracy as absolute, unconstrained rule by the people, a form of 
government effectively lacking a constitution as higher law, is thus for Aristotle 
inherently corrupt. 
Despite their different theories of constitutions, both Plato and Aristotle agree that 
political corruption occurs in pure regimes due to a loss of virtue in the sovereign body 
when personal interests take the place of the common good as the final cause of 
government. If viewed from the second law of thermodynamics, the process of political 
corruption as phthora could be conceived as the natural increase of entropy generated by 
the pursuit of individual/sectional interest against the common good within a given 
constitutional framework. This lose of virtue in the ruling body would mark the 
beginning of the end of a given good constitution, if no constant or episodic external 
‘work’ is applied to it to counteract the thrust of actions aimed at the satisfaction of 
partial interests. Moreover, because corruption and the increase of entropy inevitably 
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produce a change of nature and thus an effective modification of the constitution of the 
state, the quest for virtue is connected to the idea of preservation against corruption.  
Aristotle aims at counteracting corruption by proposing as the best form of 
government one based on a mixture of natures and principles, in which both the few and 
the many share in government, and the majority of citizens are part of the middle classes. 
Aristotle’s politeia is a constitutional direct democracy in which “the masses govern the 
state with a view to the common interest,”45 and the masses are composed mainly of the 
middle classes, who possess “moderate and adequate property.”46 This best “practicable” 
constitution— an intermediate regime between the extremes of oligarchy and 
democracy— would successfully combine qualifications of wealth and legal equality 
because the middle classes, as majority, would effectively control government.  
Being a mixture of constitutions and thus in an intermediate position, one could 
argue that, following Aristotle’s ideas on corruption, the politeia as an ideal type could 
become corrupt by tending either to oligarchy or democracy. However, the same as Plato, 
he only entertains a corrupting tendency towards democracy, even if from his ideas of the 
nature of things it is clear that things that are in intermediate positions inevitably drift 
toward either of the extremes that define them. The same as a politeia would suffer 
metabole if the principle of equal share in government is fully realized, if the principle of 
oligarchy —inequality based on wealth, status, knowledge— becomes predominant and 
driven to its extreme —with a handful of people owning most of the property— the 
politeia would inevitably undergo a regime change into an oligarchy, a regime 
“analogous to the last form of democracy” in which the sovereign is unbound to seek its 
own advantage, “closely akin to the personal rule of a monarch.”47  
Extending Aristotle’s taxonomy of good and deviant constitutions, and combining 
it with Empedocles’ cosmological theory of cyclical change,48 the Greek historian 
Polybius, who documented the rise of the Roman republic from 264 to 146 BC, 
articulated a “cycle of political revolution, the course appointed by nature in which 
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constitutions change, disappear, and finally return to the point from which they started.”49 
According to his anacyclosis, pure regimes, starting from the best one —kinship then 
aristocracy and finally democracy— are bound to degenerate into their deviant forms, 
until the tyranny of the many establishes the rule of violence, and the people “degenerate 
again into perfect savages and find once more a master and monarch.”50  
For Polybius corruption is inevitable in pure regime forms.  
just as rust in the case of iron and wood-worms and ship-
worms in the case of timber are inbred pests, and these 
substances, even though they escape all external injury, fall 
a prey to the evils engendered in them, so each constitution 
has a vice engendered in it and inseparable from it.51  
 
Following Aristotle he argues only mixture could stave off corruption. However, 
instead of combining the worse two regime types as Aristotle did, following the example 
of Lycurgus, Polybius argues we must regard as the best constitution a combination of 
the three best forms of government —kinship, aristocracy, and democracy— which he 
conceived as forms of limited government. While the king’s actions were bounded by 
rational principles, and aristocratic rule was limited by the morality and wisdom of the 
few selected to administrate public affairs, democracy was the regime in which majority 
decision prevailed within a traditional framework of popular obedience to the dictates of 
religion, elders, and civil laws.52  
The Roman constitution was of a mixed nature because it institutionalized these 
three sources of authority, which shared “in the control of the Roman state.”53 While the 
Consuls exercise authority in Rome over all public affairs, the Senate exerted control 
over the republic’s finances and public works, in addition to dispatching embassies and 
declaring war, and giving advice to magistrates.54 The people, on the other hand, had the 
“right to confer honors and inflict punishment,” especially on individuals who had held 
public office, and the power of approving or rejecting laws and ratifying issues related to 
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war and peace.55 These three forms of authority and institutional power were, moreover, 
in permanent dynamic balance in a system in which “none of the principles should grow 
unduly and be perverted into its allied evil, but that, the force of each being neutralized 
by that of the others, neither of them should prevail and outbalance another.” 56 
Corruption in this mixed regime, which Polybius associates to the Roman republic, is not 
the full realization of an antithesis, but the result of an imbalance of political power in the 
constitution, which allows for the domination of one of the principles/factions over the 
others. However, Polybius does not acknowledge the corruption slowly unraveling at the 
moment he was writing the Histories. 
Even if by the late Republic the Plebian Tribunate appeared as a strong institution 
able not only to give protection to individuals against the Consuls, but also to obstruct the 
Senate and initiate legislation, it was unable to ultimately thwart the overgrowth of the 
power of the nobility. The republic kept progressively drifting into oligarchy mainly due 
to the cooptation of tribunes into patrician ranks and the Senate’s disregard of the 
legislative authority of the Plebeian Council.57 The tumults that resulted from this 
disregard of plebeian authority plagued the late Roman republic, and served as a catalyst 
for regime change and the birth of imperial authority. 
 
II.  Individual Corruption and the Machiavellian Challenge  
The translation of phthora into the Latin root corruptus kept its abstract meaning 
of destruction and decay at the systemic level58 alongside a substantive, moral meaning 
related to individual political actions: to bribe, falsify, seduce or pervert.59 It was mainly 
Cicero who used the word corruptus in a political sense to refer to the decay of mores 
and the “depravity of evil custom”60 as the culprit of the decline of Rome. Following 
closely Plato’s analysis of the corruption of democracy, Cicero blames the decay of the 
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republic to the success of the “extreme liberty” that inevitably reaches everything in a 
commonwealth in which everyone is free and “all sense of shame is lost.”61 This 
individual moral meaning of corruptus was further developed during medieval times in 
which the sinful nature of human beings took center stage. Following closely the 
Ciceronian legacy, Augustine famously argued all earthly governments are inherently 
corrupt because rooted in the original sin, and veered the focus of analysis to civic 
stability as the highest attainable political good. This approach spawned more than ten 
centuries of “mirror of princes” texts centered on the moral virtue of rulers as a form of 
achieving stability and good rule.  
After the reintroduction of Aristotle to philosophical inquiry in the thirteenth 
century, political analyses on virtue and corruption shifted once more from the moral 
qualities of individual rulers towards the institutional merits of political regimes. Within 
scholastic thought, Aquinas fused moral values to the Aristotelian conception of “right 
reason” producing a new political meaning of virtue and corruption associated with the 
res publica christiana. 62  Political corruption was once again associated with the 
preference for individual interest against the common good63 but remained pegged to 
Christian morality and the Augustinian framework that conceived of civic stability as the 
highest political goal, and of civic discord as a sign of corruption. As Quentin Skinner 
shows, scholastic thought had a significant impact on the new humanist strand that 
developed in early quattrocento Florence, which attempted to defend the republican 
experiment in scholastic terms based primarily on virtue ethics.64  It is in this Ciceronian-
scholastic humanist legacy —according to which political corruption is reduced to 
individual vicious actions— that our current juridical conception of corruption is 
grounded.65  
A crucial challenge to the scholastic view of political corruption centered on 
individual virtue came from a “civic” strand of humanist thinkers from the Italian city-
states being threatened by papacy and empire in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. 
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Reintroducing Ancient Roman political values, this humanist tradition brought to the fore 
the political concept of liberty as connected to civic virtue and good, popular 
government,66 and put corruption as an evil in need of permanent contention in their 
proposed constitutional designs. Even if Machiavelli was not the first thinker of the 
Renaissance to focus on the role of corruption in politics, according to Skinner he reveals 
a “heightened awareness of the problem, and devote[s] an unprecedented amount of 
attention to the investigation of its causes.”67 By challenging humanists’ virtue ethics and 
their support for the rule by an educated elite as the best form of government, Machiavelli 
proposes a structural understanding of corruption that puts the burden of good 
government on institutions, laws, and procedures rather than individual actions by the 
ruling elite. While ‘virtue-ethics’ humanists saw virtue in the ruling class as the key to 
good government,68 for Machiavelli republican liberty was the result of good laws, which 
are themselves the product of the institutional conflict between the few and the many.69  
Machiavelli’s preoccupation with political corruption was embedded in the 
extraordinary democratic experiment of the republic of Florence, which begun in 1494 
with the establishment of the Great Council, a form of direct democracy that allowed for 
extensive citizen participation in legislative, electoral, and judicial authority within the 
republic. Despite the extensive powers of the Council, the republic remained effectively 
dependent on the financial oligarchy due to its reliance on mercenary armies that were 
paid by an extraordinary system of public debt. According to Jérémie Barthas, as 
Secretary and Second Chancellor of the republic, Machiavelli saw as his central task to 
liberate the republic from the grip of the financial oligarchy through the introduction of a 
project of mass conscription, an “ordinary and socialized mode of defense” that would 
establish the autonomy of the Republic of Florence from the financial power of the 
grandi.70 I argue Machiavelli’s conception of corruption needs to be understood as 
connected to this constant threat of oligarchic power, and thus his constitutional 
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proposals should be analyzed as socialized modes of defense against the relentless force 
of political decay.  
Following the Aristotelian definition of political corruption as the favoring of 
individual interests instead of the common good, in History of Florence Machiavelli 
defines a corrupt state as the one in which “laws and ordinances, peace, wars, and treaties 
are adopted and pursued, not for the public good, not for the common glory of the state, 
but for the convenience or advantage of a few individuals.”71 Since for Machiavelli men 
are by nature wicked and fickle, prone to breaking the rules72 “at every chance for their 
own profit,”73 every form of government has a natural tendency toward corruption. Even 
though a good foundation can counteract this egotistic inclination, it does not eliminate it, 
so the degeneration of political rule is a constant threat that needs to be averted through 
extraordinary measures.74  
In his analysis of corruption, Machiavelli distinguishes three interrelated 
elements: matter, form, and method. In a city the matter is constituted by the citizens, the 
form by the laws, and the methods by the rules and procedures for selecting magistrates 
and making laws.75 Even if Machiavelli certainly denounces “gifts” and “promises” as 
frequent means to corrupt individuals,76 and agrees with Cicero that a corrupt government 
necessarily entails corrupt mores, his conception of corruption is decisively institutional 
and his analysis thus focuses on the rules and procedures that enable citizens to exert 
domination. For Machiavelli the corrupting process does not begin in the matter 
(governed in part by the unavoidable egoistic tendencies of individuals) but on the form 
restraining individual interest and the methods by which rulers are selected. Individual 
interest is a force permanently trying to unduly influence government but only 
succeeding, and thus effectively corrupting the republic, if laws and methods are flawed 
and liberty’s scaffolding is already being slowly dismantled from within: “an evil-
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disposed citizen cannot effect any changes for the worse in a republic, unless it be already 
corrupt.”77   
For Machiavelli good laws promote civic virtue, and bad laws enable general 
corruption. Throughout his writings he identifies two types of corrupting norms 
promoting two forms of evil: license and socio-economic inequality. Referring to the case 
of Scipio —“that most excellent man, not only of his own times but within the memory 
of man, against whom, nevertheless, his army rebelled in Spain”78 —Machiavelli makes 
the case that norms allowing for increased license bring ruin even to the most glorious 
men and institutions. Scipio was called “the corrupter of the Roman soldiery” because he 
was too lenient and “gave his soldiers more license than is consistent with military 
discipline,”79 which encouraged them to become unruly.80  And the same as good, 
disciplined soldiers became bad and rowdy through the lifting of restraints to their 
behavior, the general corruption of mores is allowed to begin when  
the laws that restrained the citizens were often altered, such 
as the law relating to adultery, the sumptuary laws, that in 
relation to ambition, and many others, which were changed 
according as the citizens from one day to another became 
more and more corrupt.81  
 
In addition to promoting moral license and undermining virtue, laws play a key 
role in allowing for inequality, which ultimately makes the protection of liberty and the 
republican project impossible. Because republics need relative equality to exist —great 
inequality produces princedom, relative equality is conducive to republican rule—82 if 
laws allow for accumulation of wealth in the hands of a few and the destitution of the 
majority, the gradual transition from good government into a corrupt one is inevitable. 
Because Machiavelli sees the republic as a type of political organization that is inherently 
tied to the socioeconomic structure of society, republican liberty demands that citizens 
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live in relative equality, in a correspondence based on individual labor and frugality. For 
Machiavelli lords (gentiloumini) “who without working live in luxury on the returns from 
their landed possessions” are dangerous for any republic; they are the beginners of 
“corruption and the causes of all evil.”83  
But even if Machiavelli strongly denounces wealthy elites and their great 
influence as “the cause of states being reduced to servitude,”84 he also acknowledges that 
a “republic that has no distinguished citizens cannot be well governed”85 and that it is the 
job of the institutions of the state to adequately channel individual interest for the benefit 
of the republic. Bad laws enable undue influence on government from “fatal families” 
and the division of society into factions that “will strive by every means of corruption to 
secure friends and supporters” in order to satisfy their interests.86 Good laws, on the other 
hand, establish necessity and duty to create virtuous citizens and make sure the influence 
of wealth “is kept within proper limits”87 by prohibiting the legal ability to command 
enormous fortunes, castles, and subjects.88 Anti-corruption laws putting limits to the 
command of wealth and patronage are thus essential to preserve a good constitutional 
form. 
Even though in Machiavelli’s theory fundamental laws make good citizens89 by 
establishing appropriate limits, rights, and duties, it is for him on the methods were the 
burden of the maintenance of the constitution and the virtue of the citizens appears to be 
finally placed. Because human affairs are in constant flux, and the matter is not 
homogenous but composed of two opposing humors (the desire to oppress and to be left 
alone), there is a dynamic relation between form and matter, laws and men. Therefore, 
the methods regulating the creation of law and the exercise of power, the procedures 
allowing for the institutional balance between the elite and the people, are crucial. Good 
laws are not enough to shape good citizens and keep corruption at bay; an appropriate 
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method of allocating political power and the management of state rule —good procedures 
aimed at non-domination— is also necessary. It is at this point in his analysis that 
Machiavelli criticizes, as vehicles for corruption, what are the two most fundamental 
elements of our current liberal representative systems: elections and free speech. 
Using as an example the Roman republic, Machiavelli describes how corruption 
derived from inequality at the political level ultimately undermined the constitutional 
order. The procedure for the selection of magistrates, based on voluntary candidacy, and 
the right to propose legislation and speak in the assembly, even though were in the 
beginning good, allowing for the most able to become magistrates and for “each one who 
thinks of something of benefit to the public” to have the right to propose it,90 were the 
means through which corruption crept into the political system, undermining liberty:  
such a basic custom became bad, because only the powerful proposed 
laws, not for the common liberty but for their own power, and for fear of 
such men no one dared to speak against those laws. Thus the people were 
either deceived or forced into decreeing their own ruin.91  
 
While the procedure of election, based on the political equality to compete for 
office, brought corruption through the self-selection of candidates, the right to speak in 
the assembly, what for Athenian democracy constituted the fundamental principle of 
isegoria, became the vehicle through which the powerful imposed their values and ideas 
on the many, forcing their consent. The rights to election and political speech, at least as 
they were originally conceived, were thus the mediums through which corruption through 
hegemony92 was imposed, creating a state in which the many chose and decreed their 
own ruin, undermined their actual power and destroyed the republic. Consequently, for 
Machiavelli it is when the grandi dominate the popolo based on their own (forced) 
consent, by creating through deed and speech a narrative of their worldview which is 
gradually accepted as legitimate, that the matter is corrupted and laws are not enough to 
maintain liberty. In other words, when socio-economic inequalities permeate the political 
process and laws are consistently being made (or not approved) for the interest of the 
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few, amidst generalized complacency, universal corruption ends up transforming the 
republic into a tyrannical government. This gradual corruption of the republic into 
oligarchy happens then not despite institutions and procedures, but enabled by them. 
At least two lessons are to be learnt from what Machiavelli discovered in the 
examples of the Ancients: that neither the matter or the form are inherently virtuous, and 
that even if the matter has been made good through an original virtuous form, the form is 
not enough to keep citizens good when corruption has been introduced through legitimate 
political methods and has become pervasive. Moreover, when the matter is corrupt, the 
form and the methods do nothing more than fostering corruption, and republics 
increasingly drift into an oligarchy of consent through the natural functioning of its 
methods.  
 
III.  Institutional Corruption and Corrupting Dependence 
 
 As seen from a longue durée perspective, it is clear that the concept of political 
corruption was meant to account for a systemic phenomenon, a layer of great explanatory 
value that was almost entirely dropped from theoretical analysis after the eighteenth 
century, when corruption was reduced to its current juridical form. While the ancients 
thought of corruption as inherent to everything, and thus inescapable for political forms, 
Machiavelli was perhaps the only modern thinker to engage, at length, with the problem 
of universal corruption as a constitutional challenge. I argue we need to pick up this lost 
thread of thinking that conceptualized political corruption as systemic, and draw the 
contours of this structural form of political corruption for our present time. This 
alternative meaning of corruption should be seen as complementing, instead of replacing, 
political corruption as individual acts of misconduct by public officials, since particular 
instances of corruption are expressions of a universal phenomenon that cannot be reduced 
to their aggregation. This attempt at rethinking political corruption from a republican 
approach is meant to contribute to an emerging literature that has been assertive in 
criticizing the neo-republican interpretation of corruption (for not being different enough 
from the liberal conception) but not propositive enough. 
 The most prominent scholars to dedicate attention to corruption in republican 




contributions in bringing republican thought to the forefront during the last fours decades, 
I would argue their misreading of Machiavelli makes them unable to grasp the systemic 
nature of political corruption. This misreading is of course not rooted in their lack of 
knowledge about Machiavelli, but rather on their own fierce commitment to liberal 
democracy. To question the constitutional structure of a regime that was progressively 
becoming “the only game in town” in the last stages of the Cold War would have been 
perhaps ludicrous, especially after legal positivism and a minimalist procedural 
conception of democracy became hegemonic in the social sciences.93 But it is precisely 
the consolidation of liberal democracies —when, according to Adam Przeworski, the 
regime “becomes self-reinforcing” and “no one can imagine acting outside the 
democratic institutions”94— what for Aristotle would prompt metabole, allowing for 
systemic corruption to begin taking hold of institutions, relentlessly moving the regime 
into oligarchy. This drift was missed by mainstream academia, oblivious of rising 
inequality and its effects on the political system,95 dedicated to studying the institutional 
framework instead of appraising it, and thus unable to recognize systemic corruption and 
articulate a structural critique of liberal democracy. Republican theory was no exception 
to this blind spot. 
In his civic humanist reading of the Florentine Secretary, Pocock famously 
identifies in Machiavelli the emergence of contingency as an “irruption of temporality in 
political discourse,” which positioned republican thought as a radically immanent 
approach to theorizing the political.96 Nevertheless he understood Machiavellism as a 
mode of thought that pursued “universal values in transitory form,”97 minimizing both the 
role of institutional conflict to produce good laws and the radical creative force of virtù 
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during republican refoundings. In his recent critique of Pocock, Robert Sparling argues 
this Aristotelian reading of Machiavelli coupled with Pocock’s attempt to construct a 
conceptual continuous tradition of corruption from the early Renaissance to the late 
eighteenth century resulted in a misleading interpretation of political corruption and the 
pessimistic outlook derived from it. If corruption is connected to universal values that 
cannot be fully realized in any given institutional form, then corruption is perennial and 
liberty at most only partial. What Sparling misses in his critique is that Pocock chooses 
principles as the source of normativity because he neglects the pivotal role institutional 
conflict between the few and the many plays in Machiavelli’s theory of republican 
liberty. It is not constitutionalized principles what for Machiavelli keeps the republic free 
from corruption, but rather political conflict and periodic renewals of fundamental laws 
and institutions. 
The hopelessness to effectively deal with corruption in an era determined by 
commerce and self-interest also seems to run against Machiavelli’s account of virtù as an 
inherently contingent force, grounded on necessity and effectual truth (verità effetuale), 
capable of bringing republics back to their beginnings even in the case of universal 
corruption. Machiavelli’s project in the Discourses was to figure out how to reestablish 
liberty and then keep it. In his theory of foundings, Machiavelli argues that refounding a 
republic is the most glorious action because it is the most difficult —because of the 
strength with which individuals benefiting from corruption will defend the status quo— 
and thus we should not only admire the actions of extraordinary leaders such as Romulus, 
Lycurgus, and Solon, but also imitate them.98  As Sparling argues, in The Machiavellian 
Moment the language of corruption is one of “rhetorical excess and of moral absolutes,” 
which is neither coherent with the radical immanence of Machiavelli’s thought nor 
conducive to a republican critique of corruption in liberal democracies, serving more as 
“dynamite than foundation”99 for reformers aimed at dealing with the threat of oligarchy.  
 Even if in Pocock’s interpretation of Machiavelli political corruption is an 
“irreversible, one-way process”100 of moral decay, and thus it is the degeneration of 
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customs and mores what renders the constitutional framework ineffective to reactivate 
civic virtue, it is Skinner who decisively positions corruption within the current liberal, 
juridical paradigm. As Amanda Maher shows in her critique of Skinner’s interpretation of 
Machiavelli, his humanist reading of the Florentine Secretary coupled with his project to 
combine civic participation and negative liberty obscured the “sociological foundations 
of political corruption in Machiavelli’s republicanism.”101 Skinner reduces corruption to a 
sinful disposition, to being unable “to devote one’s energies to the common good,”102 “a 
failure of rationality”103 that can be best counteracted by promoting civic virtue and a 
sense of patriotism in the citizenry. Even if he acknowledges both the role of institutions 
in fostering virtue through participation and the connection between corruption and the 
capture of the state by oligarchs, the same as Cicero Skinner puts the burden of liberty on 
the virtue of individual citizens instead of on institutions, procedures, and material 
conditions. Because he detaches this “ineptitude for a free way of life”104 from its 
fundamental cause —inequality— in his analysis Skinner is unable to account for the 
structural conditions that determine individuals’ public spirit incompetence. 
 Systematizing Skinner’s interpretation of Machiavelli, Philip Pettit put forward a 
theory of republicanism based on the conceptualization of republican liberty as the lack 
of arbitrary interference. Despite Pettit’s important contribution to the decoupling of 
domination from interference —broadening the conception of negative liberty to account 
for domination even in the absence of interference— his conception of corruption is even 
further removed from Machiavelli’s than that of Pocock’s and Skinner’s. By reducing 
domination to arbitrary power Pettit is unable to escape laws and procedures as 
parameters for arbitrariness and legitimacy, and thus his theory of liberty as non-
domination creates a problem of endogeneity with respect to corruption. If domination is 
defined by arbitrary power, and what is considered arbitrary is determined by the legal 
regime, then there is no external referent to judge laws and procedures in terms of their 
potential corrupting tendencies.  
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Even if Pettit conceives interference as being non-arbitrary if it “track[s] the 
interests and ideas of those who suffer the interference,”105 this surely can only apply to 
interference coming from the state, leaving interpersonal relations of domination largely 
unaccounted for. One could not reasonably expect that individual contracts must track 
equally the interests and ideas of all the parties involved —at least not in our capitalist 
societies in which relations of production are necessarily unequal. Moreover, because for 
Pettit liberty as non-domination is advanced “through a legal regime stopping people 
from dominating one another without itself dominating anyone in turn,” the burden of 
keeping this basic constitutional structure free from corruption relies on citizens’ 
“virtuous vigilance” and their effective contestation through institutional mechanisms.106 
However, while citizen’s civic judgment might be “clouded by uncivic inclinations born 
of radical material inequalities,”107 institutional mechanisms might be too corrupt to 
allow for meaningful input and reform.  
In Pettit’s framework, if a citizen suffers domination she has the civic duty to 
contest it through a process that on the ground tends to be time-consuming and 
frustrating. From a collective action perspective, to expect aggrieved citizens to stand up 
for their interests, given the high costs involved in claim procedures, is wishful 
thinking.108 To put the burden on keeping corruption at bay on individual agency is thus a 
recipe for disaster because it allows for the silent, gradual, apparently consented slip into 
oligarchy. Pettit is unable to see that material conditions determine the possibility of civic 
virtue —there is no vigilance when mere survival is at stake, and one does not need to be 
in abject poverty to be overwhelmed enough to remain passive instead of seeking redress 
when wronged. In addition to time-consuming, dealing with bureaucracy and the courts is 
not a particularly pleasant experience, and thus placing the struggle against domination in 
the hands of individual citizens seems, from a realist point of view, not very different 
from leaving institutions to their own devices. 
Recognizing the institutional corruption that the neo-republican conception of 
corruption neglects, in the mid-1990s there were increasing attempts in the fields of 
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ethics to challenge the prevailing positivist, individualist approach to political corruption, 
which pushed the focus of corruption studies towards the political structure. Dennis  
Thompson was the first to identify a type of corruption that is institutional, “usually built 
into the routines and practices of organizations,” that pertains to actions that tend to 
undermine institutions’ normal processes, frustrating their primary purposes. 109 
Corruption is for him the “condition in which private interests distort public purposes by 
influencing the government in disregard of the democratic process.”110 He highlights the 
case of democratic elections in which laws allowing for private financing of campaigns 
and lobby generate institutional corruption by enabling the distortion of public purposes 
by private interests.  
Building on this perspective, Lawrence Lessig argues that institutional corruption 
is the outmost threat to democracy because it promotes “corrupting dependence”111 based 
on material relations of subordination, which undermines citizens’ trust on democratic 
institutions. According to Lessig, corruption should be understood as:  
a systemic and strategic influence which is legal, or even currently ethical, 
that undermines the institution’s effectiveness by diverting it from its 
purpose or weakening its ability to achieve its purpose, including, to the 
extent relevant to its purpose, weakening either the public’s trust in that 
institution or the institution’s inherent trustworthiness.112  
 
Corruption occurs when institutions deviate from their “intended dependence,” 
what Lessig deems their “magnetic north,” because of a competing dependence that 
skews institutions’ public compass. Seen from this perspective, campaign finance laws 
would enable institutional corruption not only because it facilitates the distortion of 
public purposes but, more importantly, because they normalize and foster the dependence 
of elected representatives on their financiers rather than on voters.  
Despite the important contribution of the institutionalist approach to corruption, 
which allows us to see more clearly the corrupting dependence fostered by electoral rules 
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and the normal functioning of representative institutions, its functionalist definition 
leaves open the problem of determining the proper objective of government and therefore 
it is unable to provide a systemic account of corruption beyond the direct link between 
financiers and elected representatives. Moreover, it has been argued that corruption might 
even be functional to the primary purpose of institutions since some forms of clientelism 
may result in a more efficient delivery of goods and services, depending on the relative 
weakness of the state; if an institution is inefficient and unable to fulfill its task, patron-
client relations may increase its efficiency, allowing it to fulfill its goal. 113 Finally, 
because it does not provide for criteria for the “magnetic north” of government, 
institutional corruption seems to be applicable only to particular institutions in relation to 
the political structure, taking basic institutional and procedural arrangements as a 
given.114  
 Perhaps as a way of salvaging the neo-republican tradition, Sparling suggests 
republican thought should incorporate this institutionalist conception of corruption by 
conceiving domination as a form of dependence. Since liberal democracies have 
eradicated “dominating dependence,” Sparling argues republican theory should focus on 
analyzing and averting “corrupting dependence,” which is the dependence “at issue in 
systemic corruption.”  Even if I agree that republican thought needs a new theory of 
freedom to account for this type of systemic corruption,115 and that it is necessary to 
identify socio-economic inequality and an “unbalanced regime”116 form as the structural 
origins of corruption, Sparling’s attempt to reduce corruption to a form of dependence 
seems to me misguided. First, because dependence is not inherently corrupting, the need 
for a substantive agreement on what kind of dependence would be considered corrupting 
would still be needed. Second, if corruption is the opposite of civic virtue, it has more to 
do with the prevalence of interest against the common good rather than directly with 
dependence —corrupting dependence being the result of corruption. And finally, 
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reducing corruption to dependence does not allow us to escape interpersonal relations as 
the locus of corruption, leaving us unable to properly define systemic corruption 
structurally.  
 
IV. Systemic Corruption and the Oligarchization of Power 
 
In his essay analyzing the problems associated with developing an encompassing 
definition of political corruption, Mark Philp argued that the main challenge any such 
definition encounters is that it presupposes a notion of an ideal, uncorrupt form of 
political rule.117 If democracy should be understood as a procedural,118 deliberative119 or 
radical120 political form is in itself a controversial issue. I do not wish to contribute to this 
debate but simply to identify a minimal condition of good popular government.  
Following Aristotle’s logic, representative government could be conceived both 
as a compound ideal type defined by its terms of contrast, and as an intermediate political 
regime that moves towards one of its extremes. Being a hybrid regime composed of the 
principles of democracy and liberalism, a minimal definition of an ideal liberal 
democracy would be a regime that fully realizes its democratic and liberal ends: to 
accurately represent the interests of the majority within the limits imposed by individual 
rights and separation of powers. The complete opposite of this ideal type would be an 
unrepresentative illiberal government, in which neither the interests of the majority nor 
basic norms are respected. This corrupt government would fall within the Ancient 
definition of tyranny, in which those in power benefit themselves without any limitations 
on their will but their own power of coercion. 
From the perspective not of principles but of the regime’s ruling element, given 
that representative government is factually a collection of individuals elected by citizens 
to make law and policy decisions, this minimalist conception of an ideal type of liberal 
democracy would be akin to a constitutional electoral aristocracy: a government by the 
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few (the best, wisest, most representative) chosen by the majority to rule within 
established constitutional limitations. Seen through a republican lens, the corrupt form 
that completely negates liberal democracy would be then an illiberal oligarchy: a 
government by few, for the benefit of few, without constitutional constraints. Even if 
everyone would agree that a government that does not represent the majority and does not 
respect rights is no longer a democracy, this analysis is not helpful for developing a 
definition for systemic corruption, which thrives within highly guarded constitutional 
frameworks. 
If we conceive this ideal type as an intermediate regime that corrupts by moving 
towards either of its extremes, liberal democracy would corrupt by becoming either 
unrepresentative of the majority, or illiberal, depending on what principle is being 
undermined or realized. Therefore, a liberal democracy could corrupt and become either 
1) an oligarchic democracy, a non-representative liberal government in which individual 
rights and separation of powers are upheld but the interests of the majority are 
consistently not represented, or 2) an illiberal democracy, a representative but illiberal 
government in which the majority’s interests trump the rights of minorities. While an 
oligarchic democracy is still a democracy in which there are ‘free and fair’ elections and 
formal individual rights are protected, an illiberal democracy is a totalitarian form of 
government in which human rights of minorities are systematically violated.  
Even if certainly there have been examples of these three corrupt forms of 
government —illiberal oligarchy, oligarchic democracy, and illiberal democracy— the 
type of systemic corruption republican thinkers were most concerned about, and that is 
ubiquitous today, is the gradual decay of “representativeness” and the increasing 
oligarchization of government and society within a general respect for the rule of law. A 
conception of systemic corruption thus needs to be connected to increasing socio-
economic inequality, which enables inequality of political influence and the drift into 
oligarchic democracy, a regime in which citizens empower, through their ballots, those 
who enable their own dispossession and oppression.  
Perhaps the first contour we need to draw to accurately define systemic corruption 
is its political nature. Currently, political corruption relates to fraudulent action involving 




Given the complex relation between corruption and the law, a definition that focuses 
mainly on the agents of corruption and their exchanges seems inappropriate to 
conceptualize the systemic layer of political corruption. The conception of institutional 
corruption, even if a step in the right direction —away from the mainly juridical 
conception— is also unable to appropriately track the oligarchic component of systemic 
corruption given its ungrounded functionalism that avoids substantive definitions of 
primary purposes. I would argue systemic corruption in liberal democracies should be 
understood as a long-term, slow-moving process of oligarchization of society’s political 
structure, and thus it should be analyzed at the macro level. Instead of looking at the 
inputs of political corruption (undue influence, which is hard to prove and thus 
prosecute), we should focus rather on its outputs, as anything pertaining to rules, 
procedures, and institutions that has the effect of benefiting the wealthy at the expense of 
the majority. We need to move away from intention and towards the consequences of 
political corruption to identify and measure its structural character. 
Following the Ancients’ insights on systemic corruption as an inevitable and 
progressive process, the first major implication of this alternative meaning of political 
corruption would be that our liberal democracies would not be exempt from this 
degenerative movement because of the individual liberty they guarantee. This awareness 
would make us recognize not only the folly and presumptuousness of the modern and 
contemporary men who believe their institutional creations were close to perfection, but 
more importantly to acknowledge that our constitutional systems are inherently flawed 
and in need of immediate and periodic repair due to the high degree of “entropy” they 
allow for.  
The second implication, which was so evident for the Ancients as for modern 
republican thinkers like Machiavelli, is that the law is not necessarily a source of virtue, 
and that not all constitutional forms are virtuous enough to counteract natural and 
relentless corrupting tendencies. Consequently, what is legal is not necessarily virtuous, 
and what is corrupt is not necessarily illegal. Campaign finance and lobbying regulations, 
which legalized forms of bribery and undue influence, are an example of this. If we take 
as a premise that all constitutions and the laws they produce could tend to foster 




thinkers argue is the mark of liberty, becomes evident. As we saw in Machiavelli’s work, 
corruption is the vehicle for oppression and it originates not only in individuals but also 
in laws, and thus the rule of law must not be necessarily understood as a source of liberty. 
Because laws can be manipulated and used as tools for oppression, the rule of law 
appears not only as an inadequate measure of liberty, but also as an extremely 
problematic one since it could actually tend to uphold and sustain domination instead of 
combating it. 
 A third implication comes from qualifying political corruption as pertaining to 
rules, procedures, and institutions that affect the socio-political realm: there is an 
inevitable enlargement of the scope of the phenomenon. If the mark of political 
corruption is the advancement of individual/sectional interest against those of the 
majority, then we could think as being corrupt not only laws and policies actively 
favoring the wealthy, and consider as corrupting ideologies those that have this 
consequence when implemented, but also the negligence of law- and policymakers to 
counteract oligarchic outcomes, passively letting the wealthy keep further enriching 
themselves. Because conceiving political corruption in terms of its systemic effects 
allows us to separate corruption from individual immoral disposition and its immediate, 
tangible actions, ideologies such as neoliberalism —which has the effect of increasing 
socio-economic inequality and thus the power of the wealthy—121 and governmental 
inaction, such as the lack of proper regulation in the financial system —which ultimately 
enabled the last global economic crisis and the transfer of wealth from the many to the 
few—122 could be conceived as forms of political corruption because they enable the 
further oligarchization of liberal democracy. 
 In terms of how we could attempt to measure systemic corruption, the only way to 
account for the drift into oligarchy would be to take into account the effects that the legal 
structure and governmental action have on society. And thus a corruption index should 
include, in addition to corruption laws, number of prosecutions, and opinion polls, 
                                                
121 An example of the implementation of neoliberalism at the constitutional level is Chile, which has the 
highest rate of inequality in the OECD and is among the 15 more unequal countries in the world.   
122 Between 2009 and 2012, the top 1% of US households captured 95% of total income gains, while the 
bottom 90% of households saw their income fall by 16%. Immanuel Saez and Thomas Piketty, "Income 
Inequality in the United States, 1913-1998" Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118(1), 2003, 1-39 (updated 
2015). Access: http://eml.berkeley.edu/~saez/. Individuals and institutions in Wall Street that contributed 




variables relating to the outputs of law and policy such as the degree of inequality, the 
gap between capital and labor, allocation of GDP among social classes, and 
regressive/progressive taxation schemes. This data is not only already available, but 
seems better suited for undertaking a comparison among countries than solely relying on 
laws, court records, and individual perceptions of corruption, which are in themselves 
conditioned by the legal political culture. 
If one agrees that the minimal normative expectation of liberal democracies is that 
governments should advance the interests of the majority within constitutional 
safeguards, increasing income inequality and the relative immiseration of the majority of 
citizens would be a sign of corruption. However, this insight is yet to be properly 
analyzed since our juridical, individualist conception of corruption prevents us from fully 
capturing its systemic nature and its effects on the exercise of individual liberties. 
Following Machiavelli’s analysis, if corruption is reduced to individual illegal actions, 
the relentless process of political degradation and loss of liberty is obscured. Individual 
pursuit of interest is an inevitable feature in a free state, and so it is the degradation of the 
constitutional constraints on undue influence on government. While the former cannot be 
eliminated, the latter must be acknowledged and remedied to keep corruption at bay.  
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 As the previous chapter argues, systemic political corruption should be conceived 
as an inescapable phenomenon, a constant threat to liberty that is endemic to all forms of 
government. The recognition of this relentless process of political decay prompted 
ancient and modern political thinkers to study existing constitutions and engage in 
perhaps the impossible task of designing the perfect regime: a political order that would 
be immune to the degradation of its institutions and procedures, and thus perennial, 
severed from the inevitable fate of decay and regime change. The theory of the mixed 
constitution —which can be traced back to Aristotle’s politeia, a mixture of oligarchy and 
democracy1— originated as a critique of pure, mono-archic constitutions, and proposed a 
realist cure for systemic corruption based on the institutionalization of different forms of 
power that are in constant expansion and limitation, checking each other following their 
own expansionary tendencies rather than purely out of virtue or legal obligation. 
In this chapter and the following I will show that there are two main 
interpretations of the theory of the mixed constitution, which are determined both by the 
degree of institutionalization of the powers of the few and the many, and the hierarchy 
given to each within the constitutional structure: 1) an elitist interpretation, developed 
                                                
1 Aristotle, Politics, IV.8 1293b; Pasquale Pasquino,“Machiavelli and Aristotle: The Anatomies of the 




from the vantage point of elites and thus conservative of the existing socio-economic 
hierarchies, arguing the few a) should rule —authorized and checked by the people— and 
b) have final decision-making power; and 2) a plebeian interpretation, developed from 
the experience of resistance of the common people against oligarchic domination, arguing 
the people a) should effectively control the few who govern by actively participating in 
politics through plebeian institutions and b) have final decision-making power. By setting 
apart elitist and plebeian interpretations of the mixed constitution, I am not only 
questioning the rather neat continuity that J.G.A. Pocock saw in modern republican 
thought from Machiavelli to the American Founders,2 but also proposing there can be a 
sharp distinction between schools of interpretation if we take as point of departure the 
position and role of the ‘popular’ element in the constitutional structure.3 Thus, instead of 
conceiving republican thought as exclusively divided between ancients and moderns,4 I 
argue the parting should be done, at least in terms of constitutional thought, between 
elitist and plebeian approaches to the constitution.5  
Plebeian interpretations of the mixed constitution, which would place the ultimate 
political judgment on the common people as guardians of liberty, have yielded only a 
handful of constitutional models, 6 with variations stemming from the proper 
institutionalization of popular authority. Elitist interpretations of the mixed constitution, 
on the other hand, have produced a range7 of constitutional models: from political orders 
having a highly institutionalized, but subordinate ‘popular power’ such as the one in 
James Harrington’s The Commonwealth of Oceana (1656), to constitutional frameworks 
like the majority of the ones we have today, completely lacking a popular institution but 
                                                
2 Even if Pocock recognized the different emphasis of Machiavellian, Harringtonian and post-Puritan 
republicanism, there is no sharp distinction between elitist and popular strands of republican thought. 
3 The distinction springs from John McCormick’s distinction between Machiavelli’s assembly-based model 
and Guicciardini’s electoral, senatorial model. Machiavellian Democracy, 9. 
4 See for example Paul Rahe, Republics Ancient and Modern: Vol. 2 (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 2010). 
5 I propose to make the distinction based on who should have final political decision-making power in a 
given constitution—the selected few or the common people. Perhaps this division is as arbitrary as one 
based on a historical epoch, but it is clear-cut and not based on a convention, but rather on a constitutional 
rule, which could help better distinguish different strands in the republican tradition of thought. 
6 Machiavelli, A Discourse on Remodeling the Government of Florence; Discourses 
7 Perhaps because the elitist interpretation of the mixed constitution was the only one preserved from the 
Ancients. Almost all written sources preserved from the Ancients were authored by members of the elite, 
and thus we have been analyzing democracy and the republic from the point of view of the critics of 




incorporating instead neutral, counter-majoritarian, unelected elite bodies to play the 
“democratic” role of checking on government.8  
My objective in this chapter is to present a compelling reading of the predominant 
elitist strand of interpretation of the mixed constitution by offering a reading of what 
Pocock called Atlantic republican thought. I trace the ideas, proposals, and philosophical 
justifications that yielded the current elitist-proceduralist interpretation of the republican 
constitution. I argue this interpretation is not only blind to forms of domination occurring 
within and through legal structures, but also complicit in their reproduction because of its 
uncritical engagement with the socio-economic hierarchies embedded in the status quo. 
The elitism of this strand of thought refers simply to the endorsement of elites —those 
who are distinct from the common people either by birth, wealth, knowledge, popularity 
or technical expertise— as being better suited to rule and have final decision-making 
power. The particular procedural bent of this elitist strand comes from the justification of 
elitism: the belief that a set of procedural mechanisms and constraints are sufficient 
institutional conditions for the rule of law to guarantee and promote liberty for plebeian 
citizens.9 This proceduralist approach to the rule of law is unable to account for the slow 
progression of systemic corruption and oligarchic power within the constitutional 
structure because it focuses on formal rules and delegation of powers instead of on how 
political decision-making is actually done, on modes of selection instead of on the special 
interests behind candidates, and on equal constitutional rights instead of on the evident 
structural gender and racial oppression existing alongside formal protections.   
 In the first part I present the origins and theoretical development of this elitist-
procedural interpretation of the mixed constitution by offering a reading of two of the 
most influential authors shaping Atlantic republican thought: Polybius and Cicero. In the 
second section I analyze the reemergence of elitist interpretations in England in the 17th 
and 18th centuries, focusing on Harrington and Montesquieu, the latter being the most 
influential thinker shaping the American constitution. In the third part I provide a 
materialist reading of the constituent process in the United States focusing on the 
                                                
8 See Pierre Rosanvallon, Counter-Democracy: Politics in an Age of Distrust (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2013).  
9 I follow Jeffrey Green’s plebeian interpretation of liberal democracy in which ordinary citizenship is 
second-class citizenship. I will discuss his plebeian description of the liberal democratic experience in 




Founders’ support for elite control over political decision-making and their arguments 
against democracy and popular participation. I end the chapter with a critical analysis of 
Philip Pettit’s republican proposals, which have brought the elitist-procedural republic to 
its frontier of democratic possibilities and highest degree of philosophical sophistication.  
Through a plebeian lens that sharpens the difference between procedural and 
material, formal and factual forms of power, I focus my analysis on the infrastructure of 
power that the constitution establishes for the common people. Thus, in my analysis I pay 
close attention to 1) the degree of institutionalization and the role of the few and the 
many within the power structure, and 2) the anti-democratic arguments and elitist 
justifications that served as normative premises for the establishment of elitist republics 
and liberal democracies. In the subsequent chapter I present the first plebeian 
interpretation of the mixed constitution10 originating in Machiavelli’s materialist, realist 
reading of the Roman republican experience 11  and his critical reflection on the 
democratic constitutional regime in Florence.12 I will also give an account of other 
plebeian constitutional positions that emerged in France, Germany, and the U.S., and 
introduce authors I consider as contributing to plebeian constitutional thought: Nicolas de 
Condorcet, Rosa Luxemburg, Hannah Arendt, John McCormick, and Lawrence 
Hamilton. 
 












John McCormick  
Lawrence Hamilton  
 







2.1 Republican Interpretations of the Mixed Constitution 
                                                
10 There are no surviving documents from this interpretation prior to Machiavelli, which does not make him 
the first plebeian constitutional thinker, but the first whose writings survived centuries of monarchical and 
oligarchic rule. 
11 Mainly based on Dionysius de Halicarnassus rather than Polybius. Gabriele Pedullà, Machiavelli in 
Tumult, Ch. 6. 




I. Foundations of Elitist Constitutionalism: Polybius & Cicero  
Republican political thought has been commonly traced back to the Roman 
republic of the 2nd century BC, originating within a mixed constitution that combined 
three forms of government: kinship, aristocracy, and democracy. Different from other 
great states such as Sparta, Rome’s constitution was not set up by one virtuous man, but 
became a mixed constitution in an evolutionary manner, through the struggle between 
patricians and plebeians over debt and war. 13  The Roman constitution was not a 
document, but rather a tradition that incorporated fundamental institutions as well as 
written and unwritten norms (ius) and evolving practices (mos).14 To understand the 
extent of the power wielded by patricians and plebeians within the constitutional 
structure, it is thus necessary to analyze formal power through the actual practices of 
different forms of power in society. Even if not the first to theorize about the mixed 
constitution,15 Polybius was the first to attempt a conjunctural narrative of the Roman 
constitution, putting for the first time “Roman political behavior in a conceptual 
framework.” 16  In his description, written during a period of great expansion and 
conquest, Polybius accounted for formal and material aspects of political power, and 
elaborated a model of Rome’s evolutionary constitutional tradition aimed at justifying the 
superiority of the republic as mixed constitution. This aim, I would argue, made him 
gloss over the “very considerable shifts of power” that occurred during the period in 
which the republic supposedly was in balance.17 
According to Polybius, institutions giving legal authority to the one, the few, and 
the many shared “in the control of the Roman state,”18 allowing for a balance of power 
that gave stability and endurance to the republic. For Polybius, Rome’s mixed 
constitution made its republic superior to the democracies and oligarchies in the Greek 
world because of its ability to prevent the overgrowth of power and the corruption 
                                                
13 Andrew W. Lintott, The Constitution of the Roman Republic (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), p. 
32–38. 
14 Lintott, The Constitution of the Roman Republic, p. 4-7. 
15 Dicaearchus of Messene, disciple of Aristotle, would have written Tripoliticus, a tract about the best 
constitution as a mixture of monarchy, aristocracy and democracy, one and a half centuries before 
Polybius. Kurt Fritz, The Theory of the Mixed Constitution in Antiquity: A Critical Analysis of Polybius' 
Political Ideas (New York: Columbia University Press, 1954), p. 82. 
16 Lintott, The Constitution of the Roman Republic, p. 8.  
17 Fritz, The Theory of the Mixed Constitution, p. x 




stemming from it. However, as we saw in the previous chapter, his account of Rome’s 
political evolution was unable to grasp the oligarchization process unfolding underneath 
the formal structure of laws and procedures —perhaps because his aim was to explain the 
greatness of the Roman system of government, not its incipient decadence. 
If we analyze the evolution of the Roman republic through a plebeian lens, the 
trajectories of plebeian formal and material power within the constitutional framework do 
not appear to track each other after plebeians were successful in occupying the highest 
spaces of political power. Since the establishment of the Tribunes of the Plebs in 494 
BC,19 the increase in formal plebeian power through the middle and late republic was 
progressive. While at the beginning resolutions passed in the Plebeian Council only 
bound the plebs, and plebeian leadership was limited to obstructing political acts 
(intercessio) and protecting individuals from magistrates (auxilium), by mid-4th century 
plebeian leaders were allowed to become dictators, censors, and consuls, and plebeian 
resolutions were binding for all citizens.20 By the late republic plebeians could elect 
magistrates and become elected to the highest offices,21 decide on war, peace, and 
alliances, enact and reject laws, create colonies and distribute public land, inflict the 
death penalty, and even control admission to Roman citizenship.22 Plebeians appear 
wielding great institutional power —certainly much more than the institutional power 
citizens enjoy today. 
This broad institutional power of plebeians stands in contrast to the rather narrow 
institutional prerogative of the Senate, which appears as an advisory body with no 
institutional power other than its control over finance. However, the power over the 
public budget made the magistrates effectively dependent on the Senate. The Senate 
decided on the budget for lucrative contracts, had a say in all matters involving the 
treasury, even having veto power over withdraws from the treasury.23 Even if the Senate 
                                                
19 After plebeian soldiers refused to march against the enemy, and instead seceded to the Aventine Hill, 
leaving the city to its fate, patricians conceded by allowing plebeian their own exclusive leaders. 
20 Lex Hortensia 287 BC 
21 The last offices to be opened to plebeians were religious. Lex Ogulnia (300 BC) opened access to the 
priesthood and in 254 BC Tiberius Coruncanius was selected as the first plebeian pontifex maximus. 
22 Lintott, The Constitution of the Roman Republic, p. 200.  
23 Expect for the consuls who had free access to the treasury. Histories, 6 §13. However, Polybius states at 
the beginning of book 6 that magistrates can withdraw from the treasury at their own discretion. For an 
analysis of the contradictions in Polybius’ account of distribution of power in Rome see Fritz, The Theory 




did not have formal power over magistrates, being unable to punish them if they did not 
follow its directions, magistrates needed to justify their request for money and their 
decisions to the Senate. The incentive for magistrates to follow the Senate’s directions 
was strong since deviation from senatorial ‘advice’ would likely bring future denial of 
funding.24   
The Senate’s control over the budget, however, does not account for the power 
patricians had over plebeians. At least formally, the Tribunate was the only office that 
was not under the purview of the Senate; Tribunate were dependent only on the Plebeian 
Council and aimed at obstructing patrician institutional power.25 Polybius gives a class-
based explanation for the Senate’s power over the people, attributing it to socio-economic 
dependence.26 In addition to widespread patronage, which gave the nobles control over 
their dependent individuals, Polybius points to the people’s general deference towards the 
aristocracy, which was connected with the control nobles had over public religion. 
Priestly power was supreme, and the “interpretation of the requirements of the gods 
remained an aristocratic prerogative and the ensuing decisions took priority over, and 
could render void, even resolutions of the assemblies.”27 Patricians retained the ultimate 
veto power over plebeian institutions via the interpretation of divine auguries, to which 
the populus Romanus was deeply devoted.28  
In addition to socio-economic dependence, aristocratic authority, and religion, the 
Senate had control over the office of the dictator, who wielded absolute power in cases of 
emergency. The magistracy of dictator was set up by a three-step procedure in which the 
Senate requested a dictator, who was then selected by a consul,29 and then ratified by the 
Comitia Curiata, an assembly organized based on Rome’s patrician clans in which 
plebeians were not allowed to vote. Given the weight of the Senate’s authority, this 
procedure gave elites control over the republic’s emergency power institution, effectively 
excluding the people from influencing the nomination. 
                                                
24 Polybius, Histories, 6 §13 
25 Cicero, On The Commonwealth, II § 58 
26 Polybius, Histories, 6 §17; Lintott, The Constitution of the Roman Republic, 198 
27 Lintott, The Constitution of the Roman Republic, 198. 
28 For an analysis of Roman pagan religion see Elmer T. Merrill, “The Attitude of Ancient Rome toward 
Religion and Religious Cults.” The Classical Journal, vol. 15, no. 4, 1920, pp. 196–215. 
29 The first dictator Tituts Larcius, was a consul nominated by the other consul, Cloelius, who after 




Another source of elite control over plebeians came paradoxically from the 
success of the plebeian political struggle. Parallel to the progressive institutional 
empowerment of plebeians, there was an increasing cooptation of plebeian leadership 
into patrician ranks, which ended up consolidating a new “patricio-plebeian aristocratic 
consensus.”30 According to Livy the plebeian struggles of the mid-4th century BC were 
mainly led by wealthy, politically ambitious plebeians who wanted to “clear for 
themselves the way to all the other distinctions.”31 After leges Liciniae Sextiae (367 BC), 
which gave plebeians access to the consulship,32 and lex Hortensia (287 BC), which 
eliminated the Senate’s approval of legislation, plebeian institutional power appears to 
have been systematically blunted and disarmed. Plebeian colonization of patrician 
governing structures not only brought patrician and plebeian elites together, creating a 
new socio-political bond, but also made plebeian elites the beneficiaries of a status quo 
they now wanted to preserve instead of challenge.33 Consequently, as soon as plebeians 
gained full formal access to the governing structure, the so-called Struggle of the Orders 
ended and plebeian representatives begun to serve the structure of power instead of 
contesting it, becoming “slaves to the nobility.”34  
This new form of politico-institutional dependence that resulted in the 
oligarchization35 of plebeian leadership, appeared to have been manifested primarily 
through negligence and inaction. Despites the broad range of powers that the Plebeian 
Council had been granted, if we look at the exercise of these powers it becomes clear that 
by the late republic plebeians saw a de facto retrenchment of their political prerogatives. 
Even if traditionally plebeians had the power to declare war and peace, and ratify treaties, 
the Senate appears to have monopolized these decisions in the late republic.36 And even 
                                                
30 Lintott, 194; Rachel Feig Vishnia, State, Society, and Popular Leaders in Mid-Republican Rome, 241-
167 BC (London: Routledge, 1996). 
31 Livy, The History of Rome, 6.35.2  
32 Rachel Vishnia argues for a new periodization of Roman history in which the leges Liciniae Sextiae 
would be the origin of the Patricio-plebeian consensus. State, Society, and Popular Leaders, p.7. 
33 After the initial patrician rejection of sharing the consulship with plebeians, the integration seems to have 
been rather smooth due mainly from the increased economic benefits resulting from Roman expansion. See 
W.V. Harris, War and Imperialism in Republican Rome, 327-70 B.C. (Oxford 1979) 74-77 
34 Livy, The History of Rome, 10.37.11 
35 For the general process of detachment of leadership from the grassroots. See Robert Michels, Political 
Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy (New York: Dover 
Publications, 1959). 




what Polybius argues is the fundamental prerogative of the people —to allocate honors 
and penalties, which served the function of protecting against tyrannies of the one or the 
few37— appears to have been substantially weakened by the time when he was writing. 
Even if there is evidence of trials being held in the assembly, there are no capital 
punishment cases resulting in conviction during the late republic, “which calls into 
question their effectiveness as a popular weapon against the aristocracy.”38  
Despite the plebeian formal infrastructure of power, plebeian authority was 
overridden through negligence, usurpation, contempt, and open violence. Since 
enforcement of laws was part of the executive function, which was informally under the 
authority of the Senate, even if plebeians could formally pass laws, the Senate and 
magistrates could choose to disregard the legislative authority of the Plebeian Council. A 
little over a decade after Polybius’ Histories ends, the Roman republic experienced a 
constitutional crisis that ended in the assassination of the tribune Tiberius Gracchus in 
133 BC over land redistribution. According to Plutarch, Tiberius’s “zeal and 
determination” in pursuing an agrarian law was “honorable and just” because it did not 
come from his own desire to advance his office or his name, but was instead kindled by 
the people themselves, who set up “writings upon the porches, walls, and monuments, 
calling upon him to reinstate the poor citizens in their former possessions.”39 Despite 
commanding a majority in the Plebeian Council —which would have meant a favorable 
plebiscite and the consequent establishment of the agrarian law— the tribune Marcus 
Octavius opposed the law, vetoing the motion. Plutarch states that Octavius’s opposition 
was prompted by “the prayers and supplications of many influential men,” and since 
Tiberius could not pass the law in any other way, he was forced to do something “illegal 
and unseemly”: to eject Octavius from his office. Tiberius justifies this illegal motion by 
arguing that a plebeian representative that maims or annuls the people’s power is not only 
a “bad tribune” but “no tribune at all.”40 While the refusal of the Senate to recognize and 
enable the reforms to the Agrarian Law disregarded the legislative prerogative of the 
Plebeian Council, the murdering of Tiberius directly violated the foundation of plebeian 
                                                
37 Polybius, Histories, 6, §14 
38 Lintott, The Constitution of the Roman Republic, 201–202 
39 Plutarch, Tiberius Gracchus, §8. 




power: the sacrosanctity of tribunes.41 This constitutional crisis was brewing when 
Polybius elaborated his interpretation of the Roman republican experience, and despite 
evident signs of oligarchic overgrowth, he insisted in the adequate “balance” of the 
powers within the constitutional structure. 
 
 
Figure 2.2 Constitution of Rome 4th Century BC  
 
 
Figure 2.3 Roman Republic, 2nd Century BC 
                                                
41 For a description of the powers of the tribunate stemming from its sacrosanctity see Lintott, The 




While Polybius’ analytical description of the Roman republic focused on Rome’s 
apogee, before the first constitutional crisis, Cicero wrote under a crumbling system, rife 
with violence and corruption. In On the Commonwealth he laments the decay of the 
republic. 
…having inherited the commonwealth like a wonderful 
picture that had faded over time, not only has failed to 
renew its original colors but has not even taken the trouble 
to preserve at least its shapes and outline. What remains of 
the morals of antiquity…?42  
 
While Polybius was unable to account for the increasing oligarchic domination 
growing parallel to an expansion of formal plebeian power, Cicero acknowledged the 
corruption of the constitution but his solution was to regain virtue by reasserting the 
dominance of the ruling elite. He explained the corruption of the republic as due to the 
loss of “ancestral morality” and “outstanding men,”43 and so the way out of crisis was for 
him to reestablish morality through good leadership: “whatever moral alteration takes 
place in the leaders soon follows among the people.”44 In the voice of Scipio, Cicero 
states that a good leader, by strengthening the sense of shame among the people, keeps 
citizens seeking “the praise and respect of the best man.”45 Cicero not only shifted the 
focus of analysis away from institutions and toward morality and individual behavior as 
the source of corruption and erosion of the republic, but he also gave preeminence to the 
aristocracy as source of normativity. The best commonwealth is for him the one 
“controlled by its best citizens” in which the liberty of the plebs corresponds only to the 
“power of honorably pleasing respectable citizens.”46 Even if Cicero recognized not only 
the need for a balanced form of government —in which “some things [are] set aside for 
the judgment and wishes of the people,” to avoid giving the plebs reasons to revolt47— 
but also of the positive role played by plebeian tribunes in protecting liberty by checking 
the ambition of elites, what ultimately produces good government for him is the virtue of 
the ruling class.  
                                                
42 Cicero, On the Commonwealth, V §2a 
43 Cicero, On the Commonwealth, V §2a 
44 Cicero, On the Laws, III §31 
45 Cicero, On the Commonwealth, V §6 
46 Cicero, On the Commonwealth, III §38 




Cicero follows closely Plato’s ideas on the damaging effects of extreme equal 
liberty in democracies, which seems endemic to the “equal share in the constitution and 
public office.”48 For Plato the desire for “pure, unmixed freedom” in democracies 
produces anarchy:49 in the family children do not respect their parents, “immigrants are 
put on a par with citizens,” “pupils have an equal contempt for their teachers and their 
attendants,” slavery is abolished, and even “horses and donkeys are in the habit of 
wandering the streets with total freedom.”50 Cicero reproduces Plato’s argument saying 
that in a democratic commonwealth “private homes have no master and this evil extends 
even to animals,” “fathers fear their sons,” “pupils scorn their teachers,” and even 
“women have the same rights as their husbands.”51 Even if Cicero’s anti-democratic 
position is fragmentary, the thrust of his argument indicates that to avoid democratic 
tyranny the aristocratic element must be supreme within the power-sharing structure of 
the republic. Cicero’s is not a controversial argument since, differently from Athens, the 
Roman republic was effectively governed by elites. Cicero’s philosophical support for the 
dominance of elites was thus a normative description of his political reality. According to 
him, mixed constitution, “this combined and moderately blended form of 
commonwealth” is more solid than a pure regime that easily corrupts, and also tends to 
maintain the social hierarchies. “There is no reason for revolutions when each person is 
firmly set in his own rank, without the possibility of sudden collapse.”52 Cicero argued 
the ballot is “a badge of liberty” that should be used to please the “best and most 
respectable citizens;” having the right to vote is enough satisfaction for the people, who 
then tend to follow the lead of elites.53  
Cicero attempts not only to justify the current constitutional framework but also to 
innovate by proposing to broaden the legal prerogatives of the ruling class. He reduced 
the liberty of the people to choosing the most worthy of the few and acting in a 
harmonious political process in which plebeians would confirm what the senate decided 
and the magistrates executed. This shift in the scale in favor of elites did not mean 
                                                
48 Plato, The Republic, 8. 557e-566 
49 For the relation between democracy and anarchy see Stathis Gourgouris, “On Democracy’s Anarchy,” 
paper presented at Columbia Political Theory Workshop Fall 2012.  
50 Plato, The Republic, 8. 562c-564 
51 Cicero, On the Commonwealth, I.67 
52 Cicero, On the Commonwealth, I §69 




however directly attacking the power of the Tribunate. Even if among Cicero’s circle 
“everyone agrees” the power of the tribunes was “excessive,” Cicero defended the office 
of the Tribunate as necessary.54 While he considered of benefit for the republic that the 
popular sectors have representation in an exclusively popular institution, Cicero 
considered popular authority as subordinated to aristocratic authority. According to him, 
the unbound people-as-crowd is more dangerous than their political representatives, who 
moderate their own behavior out of self-interest, rapidly becoming systemic actors. Even 
if the Gracchi tribunes had caused much conflict and violence, the unrepresented crowd 
would be much worse. And even if in some instances tribunes could have made things 
worse, it would be dangerous to abolish the plebeian office because it could cause a new 
civil war.  
When the senate yielded this power [of representation] to 
the plebeians, the weapons were put down, the sedition was 
calmed, moderation was discovered, which allowed the 
lesser people to think that they were made equal to the 
leaders; and that was the single source of salvation for the 
state.55   
 
 While he had “no quarrels with the Tribunate” and thus his ideal regime would 
preserve the office intact (to the strong disapproval of his interlocutors), Cicero proposed 
to reassert the dominance of elites, on the one hand by giving magistrates the indirect 
power to obstruct the plebeian council by “taking the auspices,” and on the other by 
strengthening the authority of the Senate in the making of the law. In his ideal 
commonwealth magistrates would have “the right to take the auspices and give 
judgment” which would establish a way to “obstruct many useless but appealing 
initiatives.” 56  Since the “immortal gods” have usually “suppressed unjust impulses of 
the people,” giving the right to magistrates to take the auspices would neutralize 
undesirable plebeian motions without causing conflict. Even if you had a Tiberius 
Gracchus, willing to risk his life for land redistribution, his initiative could be suppressed 
if the auspices were unfavorable, without any bloodshed. There was no need to abolish 
the Tribunate to reassert the subordination of the plebeians to aristocratic authority. If 
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controversial motions could be vetoed by the priests as a religious upper chamber, then 
the power of the Tribunate would be neutralized, becoming an institution reproducing the 
lead of the ruling class instead of challenging it, unable to counteract the oligarchic 
tendencies of the few. 
 In addition to placing an indirect limit on plebeian decisions, Cicero wanted for 
the senate to dominate the legislative process, giving the nobles the power to decree, and 
the people the power to ratify.  
For it works out that if the senate is in charge of public 
deliberation, and if the remaining orders are willing to have 
the commonwealth guided by the deliberation of the 
leading order, then it is possible through the blending of 
rights, since the people have power and the senate 
authority, that that moderate and harmonious order of the 
state be maintained, especially if the following law is 
obeyed; for what follows is: “Let the senatorial order be 
free from fault; let it be a model to others.”57 
 
 Cicero envisioned a mixed constitution in which the senatorial order was 
dominant and the power of plebeians was only formal. His elitist model uses institutions 
and procedures as a way of taming popular power, satisfying and neutralizing the people 
so to avoid violence. The same as Plato, Cicero’s ideal model is aimed at harmony, a 
politics of cooperation that is not achieved by directly disempowering the plebeians from 
their institutional power, but by giving the people a power that is formal and subordinate: 
“…my law gives the appearance of liberty while keeping the authority of the respectable 
and eliminating an occasion for dispute.”58   
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II.  The English Republican Tradition, Harrington & Montesquieu 
Even if Cicero’s ideas on the commonwealth were never implemented, his elitist 
interpretation of the mixed constitution was preserved and later reproduced in medieval 
Europe mainly through Augustine’s citations.59 In England the mixed constitution began 
to be discussed in relation to the English commonwealth in the mid-1500s, becoming the 
“dominant political theory” in the 17th century.60 In 1642, at the verge of civil war, King 
Charles I declared in his Answer to the Nineteen Propositions that England was a mixed 
government in which the “laws are jointly made by a king, by a house of peers, and by a 
house of commons chosen by the people, all having free votes and particular 
privileges.”61 This declaration was a preemptive strategy by the King to define the 
political future on his own terms. While a “regulated monarchy” would govern according 
to the laws, the House of Commons (“an excellent Conserver of Libertie, but never 
intended for any share in Government”) would only have the power to levy money and 
impeach public officials. The Lords would wield “judicatory power,” 62 which was later 
interpreted as the power to arbitrate, “to trim the balance, to act as a supreme court of 
constitutional law.”63  
While in the English mixed government of the Answer the indirect power of the 
people through their elected representatives was supposed to be narrow, specific to 
taxation and impeachment, this was the opposite of what was happening on the ground. 
Despite the English Parliament being a temporary advisory body that did not wield 
formal institutional power, the House of Commons had been successful in the previous 
decades in getting legislation passed against the king’s wishes, and was “close to 
claiming the right to issue ordinances without his consent.”64 Similar to the Roman 
Senate, which was an advisory body with de facto power over the executive function 
through its control over the budget, the House of Commons was gradually becoming the 
dominant institution, abrogating the power to legislate and make policy.  
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According to M.J.C. Vile, because the mixed constitution was seen as a tool to 
defend a limited monarchy, the tradition of the mixed constitution incorporated the 
nascent doctrine of separation of powers, allowing for their later confusion.65 A year after 
the Answer, Philip Hunton in his Treatise of Monarchy aimed at giving supremacy to the 
law as opposed to the arbitrary will of the monarch by arguing that while the legislative 
function was to be shared, the king’s executive role was his sole prerogative. According 
to Hunton, the English form of government was a “mixed monarchy” rather than a mixed 
constitution, because the predominant element —which in this case was the monarch 
with his monopoly over executive power— “gives the denomination to the whole.”66 Vile 
argues that Hunton’s arguments regarding the separation of functions as determining the 
nature of the regime became one of the basic elements of the dominant constitutional 
theory after the revolution of 1688, which tended to confuse the checks and balances 
produced by institutional powers grounded in social orders with the mechanistic 
separation of functions of government.67 
 
 
2.4 Constitution of England 17th Century —Mixed Monarchy 
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After the king’s death one of the first actions by the Rump Parliament (1649–
1653) was to declare England a commonwealth that was to be governed “without any 
king or house of Lords.”68 However, kingly and aristocratic power would be shortly 
reinstated. After the civil wars and the establishment of the Protectorate under Lord 
Oliver Cromwell, the doctrine of separation of powers was deployed to justify the 1653 
Instrument of Government, England’s first written constitution.69 Part of what was finally 
incorporated into this constitutional framework came out of the Putney Debates in which 
the Grandees, the conservative faction of the New Model Army, presented their Heads of 
Proposals in opposition to the Levellers’ Agreement of the People, which proposed 
expanding suffrage. The elitist interpretation of the mixed constitution prevailed. The 
Instrument of Government established three political institutions: the advisory Council of 
State, an elected Lord Protector with monopoly over the executive power, and the 
Parliament, in charge of legislation, meeting every three years. A property requirement to 
have the right to elect a representative to Parliament effectively excluded the masses from 
the “Commons.”70 The arguments against the broadening of the suffrage hinged on 
property being a proxy for independence, and “if there be anything at all that is a 
foundation of liberty it is this, that those who shall choose the law-making shall be men 
freed from dependence upon others.”71 Property owners were independent, and therefore 
would not be servile to the interests of others, but only to those of the commonwealth. 
After four years this constitution was replaced by the Humble Petition and Advice (1657), 
which originated in a remonstrance to the Lord Protector by the Grandees. The original 
document not only rehashed the elitist interpretation of the mixed constitution put 
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forward in the Answer and the Instrument of Government, but also proposed to convert 
the office of the Protectorate into a hereditary monarchy.72 Cromwell refused the Crown 
and eliminated the clause of kinship. He also introduced a second chamber similar to the 
House of Lords to avoid the Commons abrogating judiciary powers.73  
 
 
Figure 2.5 Constitution of England —The Protectorate (1653–1659) 
 
A few months before Cromwell signed the new power arrangement, James 
Harrington had published his powerful materialist critique of the procedural interpretation 
of the mixed constitution in The Commonwealth of Oceana. For Harrington all 
commonwealths are a form of “domestic empire” that stand on the principles of  “good of 
fortunes” or riches. Because all “domestic empire is founded upon dominion,” and 
dominion is property, then who holds the property (or a larger proportion of if) should be 
what determines the nature of the regime. “If one man is the sole landlord of the 
territory” the regime is an absolute monarchy; if the few are the landlords or 
“overbalance the people unto the like proportion,” it is a “mixed monarchy;” and if the 
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whole people are landlords, it is a commonwealth.74 Because political power is grounded 
on property, a constitution that does not take due account of the distribution of property 
would not last for long uncorrupted. Harrington attributes the collapse of the Roman 
republic to increased dispossession of the masses and the inability of the constitution to 
properly address this problem in time.  
Whence by the time of Tiberius Gracchus the nobility had 
almost eaten the people quite out of their lands, which they 
held in the occupation of tenants and servants; whereupon 
the remedy being too late and too vehemently applied, the 
commonwealth was ruined.75 
 
Writing during the breakdown of monarchical authority, Harrington proposes an 
alternative constitutional arrangement for Oceana, a commonwealth that the same as 
England and Venice also would exist in an island. According to Pocock, Harrington’s 
purpose was to argue against going back to the “ancient” English constitutional tradition 
based on common law and fixed social hierarchies, and bridge the gap between the 
Grandees’ property requirements for active citizenship and the Levellers’ expansion of 
suffrage to independent citizens.76 For Harrington a proper Commonwealth is only 
possible when the few are not able to disproportionally concentrate wealth and 
overbalance the people. Therefore, in Oceana all people should be landlords, “or hold the 
land so divided among them” or “the balance of treasure [that] may be equal unto that of 
land;” only relative material equality would allow for political equality.  
Despite his materialist approach to constitutional thought and strong support for 
land redistribution and strict laws regulating property, Harrington’s constitutional 
proposal is closer to Plato and Cicero than to Machiavelli, who he claims to be most 
indebted to.77 Harrington’s ideal constitution endorses an elitist version of the mixed 
constitution with the few as the dominant element, having the power to set the legislative 
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agenda, and the people having the power to elect the ruling elite and decide only when 
prompted. Taking Polybius “balanced” mixed constitution and Cicero’s elitist position in 
which the republic needs to be “controlled by its best citizens,” Harrington’s Oceana 
endorsed the separation of functions, with “the senate proposing, the people resolving, 
and the magistracy executing.”78 Harrington was not so much aiming at a plebeian type 
of mixed constitution, but rather, as Pocock argues, at trying to “rehabilitate aristocracy 
in the wake of what he saw as the collapse of feudal oligarchy.”79  
…I agree with Machiavel that a nobility or gentry, 
overbalancing a popular government, is the utter bane and 
destruction of it; so I shall show in another that a nobility or 
gentry in a popular government, not overbalancing it, is the 
very life and soul of it.80 
 
 Different from Machiavelli, who chose the agonistic Roman republic as his 
model, Harrington’s preferred model was Venice,81 a hereditary oligarchic republic that 
he praises as “the most equal in the constitution,”82 equal both in “the balance or 
foundation and in the superstructures, that is to say in her agrarian law and in her 
rotation.”83 In addition to being the most equal commonwealth —given that all citizens 
were property owners, sharing in the wealth of trade, and public offices were held in 
turns through election— Venice was for Harrington also the most democratic republic 
because even “though she do[es] not take in the people, never excluded them.”84 Of 
course the common people were actually excluded, but in a manner different from the 
exclusion of the popular sectors in other republics. Venice was founded on an original 
legal border between citizens, who were all rich merchants, and the rest. This original 
legal division happened in the late 13th century when “the codification of a list of families 
authorized to sit in the Great Council marked the formal separation of the nobles from the 
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rest of the population,”85 securing for these families a monopoly over citizenship and 
political power.  
The Venetian constitution completely excluded the popolani —those who “we 
might otherwise call plebeians; those who practice the lowliest arts to support 
themselves, and have no status (grado) in the city,”86 who were the great majority of the 
population.87 The popolani were never formally excluded from political power, but were 
“defined rather by what they were not and by what they did not have.”88  The total 
exclusion of the majority of the population from political power kept Venice 
“undisturbed,” having constant civil peace according to Harrington because its “body 
consists of one order, and her senate is like a rolling stone,” with rotation disabling 
“divided or ambitious interests.”89 The rotation of the ruling class from a pool of property 
owners assured that political leaders would serve the commonwealth. This was for 
Harrington the great discovery of Venice: election and rotation as the basis for a stable 
republic.   
Despite the relative material equality of citizens, the organization of power of the 
Venetian constitution was decisively elitist. As portrayed by Donato Giannotti, “the most 
excellent describer of the commonwealth of Venice,”90 the republic of Venice had a 
pyramidal structure of power with the Great Council of 3,000 men at the bottom having 
mainly an electoral function; the Senate of 335 men in the lower half dedicated to 
lawmaking; the Collegio of 26 men in the upper half exercising executive power; and the 
Doge at the top as head of state.91 Harrington particularly liked the fact that the Great 
Council did not debate laws, but only voted on them when prompted. While letting the 
people both debate and decide had according to him ruined Athens and Rome, in Venice 
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deliberation was reserved for a selected group of nobles. The Senate had the prerogative 
of proposing legislation, and even “sometimes resolving too.”92 Therefore, the Venetian 
“popular” assembly was not only non-deliberative and limited to voting for candidates or 
motions, but would sometimes yield its “resolving” function to the Senate, which had a 
monopoly over deliberating and proposing.  
Alongside ordinary institutions, the same as Rome, Venice also featured a 
dictatorial office: the Council of Ten. Even if the members of this council were elected by 
the Great Council, the office was not under the control of the people, but tended to 




Figure 2.6 Constitution of Venice, 15th Century 
 
Following the Venetian experience, Harrington proposes for Oceana a model 
based on three orders fulfilling different functions —the senate debating and proposing, 
the people resolving, and the magistracy executing. The law is debated and proposed by 
the Senate, sanctioned by the popular assembly, and adjudicated by the magistrates and 
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the courts, which are considered a separate order, replacing the monarchical element of 
previous versions of the mixed constitution. 
The two first orders, that is to say the senate and the people, 
are legislative, whereunto answers that part of this science 
which by politicians is entitled de legibus, or of the laws; 
and the third order is executive, to which answers that part 
of the same science which is styled de judiciis, or of the 
frame and course of courts or judicatories.94 
 
 
Figure 2.7 Harrington’s Constitution of Oceana, 1656 
 
For Harrington the best way to promote equality is to separate those who debate 
from those who resolve. He uses the example of two girls who want to eat a piece of 
cake. Only if one of them divides the cake and the other chooses, will the shares be equal. 
In the lawmaking process, dividing and choosing would translate as debating/proposing 
and resolving. 
If a council capable of debate has also the result, it is 
oligarchy. If an assembly capable of the result has debate 
also, it is anarchy. Debate in a council not capable of result, 
and in an assembly not capable of debate, is democracy.95 
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Despite his peculiar interpretation of democracy as a mixed constitution in which 
the senate proposed and the popular assembly decided, Harrington follows the ancients in 
arguing that liberty is the principle of the democratic regime. Democracy for him is 
“nothing but entire liberty.”96 Even if Harrington does not provide a definition of what he 
means by liberty, he states he is indebted to Thomas Hobbes’ works on Human Nature 
(1650) and Of Liberty and Necessity (1654), which are “the greatest of new lights, and 
those which I have follow'd, an shall follow.”97 According to Hobbes liberty is not 
collective political action, but the “absence of external impediments” to individual 
action.98 While in the state of nature liberty is absolute, lacking a supreme authority to 
impose limits, liberty under the state is for Hobbes necessarily non-political since 
tolerating opposition to the will of the absolute, arbitrary sovereign could become an 
existential threat to the state. In the state liberty is limited by law and therefore ceases to 
be conceived in binary terms (either you ruled yourself and were free from domination, 
or a slave), and becomes a relative concept depending on the degree of power being 
curtailed by impediments. Since the law is an obstacle for action, under the state freedom 
is possible when the law is silent, and the more intrusive the legal system, the less liberty 
subjects have to engage in free action. In contrast to the republican interpretation of 
liberty, for Hobbes “freedom is undermined not by conditions of domination and 
dependence but only by overt acts of interference.” 99  While Harrington criticized 
Hobbes’ endorsement of absolute monarchy and his dismantling of the ancient taxonomy 
of regime forms, there is no indication that he does not agree with Hobbes about the 
meaning of liberty, which would make Harrington a “deeply idiosyncratic member of the 
English flock.”100 
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 Harrington’s constitutional model, which he claims is democratic, is highly 
institutionalized, with 30 foundational “orders” determining groups, institutions, 
procedures, and functions.101  
The materials of the commonwealth are the people; and the 
people of Oceana were distributed by casting them into 
certain divisions, regarding their quality, their ages, their 
wealth, and the places of their residence or habitation…102 
 
According to Jonathan Scott, Harrington would have embraced the mixed 
constitution only because it allowed him to divide society into groups and in this way 
control the passions. Against Machiavelli’s agonism and closer to Platonic harmony, 
“Harrington’s purpose was to do away with tumults, by rendering the passions 
impotent”103 through division and rotation. This mechanistic interpretation of the mixed 
constitution as the separation of functions and checks and balances would be 
reformulated procedurally a century later by Montesquieu, who argued Harrington had 
“examined the furthest point of liberty to which the constitution of a state can be carried” 
but that he had misunderstood what liberty actually meant.104  
Even if Montesquieu argued against Hobbes’ understanding of human nature as 
defined by the “desire to subjugate others”105 and of the possibility of having liberty 
under a state based on fear, Montesquieu’s definition of liberty seems in a paradoxical 
way very similar to Hobbes’. In The Spirit of the Laws (1750) Montesquieu defined 
liberty in a negative and procedural sense. Liberty is for him both an individual 
“tranquility of spirit” based on the absence of fear and a sense of security,106 and “the 
power of doing what we ought to will, and in not being constrained to do what we ought 
not to will.”107 According to Annelien de Dijn for Montesquieu security was more 
important to attain human happiness than self-government, and thus monarchical subjects 
could be as free as their republican counterparts due to high levels of security of life and 
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possessions under some monarchs.108 While Hobbes argued liberty is absolute in the state 
of nature and that the sovereign restricts liberty, allowing for its secure enjoyment, 
Montesquieu reduces liberty to a feeling of security that appears intrinsically related to 
the limited behavior allowed by laws, mores, and customs. Because to be free is not only 
to act within the bounds of the law, but also to will within these bounds, there is 
tranquility and security. While Hobbes justified the absolute state on the need to provide 
security from violence, Montesquieu, redefining liberty as security, argued for embracing 
a mixed constitution as a form to guarantee liberty through moderation. 
For Montesquieu, constitution and law are bound to the nature and principles of 
government, the essential logic of the political form of rule. 109 While the nature of a 
government is determined by who holds power (one, few or many), the principle is a 
“spirit,” a sort of Aristotelian effective cause that interacts with the laws, ideally 
“tighten[ing] all the springs of the government” and allowing for the principle to be 
refueled through a dynamic process of action and reaction.110 Going against the ancient 
categorization of regimes and their corrupt forms, Montesquieu conceived of three types 
of government: republican, monarchical, and despotic. Republican government could 
take either the form of democracy —a regime in which the people as a whole is the 
sovereign— or of aristocracy —a regime in which power is in the hands of a few. 
Premised on a Platonist philosophical framework, for Montesquieu democracy is not a 
desirable form of government because it is not free; it is by nature a regime without 
moderation, in which power is easily abused. After briefly surveying the different 
meanings that had been ascribed to the word liberty in different historical contexts, 
Montesquieu denounces democracy as recasting liberty as popular power to justify the 
government by the masses. 
As in democracies the people seem very nearly to do what 
they want, liberty has been placed in this sort of government 
and the power of the people has been confused with the 
liberty of the people.111  
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So differently from Plato, who thought the principle of democracy was liberty, 
Montesquieu argued the spirit of the classic republic was not liberty but virtue understood 
as the “love of equality and frugality,” a “feeling” of “love of the republic,”112 and a 
desire to have “only one’s equals as masters.”113 Montesquieu sees the power given by 
democracy to its citizens as a liability because “it has eternally been observed that any 
man who has power is led to abuse it; he continues until he finds limits.”114 Extreme, 
unbound democracy is a threat to liberty due to the advent of arbitrariness. “The more the 
people appear to take advantage of their liberty, the nearer they approach the moment 
they are to lose it.”115  
According to Montesquieu, the principle of democracy is corrupted both when 
equality is lost and when there is extreme equality, and the excess of virtue takes hold of 
the republic. For him, authority in a democracy is achieved through inequalities 
established by law between citizen and man, and between the citizens who rule and the 
rest. These distinctions, which are fundamental for the well functioning of the political 
system, arise from the principle of equality because even if “men cannot render [the 
republic] equal services, they should equally render it services,”116 and are not arbitrary 
because are introduces through law, which is an expression of human reason. 
Consequently, when these necessary, non-subjective inequalities are blurred, the republic 
incurs in what Montesquieu calls extreme equality, a vice that brings its demise. The 
parallel with Plato regarding this point is very interesting. While Plato saw democracy as 
an inherently unstable system, which produced a deficit of power due to extreme freedom 
—to do whatever one pleases— which permanently undermines hierarchies, tradition, 
and rules,117 Montesquieu uses Plato’s same arguments to evidence the corruption of the 
republic, but blames excessive equality instead. In other words, while in Plato’s 
conception of democracy it is excessive liberty as the lack of interference what ruins the 
system, for Montesquieu it is the excess of interference towards equality what corrupts it. 
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According to Montesquieu, democracy’s excess makes the people want to do everything 
themselves, which causes a loss of respect for authority. 
Then there can no longer be virtue in the republic. The 
people want to perform the magistrate’s functions; therefore, 
the magistrates are no longer respected. The senate’s 
deliberations no longer carry weight; therefore, there is no 
longer consideration for senators or, consequently, for 
elders. And if there is no respect for elders, neither will there 
be any of fathers; husbands no longer merit deference nor 
masters, submission. Everyone will come to love this 
license; the restraint of commanding will be as tiresome as 
that of obeying had been. Women, children, and slaves will 
submit to no one. There will no longer be mores or love of 
order, and finally, there will no longer be virtue.118 
 
  Even though for both Plato and Montesquieu the democratic excess leads to 
despotism, for Plato freedom is lost because “excess in one direction generally tends to 
produce a violent reaction in the opposite direction,” and for Montesquieu virtue and 
liberty are lost because excessive equality leads to arbitrariness and corruption, which are 
intrinsically related to despotism.119 However, equality itself is not lost, because men are 
all equal both in a democratic government and in a despotic one, “in the former, it is 
because they are everything; in the latter, it is because they are nothing.”120 Hence, for 
Montesquieu, what is lost with the excess of democracy is virtue, the love of democracy 
and equality, but not equality itself. In other words, what is lost with the excess of 
equality is the passion, the feeling the keeps democracy in motion, the willingness to 
sacrifice one’s own interests for that of the community. 
A democratic republic is not only potentially despotic but also unfeasible due to 
the inadequacy of the spirit of virtue for the modern times. Because virtue in a republic is 
the love of frugality, one could argue that with the excess of equality this self-
containment regarding material possessions and the accumulation of wealth can no longer 
be maintained, and individual ambitions burst into the republic, corrupting it at its core. 
Democratic virtue as love of equality and frugality is for Montesquieu too weak to be 
self-sustaining without a strong legal and social enforcement.  Because virtue requires a 
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continuous preference for the public interest over one’s own, and thus it demands the 
creation of a sort of second nature in human beings, one that represses innate individual 
ambitions, “if one is to love equality and frugality in a republic, these must have been 
established by the laws.”121 However, laws are not enough to prevent the undermining of 
virtue. When “political men” argue that to sustain the republic only “manufacturing, 
commerce, finance, wealth, and even luxury” are needed, then “virtue ceases, ambition 
enters” and freedom under the law is exchanged for freedom against it.122  
Both the painful and precarious sublimation required by virtue as the love of 
equality and frugality in an open, commercial society, and the lack of moderation of the 
egalitarian spirit, 123 brought Montesquieu to embrace the spirit of commerce, as a 
moderate, foundational force for the modern republic.124 The principle of moderation, 
which he argues is what virtue means in an aristocratic republic, is for him the most 
perfect one, the closest to human nature and to freedom because it promotes the balance 
between inequalities of wealth and power. 125 As many of his contemporaries, 
Montesquieu conceived of commerce mostly as a benign, gentle force. Commerce not 
only would moderate mores and foster peace, but also produce exact justice —as opposed 
to a justice based solely upon the public good or private interests.126 This conception of 
“commerce as bring[ing] with it the spirit of frugality, economy, moderation, work, 
wisdom, tranquility, order, and rule,”127 appears at best as naïve and detached, on the one 
hand from the speculation bubbles and the extreme luxury of the upper classes fueled by 
Great Britain’s trading boom of the mid-1700s, and on the other from the poverty and 
oppression of the popular sectors in the early years of the industrial revolution. Given this 
erroneous conception of commerce as a moderating factor —blind to the powerful, 
immoderate forces of finance —Montesquieu argued the spirit of commerce would 
provide a natural balance between collective wellbeing and individual ambitions.  
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Not only would his commercial republic be superior to ancient republics, but also 
becoming commercial would be the inevitable end of any republican government 
fostering peace and liberty.128 The liberty generated in the republic would allow for each 
citizen to “have his own will and […] value his independence according to his taste,” and 
for all the passions to “appear to their full extent,”129 including the ardor for enriching 
and distinguishing oneself. The security for investment and risk-taking given by the 
political and legal structure of a stable republic would allow for economic development 
to be accelerated: 
one’s belief that one’s prosperity is more certain in these 
states makes one undertake everything, and because one 
believes that what one has acquired is secure, one dares to 
expose it in order to acquire more.130  
 
Moreover, anticipating Adam Smith’s self-reinforcing theory of economic growth 
based on productivity and the size of the market, Montesquieu argues the industry created 
through the security to acquire would foster new needs that would only be satisfied 
through commerce. Republics are thus bound to become commercial. 
Because commerce thrives in republics where there are reliable public enterprises 
in which to participate and there is certainty about the laws —security that “makes one 
undertake everything” to “acquire more”131— the more political liberty there is in a state 
—understood as legal security— the more individuals will be inclined to pursue their 
own ambitions by taking risks to acquire rather than being frugal to preserve. In other 
words, the more liberty in a state, the more commerce will be fostered, and the more 
accentuated risk-taking will become. The evident implications of increased economic 
risk-taking in society are inequality and abrupt socio-economic change. The more 
possessions one has in a secure environment, the more inclined one is to risk part of them 
to acquire more. If the risk yields more wealth, inequality will abruptly grow between 
those who preserved and those who dared, gap that is likely to become exponentially 
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wider the more wealth is accumulated. The same happens when the risk-taker makes a 
bad bet and losses his patrimony, falling into poverty. Adam Smith would argue a decade 
after Montesquieu that economic inequality inevitably comes together with commerce, 
and despite some benefits in productivity driven by luxury, a high degree of inequality is 
pernicious. Even if for Smith inequality was not intrinsically unjust, nor produced bad 
effects such as dependence, lack of social mobility, or corruption, as Dennis C. 
Rasmussen has convincingly shown, extreme inequality produces for Smith an even 
greater evil: a “distortion in our sympathies” that makes us favor the rich and neglect the 
poor, which “in turn undermines both morality and happiness.”132   
The same as Cicero brought normative considerations to justify the Senate’s 
factual dominant position in Rome, Montesquieu theorizes a constitution that is based on 
a Whig interpretation of the English political system and proposes a hybrid commercial 
republic that incorporates the commercial spirit as a moderating force alongside the 
democratic virtue generated by popular sovereignty. The result is an elitist, proceduralist 
model in which the common people’s only power is the right to elect representatives, 
while the few preserve their dominant position in the power structure through a formal 
institutional balance. Following Cicero’s elitist republicanism, Montesquieu argues that 
while man has a natural ability to perceive merit and elect, the people in general are not 
competent enough to be elected.133 Thus, even if Montesquieu argued for extending the 
suffrage, giving the right to vote to all male citizens, excluding only those “whose estate 
is so humble that they are deemed to have no will of their own,” for him the right of the 
people to legislate is only exercised indirectly, through representatives who are selected 
from the elites. Even though in a free state the legislative power is the prerogative of “the 
people as a body,” Montesquieu argues “the people should not enter the government 
except to choose their representatives; this is quite within their reach.”134 Representation 
appears not as a device to bridge the gap between the people and power, but as a 
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mechanism to keep the people away from power through the formal expansion of the 
aristocratic procedure of election to the common people.135  
Montesquieu’s commercial republic is a modified version of a mixed constitution 
in which the common people’s sovereignty was limited to selecting representatives to “do 
all that they themselves cannot do,”136 and the aristocratic element was predominant de 
facto within the organization of power. Inspired by ancient republican experiences, he 
proposed a bicameral legislative institution composed of two separate bodies: one for the 
nobles —“people who are distinguished by birth, wealth, or honors”— and the other for 
the representatives of the people. Legislation entailed both the faculty of enacting and 
vetoing, and thus the ambitions of the nobles and the commons would be mutually kept in 
check through initiating, modifying, and stopping legal motions. In addition to the 
legislative power, he conceives of the executive power as one that should be in the hands 
of a monarch, due to its requirement of immediate action, and of the judicial power as 
null and autonomous, limited to adjudicating the law.137 The mechanical separation of 
these powers would keep these unequal bodies in a dynamic equilibrium, promoting 
stability and liberty. 
 It is not surprising that Montesquieu, who was part of the French aristocracy, 
would make a strong defense for preserving the political privileges of the nobility in the 
lawmaking process.138 However, his defense of the necessity for an aristocratic institution 
was not based on the superior virtue of elites as in Cicero, but on the realist assessment 
that elites will aim at subverting liberty if they share an institution with the common 
people: 
 if they [the nobles] were mixed among the people and if 
they had only one voice like the others, the common liberty 
would be their enslavement and they would have no 
interest in defending it, because most of the resolutions 
would be against them.139  
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Elite subversion of the constitution through negligence and passivity in an 
unmixed regime could then be interpreted as being justified as an act of self-defense 
stemming from the fear of domination coming from the common people. The only way to 
avoid this inevitable vulnerability, argues Montesquieu, is to institutionalize inequality by 
giving to the few its own institution with a role proportional to “the other advantages they 
have in the state,” and veto power over the attempts by the representatives of the common 
people to ‘enslave’ them. Even if he also gives the same powers of enacting and vetoing 
to the commons, and thus formally allowing the people to resist further oppression from 
the few, Montesquieu’s model of power allocation de facto entrenches power relations by 
giving the nobles political power commensurate with their socio-economic power, and 
the faculty to stop any attempts at reform coming from below. While the formal equality 
of legislative prerogatives in Montesquieu’s model obscures a status-quo bias that gives 
political dominance to the elite, the introduction of representation through the extension 
of the suffrage to the common people as an alternative to class-specific institutions 
radically changed the interpretation of the mixed constitution. 
 Normatively, Montesquieu’s procedural model is justified because it produces 
liberty. By defining liberty as “the right to do everything the law permits”140 and then 
arguing good laws are those resulting from the correct procedures and institutional checks 
and balances he endorses, Montesquieu pegs liberty to the rule of law, closing the 
possibility of legitimately questioning the law outside from formal political institutions 
that are effectively controlled by the few —hopefully the virtuous, moderate few. Under 
this constitutional framework, in which law is produced, executed, and adjudicated 
through a mechanistic division of functions aimed at preventing abuse, all individuals 
would be considered free simply because they “live under civil laws.”141 
If virtue conceived as love of equality needs to be established by law, and virtue 
as moderation lacks the mistaken beneficial force of commerce to constantly promote 
moderation, and therefore would also need to be established by law, then the making of 
the law is the most vulnerable point in Montesquieu’s liberty-producing structure. Laws 
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promoting equality and moderation would be aimed at limiting the few, which means that 
selected elites would be both in charge of making and executing rules aimed at limiting 
themselves. This problem of self-binding and self-policing is aggravated because 
Montesquieu’s gives equal formal power to the many, even if the few have factual 
dominance. The few are in an advantageous position and need to protect what they have; 
the many need to protect themselves from new attempts at domination and push back 
against pervasive domination by advancing their position. The preservation of the status 
quo works for the advantage of the few. Therefore giving the “senatorial” power a veto 
over demands for change coming from the popular sectors allows elites to legally, and 
peacefully, keep their dominant position. And even if in England the House of Commons 
ended up becoming the government, absorbing executive and legislative functions —
something that was already happening under Walpole while Montesquieu was living in 
London— the supremacy of parliament was not the result of an increase of popular power 
vis-à-vis the power of the few, but the result of the displacement of the old aristocracy 
from the real seat of power by the new commercial elite. 
 
 





Figure 2.9 Constitution of England, 18th Century  
 
Even though Montesquieu praises England for always subordinating political 
interests to that of commerce,142 he does not openly advocate for liberty as non-
interference in relation to trade, but still follows the republican conception of liberty in 
which law is the condition of possibility for public life. 
Liberty of commerce is not a faculty granted to traders to 
do what they want; this would instead be the servitude of 
commerce…in agreements that derive from commerce, the 
law should make more of public convenience than of the 
liberty of a citizen.143  
 
This tendency to decide in favor of the public interest instead of private ambition 
regarding lawmaking cannot be motivated by the spirit of commerce, but by virtue. But 
can virtue be maintained when the equality of fortunes that sustains frugality is 
relentlessly being undermined by the risk-taking spirit of commerce? When mores are 
being heavily influenced by new needs and ambitions? How can the law be kept 
independent from the servitude of commerce, how can freedom be sustained, if 
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inequality, individual ambitions, and risk-taking permeate mores and lawmaking itself, 
permanently pushing for laissez-faire? On the one hand, to follow one’s ambitions is 
easy, natural, and encouraged by a legal context that secures individuals from arbitrary 
seizing of property by the state or other citizens, and on the other hand, the cultivation of 
virtue, the suppression of individual interests for the common good, is difficult and 
demands of citizens a second nature born out of sublimation. Consequently, without 
strong legal restraints and a fierce republican ethos, it seems the spirit of commerce, 
which was at the center of the new American republic, does not merely come to moderate 
virtue, but to push for its extinction. 
 In the next section I will analyze how Montesquieu’s model was adapted to 
establish the first modern representative government in America. I will begin by 
engaging with the conception of liberty that became functional to the justification for the 
new organization of power under the American constitution, and then delve into a 
materialist analysis of the founding and of Madison’s constitutional thought. 
 
III.  From Mixed Constitution to Liberal Representative Government 
The problematization of concepts has been at the core of political philosophy 
since ancient times. Because concepts and categories set up the theoretical framework 
through which we think about the political, the redefinition of a term as central as liberty 
fundamentally changes our understanding of what is a free government. Every form of 
free political rule is aimed at instituting freedom. The principle of ancient democracy was 
freedom understood as self-rule through the equal sharing of political power. Thus, 
citizens had equal rights to deliberate, legislate, and judge in turns.144 The principle of the 
ancient Roman republic, which was based on the legal division between the elites and the 
common people,145 was also to establish freedom understood as non-domination by 
giving each group its own political representative institution —the Senate and the 
Council of the Plebs led by the Tribunes— with powers to check their mutual ambitions. 
While in ancient democratic theory sharing in government was seen as constitutive of 
political liberty, and free political action —which presupposed civil liberty of  “living as 
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one like”146— was the highest end all citizens could aspire to, in the republican tradition 
political participation, which recognized the right to legislate, judge, and veto laws and 
decrees, is only a means to assure security from domination. These two ancient 
conceptions of political freedom, which presupposed individual freedom to act, were put 
into question by the birth of liberalism and individualism.  
Against Hobbes’ conception of liberty as the lack of external impediments to 
action, and combining natural law and republican thought, John Locke also argued that 
liberty is limited, but not by the will of the sovereign but by natural right. Natural, 
individual rights become the normative foundation of Locke’s ideal political order in 
which the people are at the same time sovereign —limited only by natural and civil 
law— and ruled over based on their tacit consent. Locke attached liberty to the law, 
arguing that liberty is to dispose of “person, actions, possessions, and his whole property, 
within the allowance of those laws under which he is; and therein not to be subject to the 
arbitrary will of another…”147 Individual rights become in Locke’s theory of government 
the fundamental limit on government; pre-political entitlements that the government must 
never violate. 
Although a proto-liberal conception of freedom would predominate in the 
American constitutional convention, the first attempts at codifying rights and duties in 
state constitutions recognized strong political rights that went beyond election and mere 
protection from abuse. The preamble of the 1780 Massachusetts Constitution, for 
example, stated a twofold end for government: to secure the existence of the body politic, 
and to give individuals the power to enjoy their natural rights. While the latter goal is 
based on a liberal understanding of the state, the objective of securing the political 
community is based on a republican understanding of politics in which the body politic is 
the source of freedom as non-domination, and the active role of citizens in checking the 
power of government is crucial for its maintenance.  
Even though the newly constituted American states would institute indirect, 
representative government, the role of individuals in politics went beyond the selection of 
magistrates. Article VII of the 1780 Massachusetts Constitution recognized that:  
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Government is instituted for the common good, for the 
protection, safety, prosperity, and happiness of the people, 
and not for the profit, honor, or private interest of any one 
man, family, or class of men; therefore the people alone 
have an incontestable, unalienable, and indefeasible right to 
institute government, and to reform, alter, or totally change 
the same when their protection, safety, prosperity, and 
happiness require it.  
 
 A similar clause was later proposed by James Madison148 as a part of the First 
Amendment to the Constitution, but ultimately rejected. The recognition of the common 
good, understood as the safety and prosperity of the people as the aim of government, is a 
central feature in republican thought. The end of government is not the liberal protection 
of rights to assure individuals only the “enjoyment of their property in peace and 
safety,”149 but to guarantee security, prosperity, and happiness. While the liberal state is 
conceived by Locke as a minimal state that comes only to fix what does not work 
properly in the natural state, as an impartial third party that enforces contracts and secures 
property, the aim of the republican state is more demanding because it first and foremost 
has the duty to assure the prosperity of the population as a whole, which may entail the 
curtailment of individual rights for the benefit of the majority. Interference may be 
necessary to preserve freedom as non-domination. The republican constitution recognizes 
the power struggles within the community that may permeate the state, and that can only 
be dealt with through the active participation of the people in checking government 
action. Therefore, in a republican constitution, common citizens can legitimately 
constitute, direct, change, or overthrow a government, not only if there is evident 
usurpation and tyranny, but also if representatives are not advancing prosperity and 
happiness150 properly because of their favoring of a specific class or group of citizens. 
The crucial role of the people in keeping government honest is therefore guaranteed in 
political rights that go beyond election. Under Article XIX, citizens had the right to: 
assemble to consult upon the common good; give 
instructions to their representatives, and to request of the 
legislative body, by the way of addresses, petitions, or 
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remonstrances, redress of the wrongs done them, and of the 
grievances they suffer.  
 
What articles VII and XIX make evident is that, in the first state constitutions, 
private citizens were conceived not merely as authorizing through their consent a 
legitimate representative government, but as having an active role in political power as a 
counterbalance to the inefficiency of the state apparatus to guarantee prosperity for all, 
the usurpation of power by government officials, or the instrumentalization of 
government “for the profit, honor, or private interest of any one man, family, or class of 
men”151 to exclude the majority from collective benefits. This active role of the common 
citizens in securing popular sovereignty was part of the democratic legacy of the 
independence movements, which “shocked many American leaders who feared 
revolution within America” and actively opposed any “fundamental changes in the 
political structure of American society.”152 
Despite the crucial legal role of ordinary citizens in keeping corruption at bay, 
their political power was kept only in the realm of individual rights, while the powers of 
representative government were codified and given institutional expression. In other 
words, while the constitution gave the different branches of government detailed 
institutional powers, the political rights of the people to contest the actions of government 
were not given institutional recognition. Assembly was seen as spontaneous —as had 
happened in the “Committees of Correspondence” formed to organize against the unjust 
actions of the British Empire— and collective demands and instructions lacked the 
necessary institutional command to coerce representatives into compliance. The active 
political rights of citizens, the rights to action and decision in political affairs, were as 
imperative as commands based on moral duty, relying only on the virtuous character of 
government officials. The constitution did not recognize the representative government’s 
legal obligation to obey the organized multitude’s complaints. Consequently, when the 
personal interests of government officials, or the group that supported them, became in 
direct conflict with those of a large group of private citizens, as it did during the 1780s 
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debt crisis, formal rights were not respected and the de facto rulers at that moment were 
revealed.  
At the early stage of the constituent moment, both the national government and 
common citizens organized in councils and committees suffered from a lack of real, 
institutional power vis-à-vis the states and their representative governments. Referring to 
the fundamental defect of the Articles of Confederation, Thomas Jefferson stated that the 
power of Congress “was only requisitory, and these requisitions were addressed to the 
several legislatures, to be by them carried into execution, without other coercion than the 
moral principle of duty.”153 The same as the national government lacked the tools to 
implement laws and statutes at the state level, individual citizens were institutionally 
powerless to counteract the machinery of state governments. While in the case of the 
national government the lack of resources hinged on the unwillingness of states to cede 
sovereign power and autonomy —which was remedied by the 1786 Constitution— the 
lack of institutional power regular citizens could wield was due to an elitist interpretation 
of the mixed constitution that undermined the power of common citizens to control their 
representatives.  
According to John Mercer, delegate from Maryland to the Constitutional 
Convention, the leading voice against the Constitution, representative government was 
already a de facto aristocracy that could not be reigned in by the citizenry:  
It is a first principle in political science, that wherever  the 
rights of property are secured, an aristocracy will grow out 
of it. Elective Governments also necessarily become 
aristocratic, because the rulers being few can & will draw 
emoluments for themselves from the many. The 
Governments of America will become aristocracies. They 
are so already. The public measures are calculated for the 
benefit of the Governors, not of the people. The people are 
dissatisfied & complain. They change their rulers, and the 
public measures are changed, but it is only a change of one 
scheme of emolument to the rulers, for another. The people 
gain nothing by it, but an addition of instability & 
uncertainty  to their other evils.154  
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According to Merrill Jensen, the main result of the American Revolution was the 
“enormous increase in the democratic potential” in politics and law.155 The principle of 
universal suffrage, the regulation of commerce, state intervention in industry, and the 
alteration of taxation patterns according to the will of the sovereign people, who 
effectively controlled state legislatures through annual elections, were part of the legacy 
of the revolution. The new powers to regulate commerce were put in practice 
immediately after the war, when 7 out of the 13 states in the confederation took measures 
to alleviate the scarcity of money and the private debts of farmers, who petition the 
government to issue paper money, which had been abandoned during the war. Due to the 
fear of devaluation and loss of investments, paper money was bitterly opposed by 
merchants, planters, and creditors, but the pressure from the yeomen farmers, who 
accounted for the majority of the population, could not be contained.156 In the 1780s, the 
United States was for the most part composed of rural communities. Even though there 
was a powerful commercial elite settled in the costal urban centers, the bulk of the 
population still lived off the land and used barter instead of cash in most of their 
transactions.  
The American Revolution brought about not only liberation from the British yoke 
and a desire for democratic rule, but also an economic recession. While by severing ties 
with England the Unites States loss its most important trading partner, the devastation left 
by the war meant a material contraction of the economy. Personal income remained 
stagnant from 1774–1790,157 and, especially for farmers, who endured the constant 
looting of their lands and resources during the war, debt became an ubiquitous and 
constant threat to property, liberty, and full citizenship. Due to the recession, independent 
farmers, many of them war veterans, became tenants in their own land, were often jailed, 
and lost their political rights together with their property. Even though the idea of 
universal male suffrage was starting a trend in several states, and at the time of the 
Federal Convention the majority of states in the union had extended the right of suffrage 
beyond freeholders, some states still required property to be able to vote, and all of them 
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except for Pennsylvania158 required a considerable amount of property to become an 
elected official, which effectively separated the common people from the elites who 
represented them in government.  
The 1780 Massachusetts Constitution granted the right to vote to male owners of 
local property, valued at least in sixty pounds or combined with an annul income of three 
pounds.159 Even though the provision requiring pecuniary qualifications to be able to vote 
was criticized by some of the towns as “infringement on the natural rights”160 and “a 
degree of slavery,”161 the rule opened the path to citizenship to the majority of war 
veterans, who received a minimum of sixty pounds for three years of service.162 
However, the political right of direct lawmaking and ruling was reserved for the 
wealthiest individuals; to become a senator a citizen had to own five times the minimum 
amount of property to be eligible to vote, and to become governor, sixteen times.163 Thus, 
although the property requirements to vote were not too stringent, which made the 
Massachusetts political process fairly inclusive at that time, the reigns of government 
were still reserved for affluent citizens. This inequality of wealth between the majority of 
private citizens and their representatives would prove pernicious when the debt crisis 
brought the interests of these two groups into direct conflict. As early as 1784, citizens 
affected by debt, taxes, and lack of currency begun to spontaneously organize in 
committees or councils, from which emanated petitions for redress.164 However, the 
representative government remained deaf to the common people’s voice and continued to 
enforce contracts and agreements, which threw many farmers out of their lands and into 
jail.  
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In addition to a damaged economy and debt collection, farmers were 
overwhelmed with new taxes being levied to fund the nascent republic. As Plough Jogger 
argued in the press days before the debt rebellion started in 1786:  
I’ve labored hard all my days and fared hard. I have been 
greatly abused, have been obliged to do more than my part 
in the war; been loaded with class rates, town rates, 
province rates, Continental rates and all rates... been pulled 
and hauled by sheriffs, constables and collectors, and had 
my cattle sold for less than they were worth. I have been 
obliged to pay and nobody will pay me. I have lost a great 
deal by this man and that man and t’other man, and the 
great men are going to get all we have and I think it is time 
for us to rise and put a stop to it, and have no more courts, 
nor sheriffs, nor collectors nor lawyers, and I know that we 
are the biggest party, let them say what they will. We’ve 
come to relieve the distresses of the people. There will be 
no court until they have redress of their grievances.165 
When the institutional path for rectification was exhausted, and the representative 
government remained unaccountable, the organized multitude engaged in direct action by 
closing and burning courthouses where debt records were kept. According to the more 
conservative sections of the elite, the rebels were no more than criminals because they 
wanted to abolish private property and debts, and achieve land redistribution with the 
help of tender, paper money. In a letter to John Adams, George Washington quotes 
General Knox’s description of the radical group as accounting for a fifth of the 
population, “a body of twelve or fifteen thousand desperate and unprincipled men,”166 
which positions the rebels as a threat to the moral virtue of the republic. An echo of these 
arguments is present in Abigail Adams’ concerned letter to Jefferson in the midst of the 
rebellion:  
Ignorant, wrestles desperadoes, without conscience or 
principals, have led a deluded multitude to follow their 
standard, under pretense of grievances which have no 
existence but in their imaginations. Some of them were 
crying out for a paper currency, some for an equal 
distribution of property, some were for annihilating all 
debts…167 
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However, the debt rebellion was not the works of a bunch of corrupt men or a 
deceived multitude, but a popular movement based upon local committees organized for 
the purpose of exerting their constitutional rights. Even though this rebellion was later 
known as Shays’ Rebellion, war hero Daniel Shays did not initiate the movement, but 
only led its final armed struggles.168 The power of the rebellion was not on its leader, but 
on the collective force of organized common people. Jefferson was perhaps the only 
prominent official to recognize the beneficial element of the rebellion. For him freedom 
in the republic hinges on public education and local self-government,169 and since the 
debt rebellion was based on local committees, it was the closest expression of his theory 
of elementary republics. Jefferson’s idea of separation of powers and checks and balances 
referred not only to functions of government, but to the relation between ward, county, 
state, and national governments. For Jefferson, the ward was the ultimate bulwark of 
freedom, and the small landholders, the most valuable part of the state. 
The elementary republics of the wards, the county 
republics, the State republics, and the republic of the 
Union, would form a gradation of authorities, standing each 
on the basis of law, holding every one its delegated share of 
powers, and constituting truly a system of fundamental 
balances and checks for the government. Where every man 
is a sharer in the direction of his ward-republic, or some of 
the higher ones, and feels he is a participator in the 
government of affairs, not merely at an election one day in 
a year, but every day; when there shall not be a man in the 
State who will not be a member of some one of its councils, 
great or small, he will let the heart be torn out of his body 
sooner than his power be wrested from him by a Caesar or 
a Bonaparte.170 
 
Following a plebeian interpretation of republican thought, Jefferson saw this kind 
of popular rebellions as constitutive to a good republic, because freedom is only attained 
through periodic resistance against oppression. For freedom to be preserved, rulers must 
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be regularly warned of the power of the common people: “the tree of liberty must be 
refreshed from time to time with the blood of patriots & tyrants. It is it’s natural 
manure.”171 Representative government and civil society are in permanent need of 
reconciliation, in a relentless struggle for and against inequality, and when the gap 
between state and local government is too wide, rebellion is necessary to coerce 
representative government to achieve more equality through a show of force of the 
collective power of the multitude.  
This unusual view about the productive nature of rebellion was certainly not 
shared by the rest of political leaders. As Jon Elster claims, the rebellion caused an 
element of “visceral fear”172 that was a driving force for the calling of the constituent 
assembly and influenced the deliberation of the Founders.173 But the Federal Convention 
was not only a response to an emotional reaction based on the violent acts themselves, 
but also to a rational, “prudential fear,” a fear rooted on the logical expectations brought 
about by the equalizing effects of emancipation. Political leaders feared that the 
democratic force born with the revolution and enshrined in the Declaration of 
Independence would give preeminence to the leveling spirit, to the redistribution of 
property and the control of commerce for the benefit of all citizens. The fear of the 
American upper classes was a prudential fear —a logical conclusion derived from the 
principles of democracy and the continuing political equalization in society— which was 
channeled and made effective thanks to the visceral fear ignited in the rebellion that 
ultimately galvanized support for a counterrevolution and the drafting of the Constitution.  
America fits the revolutionary pattern of “two steps forward, one step backward,” 
a democratic revolution undone by a counterrevolution against democratic ideals.174 
Revolution of the fundamental structure of political society was rooted in the war of 
independence, in the battlefield —in which the rich and those of moderate means are 
brought into close contact, and class ceases to be a legitimate division between rulers and 
ruled. As Plato argues, the close encounter between the rich and the poor in a condition of 
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war is likely to brings about the collapse of oligarchy because the people would be able 
see their rulers “carrying a good deal of superfluous flesh… wheezing and struggling,” 
unworthy of their wealth and high-ranking position.175 In the American colonies, war had 
also an equalizing effect that inevitably led to the desire for democracy, which gives 
“equal share in the constitution and public office.”176 According to Jensen, the specific 
expression of democracy that ignited fear in the elites, and ultimately brought about the 
Convention, was economic legislation aimed at “suspending or delaying the collection of 
debt and taxes” and the issuing of paper money.177 James Madison made this clear at the 
beginning of the Convention by stating that the interests of the majority were a threat to 
the rights of the minority:  
Debtors have defrauded their creditors. The landed interest 
has borne hard on the mercantile interest. The Holders of 
one species of property have thrown a disproportion of 
taxes on the holders of another species. The lesson we are 
to draw from the whole is that where a majority are united 
by a common sentiment, and have an opportunity, the 
rights of the minor party become insecure. 
 
 Even though the intellectual aptitude of the framers as lawyers and experienced 
politicians is the most significant feature often highlighted in historical accounts of the 
American founding, if one analyzes the composition of the Federal Convention, 
individual biographies reveal that it was finance, more than lawyering, what was more 
predominant among the members. While 56% of the framers were lawyers and 
politicians, 74% of them were moneylenders of some sort,178 which puts the issue of debt 
and currency speculation at the top of the list of interests the delegates were probably 
aiming at protecting when negotiating constitutional provisions. Therefore, not only the 
overwhelming majority of members were rich property owners —which foreseeably put 
the protection of property as the principal object of the new state— but were also 
creditors being threatened by popular measures advocating debt relief against the 
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enforcement of contracts —which comes to reinforce the role of prudential fear in the 
constituent process regarding the protection of a specific type of property: financial 
assets.  
 Departing from the principles established in the Declaration of Independence, a 
basic premise in the discussions of those present during the 1787 Federal Convention was 
that the safety of property rights —not the happiness and prosperity of the people— was 
the main purpose of the state.179 Except for a couple of dissenting opinions, there was 
general agreement among the delegates that the protection of property must be the 
fundamental aim of the new federation. Within the discussions surrounding 
representation in Congress, Governor Morris argued for property to be taken into account 
when estimating the proportion of representatives to the lower branch: “Life & liberty 
were generally said to be of more value  than property. An accurate view of the matter 
would nevertheless prove that property was the main object of Society.”180 He was 
seconded by John Rutledge, planter and lawyer from South Carolina, and Rufus King, 
lender, merchant, and lawyer from Massachusetts, who stated that property was certainly 
the “primary object of society.”181 It is striking that the defense of property as the 
principle aim of the state was not argued for on normative grounds, but just taken for 
granted, an obvious claim all delegates —rich property owners— shared. The only 
delegate providing an explanation of this principle was James Madison, who did so 
through a realist argument grounded on interest:  
In all civilized Countries the people fall into different classes 
having a real or supposed difference of interests. There will 
be creditors & debtors, farmers, merchants & manufacturers. 
There will be particularly the distinction of rich & poor… 
An increase of population will of necessity increase the 
proportion of those who will labour under all the hardships of 
life, & secretly sigh for a more equal distribution of its 
blessings. These may in time outnumber those who are 
placed above the feelings of indigence. According to the 
equal laws of suffrage, the power will slide into the hands of 
the former. No agrarian attempts have yet been made in in 
this Country, but symptoms, of a leveling spirit, as we have 
understood, have sufficiently appeared in a certain quarters to 
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give notice of the future danger. How is this danger to be 
guarded against on republican principles?182 
 
 In this way, Madison reveals the protection of property, against the dispossessed, 
as the central aim of the constitutional design based on republican principles. He argued 
that pressures for wealth redistribution coming from below would be inevitable because 
“according to the equal laws of suffrage, the power will slide into the hands of the 
[poor].”183 The challenge for him was then how to guard against this “danger” coming 
from the masses on republican principles. For achieving this enterprise, he relied mainly 
on Montesquieu —who he calls the “oracle”— and his elitist procedural model of 
republic based on universal suffrage, representative government, and separation of 
powers.  
Despite being in favor of the continued recognition of hereditary aristocracy as 
necessary for liberty, Montesquieu became the most influential thinker during the 
founding of the first modern republic in America.184 Based on the tenet that ‘power 
checks power’ and that adequate distribution of powers185 (executive, legislative, and 
judicial) was enough to avoid corruption, Montesquieu’s interpretation of the mixed 
constitution appears as decisively elitist and proceduralist, a mechanistic system of 
checks and balances designed to produce liberty through correct procedures and 
institutional interactions, with the people exercising sovereignty only when voting for 
representatives.186  
Even though Montesquieu’s The Spirit of the Laws was one of the most influential 
texts informing the theoretical framework propping the constitution, and the framers 
heavily relied on his model to accomplish the Lockean state as protector of property, the 
model of representative government and separation of powers established in America was 
different from what the “oracle” had envisioned. Montesquieu’s republican model was a 
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mixed constitution —an elitist regime based on the unequal relation between the elite and 
the people expressed in two separate representative bodies, with different interests and 
equal faculties for enacting and vetoing legislation. The American republic, on the other 
hand, was based on the liberal principle of universal equality, which made Montesquieu’s 
mixed constitution, based upon the institutional recognition of the division between the 
aristocracy and the common people, impossible. The nascent republic demanded the 
elimination of privilege and the embrace of popular government, which undermined the 
check and balance between the elite and the people, one of the cornerstones of liberty in 
Montesquieu’s model.  
This elitist view of the republic was pervasive in the discussions in the Federal 
Convention. Regarding the mode of election to the House of Representatives, there was a 
strong opposition to the election by the people and there was general agreement that the 
common people “should have as little to do as may be about the Government” because 
they are in want of information and “are constantly liable to be misled.”187 To the few 
objections against the aristocratic character of the constitution that, given “the inequality 
of representation,” puts the state “at the mercy of its rulers,”188 the anti-democratic 
faction argued the problem was not elite corruption but the inevitable corruption that 
people enable when entering the government. The problem was not that an elitist cast 
could grow out of the House of Representatives but that giving political power to the 
common people would lead to corruption due to the material subordination of the 
working classes:  
Give the votes to people who have no property, and they 
will sell them to the rich who will be able to buy them. We 
should not confine our attention to the present moment. The 
time is not distant when this Country will abound with 
mechanics & manufacturers who will receive their bread 
from their employers. Will such men be the secure & 
faithful Guardians of liberty? Will they be the impregnable 
barrier against aristocracy?... The ignorant and the 
dependent can be as little trusted with the public interest.189  
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Endorsing Montesquieu’s elitist argument that the spirit of democracy was 
potentially despotic and the common people should only have the power to elect 
representatives, the American framers extensively discussed ways in which to undermine 
the “evils” that flow from the “excess of democracy”190 by restricting suffrage to property 
owners. Freeholders were considered as the best guardians of liberty, and “the restriction 
of the right to them as a necessary defense against the dangerous influence of those 
multitudes without property & without principle with which our Country like all others, 
will in time abound.”191 There was such agreement among the delegates that it was at first 
thought that the restriction of suffrage to property owners would not be too unpopular, 
since “the great mass of our Citizens is composed at this time of freeholders, and will be 
pleased with it.”192 However, because numerous states had already extended the right to 
vote to white males, regardless of property, this option was deemed unfeasible. Because it 
was such a “tender point, and strongly guarded by most of the State Constitutions,” the 
delegates thought the people would not ratify the constitution “if it should subject them to 
be disfranchised.”193 Consequently, the right to vote —what for Montesquieu was the 
people’s sovereign action— was left out of the constitution, reserved for the individual 
states to decide on expanding or restricting the suffrage. 
In the American implementation of Montesquieu’s model, the framers wanted to 
accomplish the Lockean state as protector of property. Even if there was no legal nobility 
in America, the Senate was conceived as the embodiment of the aristocracy, as the 
guardian of property against the common people.194 The Senate was seen not only as 
being able to “filter” the passions of the common people, as famously stated in Federalist 
10, but also as representing propertied interests because “one of its primary objects [is] 
the guardianship of property.”195 Given that at least 2/3 of citizens in America were at 
that time yeomen farmers, the framers saw as the interest of the current majority to 
conceive of the Senate as a body representing property owners, guarding against a future 
majority of property-less citizens.  
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Figure 2.10 Constitution of the United States, 1803 
 
The same as Montesquieu’s, Madison's constitutional model was designed against 
the tyranny of the majority as the greatest danger in the republic because of the majority’s 
leveling spirit. To prevent corruption and domination within government, Madison’s 
mechanistic model of representative government relied on the division of functions and 
conceived “mutual relations” of the several departments of government as the “means of 
keeping each other in their proper places.”196 The most effective way to counteract power 
is by giving officials of different departments the necessary “constitutional means and 
personal motives to resist encroachment of the others.”197  
In the American implementation of Montesquieu’s model, the Senate was 
conceived as the embodiment of the aristocracy, as the guardian of property against the 
common people. The general object of the constitutional framework was 
to provide a cure for the evils  under which the U.S. 
laboured; that in tracing these evils to their  origin every 
man had found it in the turbulence and follies of  
democracy: that some check therefore was to be sought for 
against this tendency of our Governments: and that a good 
Senate seemed most likely to answer the purpose.198  
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The Senate was seen not only as being able to “refine and enlarge the public 
views,” blocking “intemperate and pernicious resolutions” resulting from the people 
being “seduced by factious leaders,” 199 but also as representing propertied interest. The 
Senate was conceived as having as “one of its primary objects the guardianship of 
property,”200 and thus as checking the “excesses against personal liberty, private property 
& personal safety.” Not only would the Senate have the institutional role of being the 
guardian of individual liberties, but also the members of the Senate must be wealthy so to 
…have a personal interest in checking the other branch… It 
must have great personal property, it must have the 
aristocratic spirit; it must love to lord it thro' pride, pride is 
indeed the great principle that actuates both the poor & the 
rich. It is this principle which in the former resists, in the 
latter abuses authority.201  
 
In addition to the aristocratic ethos that the framers wished the Senate to embody, 
the spirit of commerce was also thought of as foundational to the new representative 
republic. The overly positive view of commerce as the cure of all evils that Montesquieu 
embraces was also predominant in the Federal Convention, except for the caveat posed 
by a group of planters, who saw commerce as a source of inequality from which a 
commercial nobility, “a new order of men will arise.”202 Nevertheless, in the constituent 
discussions the commercial spirit of free trade triumphed over that of virtue as the 
foundation of the new constitutional order, and was let free to “reign alone and not be 
crossed by another.”203  Moreover, going beyond Montesquieu’s idea that the spirit of 
commerce would be a moderating force for democratic virtue, the framers thought of 
democracy and free enterprise almost as opposing principles; while the evils of 
government were rooted in the “turbulence and follies of democracy,”204 free trade was 
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the source of moderation and liberty, the cure for the excesses of democracy. “Take away 
commerce, and the democracy will triumph.”205 
 What Madison and the rest of the founders were establishing was thus not a 
democracy but a republic, which Madison defines as a “government in which the scheme 
of representation takes place.”206 This new regime type, defined by its representative 
character, by “the delegation of the government… to a small number of citizens elected 
by the rest,” needed as a “sufficient” condition to be considered as a free form of 
government that the “persons administering it be appointed, either directly or indirectly, 
by the people,” and that they hold their office according to the law.207 Consequently, the 
central institution of this new form of republic is for Madison the procedure of election, 
which is both the method of selecting a ruling elite and the source of normativity for the 
regime, the “essence of a free and responsible government.” 208  If one follows 
Montesquieu’s criteria for determining regime type, the nature of the representative 
republic is defined by who has political power. In the American republic’s case, the 
holders of power are not the few or the many, or a mixture of both, but the 
representatives: a government by the few authorized and checked by all citizens.  
Because procedurally the government is legitimate if elected by majority under 
set rules, the burden of producing legitimacy and good leaders is placed not on individual 
elites but on the “right to elect,” a procedure that was for Montesquieu inherently 
aristocratic. The whole complex federal structure of power put in place by the framers 
was erected on the right to elect, procedure that was not thought of as faithfully 
representing the will of citizens, but as a better way to approximate the common good: 
“the public voice, pronounced by the representatives of the people, will be more 
consonant to the public good than if pronounced by the people themselves, convened for 
that purpose.” The clear superiority of representation over the democratic method of 
popular assembly however did not blind Madison to the tyranny likely to occur in such a 
system in which “men of factious tempers, of local prejudices, or of sinister designs, may, 
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by intrigue, by corruption, or by other means, first obtain the suffrages, and then betray 
the interests of the people.”209  
I wish, among other reasons why something should be 
done, that those who have been friendly to the adoption of 
this constitution, may have the opportunity of proving to 
those who were opposed to it, that they were as sincerely 
devoted to liberty and a republican government, as those 
who charged them with wishing the adoption of this 
constitution in order to lay the foundation of an aristocracy 
or despotism. It will be a desirable thing to extinguish from 
the bosom of every member of the community any 
apprehensions, that there are those among his countrymen 
who wish to deprive them of the liberty for which they 
valiantly fought and honorably bled.210  
 
Madison responded to the challenge that political corruption posed for 
representative government with an argument based on the beneficial effect of the size of 
the republic, and another based on the effectiveness of the surveillance exerted by the 
press and public opinion over public officials. The first argument, developed at length in 
Federalist 10, is mostly probabilistic, premised on the idea that more/larger/bigger is 
better. Madison argues that while the probability of having good candidates standing for 
election and of selecting them increases proportionally with the pool of candidates and 
the electorate, a large republic is “most favorable to the election of proper guardians of 
the public weal.” But having a larger electorate would not only be beneficial in terms of 
selecting good representatives, but would also decrease the probability of domination by 
the majority: 
Extend the sphere and you take in a greater variety of 
parties and interests; you make it less probable that a 
majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade 
the rights of other citizens; or if such a common motive 
exists, it will be more difficult for all who feel it to discover 
their own strength and to act in unison with each other.211 
 
Given the factual pluralism in a large republic, majorities are difficult to attain 
and mobilize due to the collective action problems that make it harder to transform the 
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will of citizens into actual political power. 212  Therefore, for Madison having a 
representative government in a large republic would constitute in itself a guard against 
the tyranny of the majority by effectively hindering the capacity of organization of the 
masses at a grand scale. The federal structure would further enhance this anti-
majoritarian —but mostly anti-plebeian— feature of the large representative republic, by 
making it less likely for “a rage for paper money, for an abolition of debts, for an equal 
division of property, or for any other improper or wicked project…to pervade the whole 
body of the Union.”213  
The structural protection against the domination of the majority, however, does 
not apply as well to the domination coming from the powerful few, who do not 
experience the collective action problems of the masses. While separation of functions 
and jurisdictions is meant to counteract ambition with ambition, mechanical checks only 
deal with the existence of factions within representative government, not with the quality 
of the representatives, which hinges on the electoral procedure. For Madison to elect 
good representatives it is necessary to scrutinize them, and thus the right to free speech 
and to a free press is the most fundamental political right in the republic giving “value 
and efficacy” to the right of electing by enabling the censorial power of public opinion 
and allowing for government accountability.214  
Even if the American Constitution contained a detailed organization of the powers 
of representative government, it had little recognition of individual rights215 and did not 
recognize the rights to vote or to freedom of speech. Madison was initially opposed to a 
formal recognition of rights because a list of rights could never be exhaustive or properly 
enforced, and thus would only account for “parchment barriers” against government 
oppression.216 Nevertheless, the first ten amendments to the Constitution, which are now 
called the Bill of Rights, contain a list of individual rights as conceived, in a Lockean 
fashion, against the power of the federal government. It is this fundamental antagonism 
between government power and individual freedoms what establishes perhaps the 
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original, most decisive rule of interpretation in American constitutional jurisprudence: a 
categorical approach to rights in which freedoms are understood as absolute vis-à-vis the 
government. At least in theory, the government must not infringe on individual rights, 
and thus liberty acquires a “negative” meaning: lack of state interference.  
Madison puts forward an interpretation of the right to free speech as both 
functional —because aimed at enabling the proper exercise of the right to elect— and 
absolute, not subject to abridgment. Freedom of the press and speech are not ends in 
themselves, but means to achieving accountability and virtuousness in politics, expected 
to expose the truth about public officials and affairs, so citizens can adequately judge 
characters and measures, and elect good leaders. Absolute free speech, understood as the 
right to scrutinize public officials, was conceived by Madison both as a necessary 
premise for exercising the right to elect and as the ultimate guard of liberty, allowing for 
the formal structure of power based on separation of functions and veto powers to 
reproduce liberty through the normal functioning of political institutions.  
According to Madison freedom of speech should be conceived as absolute 
because it is a natural right and therefore the federal government lacks the authority to 
control speech “on the original ground of not being delegated by the Constitution, and 
consequently withheld from government.” 217  In addition to the philosophical and 
jurisdictional justification for conceiving free speech as an absolute right, Madison claims 
that limiting speech is impossible without undermining the surveillance role of the press 
and the whole republican structure. Good and abusive speech are for Madison 
inseparable. Despite the press being “checkered… with abuse,” it is impossible to cut the 
“noxious branches” without injuring the “proper fruits.”218 If free speech is curtailed 
(either by prior restraint or posterior criminal actions), valuable information about 
political leaders and the policies they sponsor would be lost, and citizens would choose 
corrupt leaders, who would govern for their own interest or that of a faction. The burden 
of virtue in the Madisonean republic is thus placed on citizens’ informed election of 
representatives, which depends on the surveillance role of the press and the unveiling of 
truth about candidates, laws, and policies.  
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IV. Neo-Republican Mixed Constitution: Popular Power as Discursive   Control 
Today perhaps the greatest exponent of the elitist proceduralist strand of 
republican constitutional thought is Philip Pettit, who interprets liberal democracies as 
mixed constitutions and seeks to develop the institutional checking power of the people 
to its highest degree. Searching for a “social philosophy that is at once anti-collectivist 
and anti-atomist,” Pettit found in modern republican thought a conception of liberty that 
is “intermediate between the ideals of non-interference and self-mastery.”219 According 
to his reading of republican thought, republican freedom as non-domination would, on 
the one hand, justify non-arbitrary interference, and on the other, require the absence of 
mastery, providing an alternative between the liberal and democratic conceptions of 
liberty. To be free in a republic would be the status of being only subject to interference 
that “is not arbitrary and does not represent a form of domination: when it is controlled 
by the interests and opinions of those affected, being required to serve those interests in a 
way that conforms with those opinions.”220  
Even if Pettit’s proposed conception of liberty is certainly thicker than a purely 
Hobbesian one, and he would never endorse the anti-democratic ideas that were 
pervasive at the moment of the American founding, his proposal is unable to escape the 
elitist framework of formal equality and the preservation of socio-economic hierarchies. 
He not only takes the constitutional order as a given, but also interprets it as a form of 
mixed constitution in which the checking power of the people is exercised individually 
through the courts and collectively through neutral, technocratic elite bodies. The popular 
element not only does not have an institution to assemble and exercise direct collective 
power, but also has the duty to individually resist oppression through the resources 
provided by the system. Formally egalitarian, when seen through a plebeian lens the 
status quo bias embedded in the connection between non-arbitrariness and individual 
interests comes to the fore.  
Since in many political decisions there are always winners and losers, under 
Pettit’s normative framework any interference by the state to change the balance of socio-
economic power, depriving a minority to empower a majority, would be a form of 
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domination because it would not track the interests of the few being forced to give up part 
of their property. According to Pettit, the goal of intensifying non-domination supports 
state provision of social services to fulfill what Amartya Sen’s describes as the basic 
capabilities for functioning in society, even if it is hostile to material egalitarianism.  
In order for the state to provide one person with extra 
resources, and thereby to extend their undominated choices, 
it must deprive another person of those resources, and must 
thereby reduce the extent of that person’s undominated 
choices. There is no reason to think that the transfer will 
make for a gain. On the contrary, the costs of the state 
intervention will almost certainly mean that less is given to 
the second person than is taken from the first and that the 
transfer makes for a decrease in the extent of undominated 
choices overall.221  
 
A strict application of Pettit’s definition that demands the state to be “controlled 
by the interests and opinions of those affected” would not allow for redistributive policies 
beyond universal social services, such as the motion to allow the state to expropriate 
property without compensation, recently passed by the South African parliament.222 The 
result is the preservation of the status quo and its current socio-economic hierarchies 
based on patterns of accumulation and dispossession that cannot be modified without 
domination. This seems closer to a liberal conception of freedom in which individual 
rights are conceived as absolute against the state, rather than to a republican view of 
liberty in which rights are inherently political, and thus subject to legitimate abridgement 
and even outright violation, like in the case if expropriation of property, if it is necessary 
for preserving a free republic. 
Following Montesquieu’s positivist interpretation of the rule of law as the mark of 
liberty, Pettit argues that freedom as the lack of arbitrary interference is only possible in a 
regime with separation of powers in which the people elect representatives. However, for 
Pettit these are not sufficient conditions for freedom, and therefore proposes to enhance 
the  “contestatory” nature of liberal democracies. Even if the American republic was not 
conceived as a mixed constitution but as a representative government with separation of 
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powers and checks and balances, Pettit argues our current system of government is a 
form of mixed constitution  
insofar as it lets final decisions on law and policy be 
determined, whether simultaneously or sequentially, on the 
basis of interaction between different centres, civic and 
official, executive and legislative, constitutional and 
judicial.223  
 
Through Pettit’s framework, the mixed constitution is not an institutional structure giving 
political power to the few and the many, but a “contestatory constitution” based on an 
“acceptability game” that allows for the rise of “shared policy-making norms,” and that 
guarantees multiple “sites of opposition” such as electoral debates, public justification of 
policy, and political exchanges in the media.224 By abstracting the ancient checking role 
exerted by the people through class-specific institutions, and conceiving it as a system of 
“popular control” that influences and gives direction to government directly and 
indirectly, Pettit attempts to reinterpret the representative republic as a mixed constitution 
in which the people could exert discursive control over the state. 
Even if Pettit correctly diagnoses the shortcomings of liberal democracies, 
highlighting the current lack of effective control of the people over law and policy, his 
attempt to empower individuals within the current structure does not allow him to exit the 
elitist constitutional tradition. He rightly argues that the electoral system is deficient in 
guaranteeing “the people an unconditioned sort of influence” on certain aspects of 
government because of public officials’ unwillingness to comply with popular 
authority.225 The best way to force government to yield to popular influence would be, 
according to Pettit, to embrace a form of mixed constitution that would  
ensure the separating of the many powers of government, 
the sharing of each of those powers by different authorities, 
and the recognition of popular acquiescence as the ultimate 
guarantor of the constitution.226  
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While separation of powers and sharing of prerogatives are already institutional 
features of liberal representative governments, the third normative goal of having popular 
consent as ultimate guardian of the constitution has endemic problems in terms of the 
recognition of true consent and the enforcement of indirect popular influence on 
government. 
To address the institutional weakness of popular influence, Pettit proposes a  
“dual-aspect model” of democracy aimed at enhancing popular control over government 
by providing citizens with an “individualized, unconditioned, and efficacious influence 
that pushes [government] in a direction that they find acceptable.”227 The duality of 
Pettit’s model comes from the two temporal registers in which popular influence 
operates: while in the short-term a plurality of citizens exert influence on law and policy, 
in the long-term the people, conceived as a “group entity, taking the form of a singular 
agency,” constitute the state itself by ensuring the compliance of law and policy with the 
norms that frame the exercise of political power.228 Based on the ideal conceptions of 
“public interest” —understood as “those goods that anyone who accepts the necessity of 
living in equal terms with others is likely to have collectively guaranteed or promoted”— 
and the “invisible-hand mode” —through which electors, seeking their particular 
interests, would promote a “utilitarian version of the public interest”— Pettit argues these 
three requirements for achieving a more perfect mixed constitution —individualized, 
unconditioned, and efficacious popular influence— are already present in our political 
regimes. While the electoral system would provide for “individualized contestation,” the 
unconditioned character of this contestation would be based on the “resistive character of 
the citizenry,” and its efficacy would depend on the “insulation of the channels of popular 
influence against the distorting effects of electoral pressures and private lobbies.”229  
To force the state to be influenced by the people and track individual interests, 
Pettit argues that the constitution must establish democratic institutions with both a 
“positive search-and-identify dimension” equivalent to an “authorial” form of control, 
and a “negative scrutinize-and-disallow dimension,” which he understands as an 
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“editorial” form of control. 230  Accordingly, through democratic institutional channels 
ordinary people would be able to formulate as well as criticize law and policy, exercising 
the type of popular control proper to a mixed constitutional regime. Despite Pettit’s 
attempt to empower individual citizens by giving them negative and positive authority to 
author and edit law and policy, the powers he gives to ordinary citizens are far removed 
from the common account of authorial and editorial powers, and the power mixed 
constitutions have afforded to the popular element. 
For Pettit the people are “indirect, electoral authors” because they “choose the 
personnel who will author the laws and decisions.”231 This is a highly controversial claim 
that he does not philosophically substantiate. Even if individual citizens would contribute 
with their selection of representatives to the collective legislative and policy-making 
process, they are certainly not authors. The same as the selection of my favorite group of 
artists to make a sculpture under certain guidelines does not make me an indirect author 
of that piece of art, the selection of representatives to make law and policy does not make 
citizens authors of what is produced by representative government. Citizens indirectly 
authorize the law through their election of representatives,232 but they do not make the 
law. And even if one were to concede that electing lawmakers is akin to indirectly 
making the law, this tenuous connection between the right to elect and the right to author 
becomes even more dubious given the fact of what Pettit calls the discursive dilemma: 
“that even if all representatives endorse a consistent set of policy judgments, the effect of 
aggregating their votes may be to support an inconsistent package.”233  
In addition to conceiving citizens as indirect electoral authors, Pettit argues 
citizens have an editorial power capable of “rigorously scrutinizing and eliminating those 
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candidate policies and those modes of policy-implementation that do not advance 
common avowable interests.”234 However, the popular editorial power he proposes is not 
strictly editorial —having the authority to modify law and policy, and even to veto 
them— but rather a “power of challenge” or “contestation” that is exercised through 
procedural resources, such as separation of powers and depoliticized decision-making 
bodies, 235  consultative opportunities for non-binding citizen input, and the judicial 
system. More than editors able to direct and edit the content of law and policy, in Pettit’s 
framework citizens are better understood as subscribers of the government who can 
challenge the direction and content of law and policy through petitions, public statements, 
and the courts, but certainly have little pull to make substantial changes to the “editorial 
line” of the government.  
If we compare the powers Montesquieu gave to common citizens within an elitist 
mixed constitution, to the power Pettit gives to the people in his ideal dual-aspect model 
of democracy, it becomes clear that common citizens in Pettit’s framework would have 
even less power to resist the oppression coming from elites than in Montesquieu’s 
commercial republic. In addition to giving citizens the right to elect representatives, 
Montesquieu gave to the representatives of the people the powers of introducing 
legislation and vetoing attempts at domination coming from the elites. In Pettit’s model, 
by contrast, citizens have the power only to elect representatives and contest laws and 
policies mainly through the courts, even if in his latest work he also endorses referenda as 
a desirable way of exercising popular control —not too different from what the American 
Constitution allows to citizens today. According to Pettit, the existence in liberal 
democracies of “a multi-dimensional, multi-centred system of popular interaction and 
decision-making” would mean that “the people rule themselves” to the extent that their 
influence is present throughout the system of checks and balances,236 which ultimately 
gives legitimacy to government and normativity to the law.   
Pettit’s interpretation of the mixed constitution as a “contestatory” framework in 
which individuals and groups have procedural, consultative, and appellate resources to 
challenge government decisions is, under a plebeian lens, decisively elitist, since it does 
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not conceive of strictly popular institutions and gives to the people only weak channels to 
effectively control government. This neo-republican model is not only anti-majoritarian 
but also proceduralist, and thus blind to systemic corruption. Given Pettit’s conception of 
liberty as the lack of arbitrary interference that equates liberty to the rule of law under 
contestatory conditions, structural forms of domination cannot be properly addressed 
without putting into question rules, procedures, and institutions. If liberty is achieved 
under a rule of law that presupposes contestatory institutions and procedures in the 
making of the law, then there would be no need for extra-legal action such as political 
protest and social movements, to exert radical social change. Civic virtue and 
contestatory institutions would be enough to keep systemic corruption in check, by 
constant, multi-dimensional, multi-centered resistance to forms of oppression by 
individual citizens. The obvious problem is that while the majority of liberal democracies 
have all or a great number of Pettit’s contestatory institutions and procedures, civic virtue 
—and the minimum conditions for civic virtue to exist— are lacking, which undermines 
effective and efficacious popular resistance against oligarchic domination and liberty 
itself. This endemic problem allows for structural forms of domination such as sexism237 
and racism238 not only to exist alongside the rule of law, but also to be reproduced 
through institutions, laws, and procedures that effectively keep gender and racial 
oppression in place. How are these structural forms of domination going to be dismantled 
piecemeal if it is mainly up to the victims of domination to act, not only by resisting, but 
also by actively challenging domination?  
While the burden of virtue in the republic was for Cicero in the elites, for 
Montesquieu in the system of checks and balances, and for Madison in the procedure of 
election, Pettit places the burden of virtue in the “resistive” character of the citizens who 
will scrutinize and resist potentially dominating decisions by the government. As I argued 
in the previous chapter, to place the virtue of the system in the “vigilance” of individual 
citizens, who perhaps already live in conditions of oppression, puts an unduly burden on 
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individuals without providing the infrastructure to really guarantee active civic resistance. 
This would be the equivalent to leaving representative institutions to their own devices. 
 
 














There is much controversy within critical theory about the meaning of 
materialism and its centrality within the Marxist tradition.1 I do not wish to contribute 
here to this philosophical debate but rather to use materialism as a method to study the 
constitutional structure and its legality, as a lens to analyze the organization of political 
and economic power, rights, and the law as constructed in a specific conjuncture,2 
conditioned by existing power relations and their ideological justificatory structures. A 
materialist interpretation of the constitution seems to necessarily originate in the factual 
organization and exercise of power that is allowed and enabled by foundational 
institutions, rules, and procedures —or the lack thereof. Materialist constitutionalism 
would be premised on the idea that the organization of political power cannot be analyzed 
without taking into account the socio-economic power structure, and how the state 
enables some kinds of actions while disabling others, targeting specific groups not only 
through the criminalization of certain behaviors (e.g. loitering) and the legalization of 
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others (e.g. campaign finance), but also through the selective enforcement of rules and 
penalties that appear as neutral. The materialist constitutional lens, because it allows for 
the engagement in a dialectical analysis of the relation between power and law3 —the 
material conditions of society and the legal, juridical, and formal provisions that (are 
supposed to) determine them— would enable a constitutional ideology that would stand 
opposed not only to legal positivism and formalism, which deny the political nature of 
constitutions and reduce their analysis to jurisprudence, excluding the application of law 
and its consequences in material terms, but also to proceduralism, which enables the 
masking of inequality and domination flourishing under democratic rules of political 
engagement.4  
The material constitutionalism I present here is not the school of constitutional 
interpretation that developed in Germany after the 1958 Lüth case, which expanded the 
sphere of constitutional rights into the relation among individuals. 5  Even if it endorsed 
the application of constitutional norms to private law —which established the foundation 
for what has been called the “horizontal effect” of constitutional law, a strategy that has 
proven successful in accounting for right violations coming from private agents as well as 
the state6— the ‘material’ aspect of German constitutionalism refers not so much to the 
relation between power and law, but to an “expression of ‘the substantive’ in law,”7 as a 
system of values centered on the principle of human dignity. 8  The material 
constitutionalism I develop here, on the contrary, does not have a pre-existing ethical 
“substance” but rather is premised on the recognition that norms develop in relation to 
society and are the result of conflict. Law would carry normativity not because it 
conforms to a pre-determined substance or supreme principle, but because of the role it 
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serves in the material conflict between domination and emancipation. In order to asses if 
a given institution, procedure, or law is ‘good’ and thus part of the normative framework 
of a free society, material constitutionalism would take into account not only the 
conformity of the institution, procedure, or law to the basic democratic principle of equal 
liberty,9 but also its effects on enabling emancipation and discouraging oppression on the 
ground.  
Material constitutionalism would also differ from Constantino Mortati’s realist 
interpretation of the Italian constitutional order in its transition to fascism. Mortati, 
attempting to infuse positivism with a material point of reference to give stability to the 
state, finds in the material constitution a “supreme source of order”10 and in the political 
party a constitutive element of the modern state, the “subject from which the fundamental 
constitution emanates.”11 For Mortati, the party is the “active element of the original 
institution” of the state, allowing for the state to assume its “political form.”12 In this way, 
the material constitution, the socio-political regime of political parties, is the normative 
anchor of the formal constitution, enabling the integration of society into the 
constitutional order. Material social relations, articulated through the party, would 
constitute a normative basis for the stability of the state, which renders this constitutional 
theory as conservative of existing socio-political hierarchies.  
In contrast to liberal constitutionalism —which sees the constitution as a set of 
“metaconstraints,”13 laws as limits on governmental power, and the rule of law as neutral, 
even if its final interpretation is the monopoly of the judiciary14— under the material lens 
the constitution appears as a political document that is dynamic, constantly undergoing 
modifications, some of them radical enough to have been considered effectively equal to 
constitutional amendments, able to change the trajectory of society independently from 
                                                
9 Identified as the principle of representative government for the first time by Condorcet. For an analysis of 
the principle see Nadia Urbinati, Representative Democracy: Principles and Genealogy (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2010). 
10 Constantino. Mortati, Constitución en sentido material (Madrid: Centro de Estudios Políticos  
y Constitucionales, 2000), p. 16 & 23.  
11 Mortati, Constitución en sentido material, p. 84.  
12 Mortati, Constitución en sentido material, p. 83. 
13 For an interpretation of the constitution as having both regulatory and constitutive rules see Stephen 
Holmes, “Precommitment and the Paradox of Democracy” in Constitutionalism and Democracy edited by 
Jon Elster and Rune Slagstad (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988). 
14 Even if Montesquieu insisted that when judges effectively become lawmakers “the life and liberty of the 




procedural amendments to the original text. According to Bruce Ackerman, the United 
States constitution is “an evolving language of politics”15 and a “historical practice”16 that 
is punctured by “constitutional politics”— extraordinary political moments such as the 
“successful struggle by the New Deal Democrats to place activist national government on 
solid constitutional footing.” 17  Revolutionary reforms originating in popular 
mobilizations would be “constitutionalized” by Supreme Court decisions, changing the 
substance of the constitution and the trajectory of society without the need of a formal 
amendment. Ackerman’s controversial idea that there are distinct processes of higher 
lawmaking that do not align with the procedures established in Article V, and that judges 
tend to adjudicate based on these unwritten, informal changes resulting from constituent 
politics, puts under the spotlight peak moments of the exercise of constituent power, but 
does not account for the progressive dismantling of the legal structure put into place by 
that constituent moment. I would argue that Ackerman’s recognition of informal 
constituent changes based on limit cases involving strong popular mobilization is 
insufficient to unveil the cumulative effects of the steady ramification of smaller 
constituent changes coming out from every other judicial decision affirming and 
deepening socio-political conditions. The only way to account for these more subtle 
changes is if we recognize the material constitution as dynamic. Through this lens the 
constitutional framework could be radically transformed not only through judicial 
interpretation, which opens and closes paths for adjudication and material possibilities for 
oppression and emancipation, but also through the power of the state to selectively realize 
these legal paths. Therefore to track the progression of the material constitution, one 
needs to go not only beyond legal norms, procedures, and adjudication, but also to 
incorporate their enforcement and the effects of the constitutional framework on society. 
Thus, a relative consequentialism, in which the legitimacy of the norm would hinge on its 
material effects in preventing and containing oppression, would be an integral part of a 
materialist analysis of the constitution.   
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Seen through the materialist lens, I would argue the liberal rule of law should no 
longer be defended as a marker of equal liberty.18 Because liberalism conceives of 
individual equal rights as immunities against the state (e.g. “Congress shall make no 
law… abridging the freedom of speech”) and interprets them as a form of negative liberty 
as non-interference from the state, the constitutionalization of equal rights is not only 
insufficient to guarantee their equal protection against the state, but also does not offer 
any security against the violation of rights in social relations in cases were the law is 
silent, vague, or disregarded. Instead of a rational framework aimed at furthering the 
common good or realizing a specific principle, legality reveals itself as a means that 
could be used to liberate individuals from oppression as well as to enforce relations of 
domination. Therefore having a rule of law does not necessarily translate into equal 
liberty. This is perhaps best exemplified with the role played by the Supreme Court in 
defending the rule of law in the American South. By nullifying the 1876 Civil Rights Act 
that aimed at enforcing the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which 
would have given African Americans a legal recourse to resist social oppression, the 
Court enabled Jim Crow laws, forcing former slaves to suffer almost 100 extra years of 
domination through legal segregation and discrimination. Congress, only after years of 
popular mobilizations, passed the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the enforcement of which has 
been mediocre at best. Despite their formal equal status, Black Americans are 
discriminated against, brutally oppressed by the police and the criminal justice system, 
and systematically stripped from voting rights. They are two times more likely to be 
stopped by police, six times more likely to serve jail time and be sentenced to mandatory 
minimums for non-violent offenses, and four times more likely to lose their voting 
rights. 19  Therefore, even if they formally have equal rights on a par with white 
Americans, seen from a materialist perspective, their oppression, allowed and enabled by 
legal regulation or the lack of it, denies this equality. The same could be said regarding 
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the status of women, gender and ethnic minorities, and the working class, whose 
exclusion and exploitation has been systematically enabled by the law or its absence.20 
The material constitution, and the elements needed to properly study it, differs 
from the conception of the constitution only as text and jurisprudence. Democratic 
constitutionalism tends to be formal and procedural in its analysis, and it is representative 
and liberal in its basic structure. The study of the formal constitution requires analyzing 
the original constituent moment, the structure of power and body of norms derived from 
it, the interpretation of these norms, and the legal change to rules and procedures. I argue 
the material constitution demands a far more complex examination because it conceives 
of the constitution as an embedded set of norms that can be adequately grasped only if we 
integrate the political, economic, and social spheres into the analysis of forms of higher 
law. The proper study of the material constitution demands, in addition to the formal 
analysis of norms, an account of 1) the superstructure, basic political and social 
institutions,21 and the power they factually exercise; 2) the rules and procedures enabling 
this exercise of power; 3) the institutionalization and exercise of constituent power; and 
4) the social effects of the constitutional framework in terms of socio-economic 
inequality and the racial, religious, and gender disparities in the application of the law. 
 
I.  Plebeian Materialist Constitutionalism 
Even if a material interpretation of constitutions can be traced back to Plato, for 
whom socio-economic inequalities were integral to the structure of political orders, the 
material assessment of the constitutional power structure did not have an emancipatory 
thrust or aimed at uncovering concealed forms of domination, but rather helped enforce 
social hierarchies. Instead of correcting for material and social inequalities, elitist 
material constitutional thought recognized the impact of these inequalities on political 
power but nevertheless promoted the political dominance of the few and the exclusion 
and subordination of the many. Even if materialist in its acknowledgment that conflict 
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between the few and the many is at the center of politics, elitist thought rejected 
democracy and its equal liberty. Moving away from materialism in its constitutional 
proposals, elitist thought often turned to idealism by proposing the suppression of conflict 
and the embrace of harmony, tranquility, security, and peace as foundational principles.22  
In addition to the suppression of conflict being impossible to sustain —like a 
pressure cooker building up steam without periodic release— after the idea of equal 
natural rights became hegemonic in the West, elitist materialist constitutional thought 
could no longer be defended as a legitimate normative basis for a political order. Its 
proposed constitutional structures, based on cast systems, hereditary citizenship rights, 
and class-based institutions are certainly not compatible with liberal democracy. 
Arguably Plato’s ideal republic of guardians in which every individual had a rigid 
designated role, or Aristotle’s preferred agrarian democracy in which the many were 
toiling away in the fields and did not actually exercise their voting rights, or Harrington’s 
democratic aristocracy in which the many were excluded from citizenship, or 
Guiccardini’s electoral aristocracy in which elections meant de facto ottimati rule,23 
would not be adequate models from which to draw lessons to reform modern 
democracies, since they do not promote equal liberty but the dominance of the few over 
the many. Building on such models is likely to further increase the systemic corruption of 
republics, accelerating their oligarchization instead of reverting it. Given that elitist 
materialist constitutional thought was effectively truncated after the modern revolutions, 
in a post-liberal world elitist thought has embraced proceduralism as a way to justify the 
rule of the few on democratic grounds. Freedom of expression and extensive suffrage 
took the place of active popular deliberative and decision-making power in the 
constitutional structure, becoming the two normative pillars of representative 
government.24   
The plebeian materialist constitutional thought I attempt to reconstruct here 
recognizes the influence socio-economic inequalities have on political power, embraces 
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conflict as the effective cause of free government, and seeks to channel its emancipatory, 
anti-oligarchic energy through the constitutional structure to produce and maintain liberty 
as non-domination. This strand of thought, commenced by Machiavelli,25 sees conflict as 
productive of liberty, and seeks to justify the control of the many over political power 
through active participation on republican grounds: as necessary for keeping the republic 
free from oligarchic domination. In addition to supporting institutional means for 
common people to engage in political decision-making at the level of ordinary politics, 
plebeian thought also has proposed ways to institutionalize the constituent power —the 
power to intervene the basic structure— which has been theorized in radical democratic 
theory as a form of extraordinary politics opposed to the constituted order,26 and in 
republican thought as the revolutionary spirit that allows for the republic to renew its 
foundational principles.27 Given the pivotal role afforded to conflict in the constitutional 
structure, in materialist plebeian thought the constituent power is conceived not as a 
threat to the constituted structure, as it is widely discussed in democratic 
constitutionalism, but as a source of periodic renewal of the constituted structure to 
update its anti-oligarchic capabilities, as a necessary means to preserve the original thrust 
of the constitution of a free government built on popular actions against domination.  
Plebeian constitutionalism would aim at establishing a normative framework 
designed 1) to achieve equal liberty as non-domination —which is currently foreclosed 
for the majority of wage workers, women, and racial, religious, and gender minorities 
who suffer oppression from bosses, men, and social majorities through the rules and 
penalties enforced by the state— and 2) at maintaining this equal liberty by actively 
dismantling emergent patterns of domination through the institutional exercise of 
plebeian constituent power. The political thinkers I identify as contributing to this 
plebeian constitutional thought could be grouped into two major camps depending on 
their conception of conflict and the rule of law: the revolutionary reformers who 
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proposed institutional solutions to the problem of oligarchy and the negation of agonistic 
politics, and Critical theorists who do not propose solutions but reveal law as an enabler 
of domination, which seems crucial for an adequate development of anti-oligarchic 
thought. While the two strands begin with Machiavelli’s political philosophy, the 
institutionalist strand developed by Condorcet, Jefferson, Arendt, and more recently by 
John McCormick and Lawrence Hamilton, is strictly political and propositive of new 
sites of popular self-rule (democratic) and forms of control over oligarchic power 
(republican). The critical strand commenced by Karl Marx, followed by Evgeni 
Pashukanis, Antonio Negri, and more recently by Marco Goldoni and Michael 
Wilkinson, has remained anti-institutional and adverse to propose solutions to oligarchy, 
given the tight connection between the capitalist mode of production and the rule of law. 
Nevertheless, its contribution to the theorizing of the connection between law and 
domination, and the difficulty to achieve emancipation through the law within a 
superstructure controlled by the few, is crucial for the radical questioning of the 
legitimacy of law that is possible through plebeian constitutional thought. This distinction 
between the institutionalist and critical approaches to the republic is bridged by Rosa 
Luxemburg’s proposal to establish a system of workers’ councils alongside representative 
government as the condition of possibility for proletarian law. 
 
II.  Revolutionary Reformist Legal Theory 
Machiavelli was the first constitutional thinker to have a materialist interpretation 
of the republic and an institutional proposition aimed at correcting socio-economic and 
political inequality to prevent the inevitable drift of republics into oligarchy.28 He not 
only celebrated conflict as the foundation of “good laws” but also gave to the many the 
role of “guardians of liberty” and armed them to fulfill their function not only with 
legislative and military power but also with constituent power. 29  This meant that 
Machiavelli’s ideal constitutional structure would have not only plebeian institutions 
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exercising decision-making power during normal politics, but also that the many would 
have the extraordinary power to intervene the basic structure, able to create new 
institutions and rules to periodically renew the republic and liberate it from oligarchic 
domination. As I discuss in detail in Chapter 4, in Machiavelli this form of plebeian 
constituent power was not only creative, but also avenging, aimed at punishing those who 
actively undermine liberty. According to Machiavelli, to have a republic free from 
corruption the people must renew its foundations by periodically modifying its basic 
structure and inflicting extraordinary punishment to remind the ruling few of the mighty 
force of plebeian foundational power. Without this material enforcement of liberty 
through plebeian authority, the republic would be doomed, corrupted through its own 
structures and procedures. 
The contribution of Machiavelli to materialist constitutional thought was only 
systematically revisited in the 18th century. The renewed interest in Machiavelli, the 
mixed constitution, and plebeian constituent power sprung from a critical approach 
coming from the revolutionary experience in France to the United States constitution. 
Perhaps the strongest critic in the Girondin camp was the Marquis of Condorcet who 
argued the system of separation of powers was a complicated machine that could not 
replace the mixed constitution, only serving to conceal a parallel ruling system based on 
“intrigue, corruption and indifference.”30 Condorcet was the last of the philosophes and 
the only one to provide a constitutional proposal to institutionalize the revolution in 
France. As a rationalist who embraced knowledge as a necessary condition for liberty, 
general education and the exercise of public judgment were at the center of his ideal 
constitutional framework. But as a republican thinker, Condorcet’s principal concern was 
not with human intellectual flourishing but with corruption, the inevitable degradation of 
the system of restraints and incentives aimed at limiting representative government, “the 
vices which will corrupt even the best organized constitution if it remains unaltered.”31 
His constitutional plan for France offers a three-pronged cure for corruption: frequent 
renewal of the representative assembly, an institutional popular “protest power” exercised 
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through primary assemblies to check on representative government, and the periodic 
popular revision of the constitution. 
Public education and local government were also embraced by Thomas Jefferson, 
who considered these elements as crucial for the “continuance of republican 
government.”32 Jefferson, who was a diplomatic envoy in Paris during the revolution, 
argued in a series of letters to his American friends that liberty for the many is impossible 
without tumults, and that conflict was a necessary evil to prevent the otherwise inevitable 
“degeneration of the government.”33 Jefferson’s constitutional proposals followed closely 
Machiavelli’s by endorsing the periodic reactivation of the constituent power and the 
renewal of the constitutional order “every 19 years,”34 so that every generation could be 
bound by its own laws.35 Even if also seeking to enable the creative instance of 
constituent power, in contrast to Machiavelli he endorses periodic constitutional renewals 
not because of their anti-oligarchic benefits but on democratic grounds, as necessary for 
self-determination. 
Jefferson’s approach was also different concerning extraordinary foundational 
violence. Avengement does not relate to the institutionalized collective power of 
extraordinary public juries like in Machiavelli, but is rooted in rebellion, which according 
to him should always be allowed to spontaneously arise:  
…a little rebellion now and then is a good thing, & 
necessary in the political world as storms in the physical… 
the tree of liberty must be refreshed from time to time with 
the blood of patriots and tyrants. It is it’s natural manure.36  
 
To prevent “degeneration” rulers must be periodically warned that the 
revolutionary spirit is still present in the people; the government needs to allow for 
spontaneous revolts, and be prepared to “pardon and pacify” the rebels. 
Jefferson also endorsed a republic of wards, a local form of government in which 
every man would be an “acting member of the common government, transacting in 
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person, a great portion of its rights and duties.”37 Similar not only to the Committees of 
Correspondence that self-organized against the actions of the British Empire before and 
during the war of independence, but also to the local meetings from which Shays’ debt 
rebellion sprung, citizens in Jefferson’s small republics would be organized and active to 
plan and demand certain courses of action from their representative government. But 
even if he agreed with Machiavelli and Condorcet that local popular governments as well 
as periodic conflict and creation are necessary to keep a republic free, his arguments for 
the renewal of the constitution and the establishment of a republic of wards are not 
focused on eliminating corruption, but on promoting self-government —the positive 
liberty of men and the need for individuals to chose collectively their own fundamental 
rules.  
While Jefferson justifies popular uprisings using republican anti-corruption 
arguments —to keep representative government in check— his support for local 
government was based on democratic rather than republican principles. This democratic 
variation of republican thought was then advanced in mid-20th century by Hannah 
Arendt, who proposed a republican conception of liberty combined with a democratic 
form of self-government in the council system. Arendt’s thought, which combines the 
democratic and republican traditions, allows for the interpretation of the mixed republic 
from the point of view of revolution: as a juridical and spatial structure able to house and 
preserve the revolutionary spirit by enabling political action. Political liberty is achieved 
in action, and therefore the constitution of liberty needs to create spaces for political 
action to take place. It is in the councils, the space in which individuals disclose their 
opinions and engage in political judgment, where liberty is exercised and new beginnings 
may arise to found the republic anew.   
 Pushing back against Arendt’s conception of freedom as political action, 
Lawrence Hamilton, based on the South African experience, has argued to conceive 
political freedom as a “power through representation” that requires the involvement of 
citizens “to the extent that is possible and necessary.”38 For him Arendt’s conception of 
freedom is unrealistic because “under modern conditions we cannot all be involved 
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actively in virtuosi political acts.”39 Hamilton proposes instead to understand political 
freedom as the power of citizens to exert control over the “general trajectory of the state’s 
macroeconomic path” 40  through representation. To achieve this, he proposes a 
combination of popular institutions with advisory power, a plebeian electoral procedure, 
and an “updated tribune of the plebs,” which builds on the class-based institution aimed 
at curbing oligarchic power that was proposed by John McCormick in Machiavellian 
Democracy.41 Loyal to Machiavelli’s anti-oligarchic political philosophy, McCormick 
proposes to institutionalize plebeian power by establishing a People’s Tribunate with the 
power not only to curb the excesses of the ruling elite, but also to legislate, opening the 
possibility for establishing plebeian law. 
 
III.  Critical Legal Thought 
In addition to this ‘positive,’ institutionalist strand of materialist 
constitutionalism, Machiavelli’s thought —predicated on the conflict between the few 
and the many— also influenced a critical theory of law that was predominantly 
‘negative,’ constructed against the legal system under capitalism and grounded on the 
conflict between capital and labor. 42  While revolutionary reformers have proposed 
institutional solutions to the problems of oligarchy and the negation of agonistic politics, 
critical theorists have focused mainly on revealing representative government and the 
liberal rule of law as enablers of domination. While the reformist strand advocates for the 
institutional participation of common people in politics, the critical materialist line, 
developed through Marx against the superstructure of capitalism has tended to follow a 
path closer to anarchism in its distrust of institutions and laws to bring about real liberty 
for the proletariat. 
 Marx’s radical critique of capitalism, the liberal republic and its juridical system 
proposed, instead of institutional reforms, an alternative system, communism, conceived 
as a “real movement which abolishes the present state of things,”43 eliminating the 
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structure of production based on private property, overcoming class, and therefore also 
what for Machiavelli is the socio-ontological divide between the few and the many.44 
While the institutionalist reformist strand aims at institutionalizing plebeian power as 
supreme authority within the constitutional structure, the critical strand aims at 
transforming the foundations of society to abolish class and in this way enable the 
divided whole to become a species-being.  
As a theorist of emancipation concerned with the material and juridical 
foundations of society, Marx should be situated within plebeian constitutional thought.45 
One of his greatest contributions to this strand is his critical analysis of individual rights 
and legal emancipation. In On the Jewish Question Marx leveled a critique against the 
formal interpretation of individual rights because it allows for the endurance of alienation 
and social forms of domination. Emancipation through formal individual rights is for 
Marx only a partial form of liberty that is not conducive to actualizing our species-being. 
While “free conscious activity” rests on the recognition that individual power is 
inextricably social, individual rights codify the barriers protecting individuals against the 
state as well as separating individuals from each other, which negates the social character 
of individual power. 
Political emancipation is a reduction of man, on the one 
hand to a member of civil society, an independent and 
egoistic individual, and on the other hand, to a citizen, to a 
moral [juridical]46 person.  
Human emancipation will only be complete when the real, 
individual man has absorbed into himself the abstract 
citizen; when as an individual man, in his everyday life, in 
his work, and his relationships, he has become a species-
being; and when he has recognized and organized his own 
powers (forces propres) as social powers so that he no 
longer separates this social power from himself 
as  political power. 47 
 
For Marx liberty through equal individual rights is not only inherently partial but 
also contributes to the endurance of relations of domination that are presupposed even if 
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legally abolished.48 He developed further his critique of the legal system in the The 
Grundrisse where he argues the juridical structure is a “stabilizing” force that influences 
and reproduces specific forms of distribution and production,49 legalizing the domination 
of the few over the many.    
…every form of production creates its own legal relations, 
form of government, etc…this principle [of might makes 
right] is also a legal relation, and that the right of the 
stronger prevails in their ‘constitutional republics’ as well, 
only in another form.50  
 
The principle of the strongest prevails not despite the law, but through the law, 
complacent with it.51 Making a parallel between laws and the structure of distribution, 
Marx seems to suggest that laws determine the distribution of rights and burdens at the 
same time that they are being produced as commodities, determined by the structure of 
production. 
The structure of distribution is completely determined by 
the structure of production. Distribution is itself a product 
of production, not only in its object, in that only the results 
of production can be distributed, but also in its form, in that 
the specific kind of participation in production determines 
the specific forms of distribution, i.e. the pattern of 
participation in distribution.52  
 
The legal superstructure, which stabilizes relations of distribution, is conceived as 
being determined by the structure of production. Because socio-economic inequalities 
based on relations of production determine the patterns of distribution, which are 
preserved or modified through the law, the trajectories of the economic and legal spheres 
should be seen as developing dialectically. From this initial insight, Evgeny Pashukanis 
developed in 1924 The General Theory of Law & Marxism a materialist theory of legal 
forms that takes as its object of analysis the legal relation, “the cell-form of the legal 
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fabric.”53 For him legal relations are premised on social relations, with the law coming to 
give legal form to what is already happening on the ground.  
…the economic relation of exchange must be present for 
the legal relation of contracts of purchase and sale to arise. 
Political power can, with the aid of laws, regulate, alter, 
condition, and concretise the form and content of this legal 
transaction in the most diverse manner. The law can 
determine in great detail what may be bought and sold, 
how, under what conditions, and by whom.54  
 
Against Hans Kelsen’s “formal-juridical method,” 55  which saw law as the 
aggregation of norms, “merely a lifeless abstraction,” Pashukanis argues the law should 
be analyzed as a legal relation that is rooted in material conditions, which always have 
“primacy over the norm.”56  
…to assert the objective existence of law, it is not enough 
to know its normative content, rather one must know too 
weather this normative content materializes in life, that is 
on social relations. The usual source of error in this case is 
the legal dogmatist’s way of thinking—for him, the specific 
significance of the concept of the valid norm does not 
coincide with that which the sociologist or the historian 
understands by the objective existence of law.57 
Pashukanis rejects the equation of law and norm because of the relation of law 
with the capitalist mode of production. He argues the ‘final cause’ of the legal system in a 
capitalist society is “commodity circulation,”58 and thus the power of law to influence the 
patterns of distribution and production would not be able to produce real emancipation. 
According to his commodity exchange theory of law, “the logic of juridical concepts 
corresponds to the logic of the social relations of a commodity producing society,”59 a 
relation between subjects who are individual bearers of property rights; law therefore 
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would not be a proper tool for emancipatory structural change. Because his aim was to 
question private law and the system of private property, Pashukanis argues it is not a 
norm but the relation among subjects, and thus the power struggle inherent in that 
relation, what produces law. The legal superstructure is rooted on material relations of 
domination, and thus unable to upend these relations. As China Miéville has argued, 
Pashukanis appears to be  
hostile to law, inasmuch as he understood it to be a 
reflection of capitalist property relations, an integral part of 
a class society where the market has a commanding role, 
and he did not believe that it would last as communism 
flowered.60  
Pashukanis’ materialist constitutional thought thus did not transcend his critique 
of capitalism and the Marxist dogma that the state and its rule of law are mere tools at the 
service of the capitalist class and thus no longer necessary when property and class are 
abolished.61 This reductionism made him dismiss the possibility of a “proletarian law,” 
which was for him an oxymoron given the intrinsic connection between law and capitalist 
relations of exploitation.62 
The withering away of certain categories of bourgeois law 
(the categories as such, not this or that precept) in no way 
implies their replacement by new categories of proletarian 
law… The withering away of the categories of bourgeois 
law will, under these conditions, mean the withering away 
of law altogether, that is to say the disappearance of the 
juridical factor from social relations.63 
 
Pashukanis’ refusal to conceive of the possibility of having emancipatory laws 
working to dismantle socio-economic hierarchies instead of only reifying them, is 
connected not only to his reduction of legal forms to private property, but also to his 
reduction of material conditions to social relations of exchange under the capitalist mode 
of production. For him the legal subject “is the abstract commodity owner elevated to the 
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heavens” and his legal desires are “to alienate in acquisition and to acquire in 
alienation,”64 and therefore the agency of legal subjects would also be determined by 
capitalist relations of exchange. These reductions do not only obscure other relations of 
domination that precede and transcend capitalism,65 but also made him dismiss the 
possibility of radical constitutional change through legal means. Seen from a republican 
perspective, his denial of the possibility of proletarian law hinges on his conception of 
conflict. While Machiavelli attributed to conflict a normative force, as being productive 
of good laws, Pashukanis argues there is always conflict at the base of every legal 
relation, which “comes into being only at the moment of dispute. It is dispute, conflict of 
interest, which creates the legal form, the legal superstructure.”66 Going against Hegel 
and Kelsen, Pashukanis argues material conditions are at the origin of the legal structure, 
and even if the relation between matter and form is dialectical after that original point, the 
premises of law are always “rooted in the material relations of production.”67 Therefore, 
for Pashukanis conflict is not seen from the side of popular resistance to oligarchic power 
—as productive of liberty— but as a permanent feature of all legal relations, which are 
not derived from basic principles but are “directly generated by the existing social 
relations of production.”68  Conflict is not productive because it is reduced to the 
subjacent conflict implied in all relations of domination, denying the possibility that 
conflict coming from popular pushback against domination could generate emancipatory 
law.  
A reengagement with a critical analysis of law was enabled in the late 1970s by 
the Critical Legal Studies movement, which aimed at engaging critically with the law 
while moving away from Marxist determinism. The two overriding concerns of CLS 
were, on the one hand, the critique of legal formalism and objectivism, and on the other, 
the “purely instrumental use of legal practice and legal doctrine to advance leftists 
aims.” 69  While CLS was successful in demystifying the law by pointing to its 
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indeterminacy, internal “disharmonies,”70 and political character,71 the few institutional 
proposals that came out of this critical analysis tended to be reformist. For instance, in the 
late 1990s Roberto Unger proposed a “democratizing alternative to neoliberalism”72 
which would expand equal access to capital and democratize “the partnership between 
government and business,” in tune with a liberal-left political project.73 
Marxist thought also yielded a radical democratic interpretation of law, the 
constitution, and the constituent power, mostly anti-institutional and anarchic. Writing 
soon after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the defeat of communism, and the triumph of 
capitalism and constitutional democracy as the dominant economic and political systems, 
Antonio Negri analyzed the emancipatory nature of the constituent power as “crisis” and 
“living labor,” and its relation to the constituted order. Through a radical democratic 
interpretation of Machiavelli, in which the republic is equivalent to an absolute 
democracy, Negri generates not only an interpretation of constituent power as “the 
passion of the multitude,” 74  “absolute and untamable,” 75  but also the need for a 
constitutional model in permanent becoming, “capable of keeping the formative capacity 
of constituent power itself in motion.”76 For Negri the constituent power is in constant 
movement, and is at the same time creative and destructive, subject and strength, “a 
radical subjective foundation of being,” 77  the basis of the political: an absolute, 
unfinalized process that “comes from the void and constitutes everything,”78 that is 
always referring to the future and implies a multidirectional plurality of time and spaces. 
Negri also recognizes in the constituent power “the negative power par excellence,”79 due 
to the destructive force inherent in the process of permanent becoming. The double nature 
of the constituent power, as positive/creative and negative/destructive, is realized in 
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relation to its opposition to the constituted order, which, instead of being the basis of the 
political, is its summit, an accomplished finality, a rigidified and formal framework 
always referring to the past, which implies a limited time and space.  
Sovereignty presents itself as a fixing of constituent power, 
and therefore as its termination, as the exhaustion of the 
freedom that constituent power carries.80  
Against this ossified structure and the death of the political, “the only possible 
concept of constitution” is for Negri “that of revolution: precisely, constituent power as 
absolute and unlimited procedure.”81 A working proposition for this kind of constitutional 
framework, able to accommodate permanent constituent revolution as constant becoming, 
is yet to be elaborated, and thus Negri’s contribution to plebeian legal thought remains at 
the level of pure critique.82 
More recent Marxist legal analyses have also preferred to remain in the critical 
description rather than engage in the normative and prescriptive. Despite acknowledging 
that the strength of the material constitution rests on the social “support for the political 
aims (or even finality) of a regime,”83 Goldoni and Wilkinson explicitly embrace the 
explanatory over the normative analysis of the material constitution. From a post-liberal 
perspective,84 bringing pluralism into critical legal analysis, they argue the study of the 
material constitution cannot be “reduced to the study of the underlying economic base” 
because economic and politics are inter-related.85 As a way to escape the reduction of 
economics over politics, they negate Pashukanis’ insight of the factual dominance of 
material conditions over the norm by arguing that in this interrelation “the economic base 
must not be presented as over-determining the material constitution.”86 In their account 
conflict is not primarily between the few and the many, capital and labor, but is 
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“conducted by a plurality of subjects whose positions are conditioned but not determined 
by already established relations.”87 
 The replacement of class struggle with agonistic pluralism,88 and the negation of 
the factual dominance of economics over politics by putting economic and political 
power in equal standing, is not to my mind a materialist analysis of the constitution, since 
the dominance of the few over politics has been a constant feature since the origins of 
representative government.89 The political influence of lenders, real state speculators, and 
slave owners produced in the US a constitution constructed explicitly against democracy 
and the power of the popular sectors.90 All members of the constituent convention agreed 
that the constitution they were writing was not a democracy but a republic i.e. a 
representative government, which had as its principal objective the protection of private 
property.91 To put the power of politics as equal to material power both obscures the 
factual dominance of economic over political power, and overestimates the political 
power of individuals to exert changes to the superstructure. It is not surprising then that 
Goldoni and Wilkinson place on individuals the burden of achieving and protecting 
liberty: 
political subjects are thus essential in the formation and 
then preservation of a particular political economy, as well 
as in fomenting change through putting pressure on 
reforming the political-economic structure.92 
This post-liberal contribution to critical legal studies is liable therefore to the 
same problems as proceduralism, in which the burden of the maintenance of liberty is 
placed on individuals, which is, as I have argued before when discussing Philip Pettit’s 
neo-republican model, practically equivalent to leaving the system to its own devices. 
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89 See Bernard Manin, The Principles of Representative Government (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2010). 
90 Of the 55 members of the Federal Convention, 41 were lenders, 31 were lawyers and politicians, 21 were 
planters, 17 were engaged in commercial enterprises, and 13 in real state speculation.  
http://teachingamericanhistory.org/convention/delegates/. For the anti-democratic sentiment see The 
Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, p. 65 
91 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, pp. 69, 433. 




Structural oppression makes individuals powerless to resist domination and exert changes 
to the legal structure if collective power is not institutionalized in the constitution. 
Despite the lack of a model for a plebeian materialist constitution, critical 
constitutional thought has provided a strong critique of legal formalism. In addition, its 
push for connecting the power of the many in Machiavelli with the theory of constituent 
power has greatly contributed to plebeian constitutionalism by allowing for a partisan 
conception of the power to renew the republic. Finally, even if the anti-oligarchic side of 
plebeian thought precedes Marx, the current radical republican interpretation of 
Machiavelli put forth by McCormick owes much to Marx’s analysis of capitalism and 
class struggle, even if indirectly via an interpretation of Machiavelli through the lens of 
critical political economy. Through a post-Marxist93 (but not post-liberal)94 application of 
Machiavellian thought, McCormick has placed class struggle, the threat of plutocracy, 




                                                
93 I understand a post-Marxist perspective as embracing basic tenants of Marxism such as class struggle. 
Even if I agree with G. Pedullà that McCormick “does not place Machiavelli in Marx’s shadow,” his 
interpretative lens appears to have been influenced by critical theory and the current conjuncture.   
94 Class-based institutions and penalties are not post-liberal in the sense that they do not embrace formal 





























The tradition of elitist-procedural republican thought, which took inspiration from 
the English mixed government of the 1700s and crystalized in the establishment of an 
anti-majoritarian, electoral constitutional framework in America, stands in stark contrast 
to the materialist plebeian strand that developed from Machiavelli’s assessment of the 
Roman republic, from the viewpoint of the democratic experience of the Florentine 
Republic (1494–1512). While under the Medici Florence had a governo stretto directed 
by the ottimati, after taking power Girolamo Savonarola embraced governo largo by 
establishing in 1494 the Great Council as a popular legislative and electoral assembly. 
The new constitutional structure of the state, which acquired its definite form in 1499, 
was a new mixed ordini that lasted until 1512. The introduction of a democratic assembly 
with a membership of about 1,000 citizens who participated in turns,1  alongside other 
councils and magistracies, meant that for the first time the plebeian socio-political 
element was institutionalized in Florence. As a public official in the Florentine republic, 
Machiavelli had a first-hand experience of the inner workings of institutions and the 
struggle between social groups to exert influence on government. I argue his support for a 
mixed constitution in which the few would govern within limits and the many would be 
                                                
1 Citizenship was restrictive since it demanded membership in one of the seven great guilds. The Council 
had between 1,150 and 2400 members who could effectively participate. Citizena were divided into three 
sections to deliberate and decide. Nicolai Rubinstein and Sarah-Louise Raillard, “The early years of 
Florence's Grand Council (1494-1499)” Revue francaise de science politique (English Edition), Vol. 64, 




active guardians of liberty, both in the Discourses on Livy and his Discourse on 
Remodeling the Government of Florence, is rooted in his direct assessment of the limits 
of democratic rule to contain the informal power of the great in Florence.  
 
I.  The Republic as a Mixed Constitution 
From radically different methodologies, both Leo Strauss and the Cambridge 
School2  interpret Machiavelli’s work as advocating for a republic ruled by elites. 
However, Machiavelli’s conception of mixed constitution departs from the predominant, 
elitist strand of republicanism initiated by Cicero and picked up later by Montesquieu, 
which gives to the aristocratic element (the selected few) the reigns of government, while 
reserving for the many only the power to choose representatives.3 For Machiavelli, to live 
in liberty plebeians must not only approve or reject policies, but also dictate them, not 
only obey laws and institutions, but also establish them. As McCormick has shown, these 
elitist interpretations of Machiavelli distort his theory of the plebeian republic because 
they “underemphasize class conflict,” disregard the necessary role of active, popular 
participation in political rule, and conceive of liberty in a formal, narrow manner, which 
“rather meekly addresses forms of social domination aside from slavery.” 4  For 
‘aristocratic’ republicans, only the best citizens should control the government because 
they contribute much-needed moderation to the republic; the many should be limited to 
elect the best citizens to rule.5 On the contrary, for Machiavelli a regime of liberty 
demands a dynamic balance of power between the few and the many that is only 
achieved through institutionalized political conflict allowing for the few to satisfy their 
                                                
2 John Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975); Quentin Skinner 
“Machiavelli on the Maintenance of Liberty,” Politics (1983) 18: 3–15; Maurizio Viroli “Machiavelli and 
the Republican Idea of Politics,” in Machiavelli and Republicanism, Gisela Bock, Quentin Skinner, and 
Maurizio Viroli, eds. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); and Philip Pettit, Republicanism: A 
Theory of Freedom and Government (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997). 
3 For an extensive critique of the aristocratic strand see McCormick, Machiavellian Democracy.  
4  McCormick, Machiavellian Democracy, p. 9–10; “Machiavelli Against Republicanism: On the 
Cambridge School's “Guicciardinian Moments” Political Theory (2003) 31.5, pp. 615–643. 
5 Cicero, On the Commonwealth, Book 1 [52]: 23; Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, Part 1, Book 3, Ch. 




ruling ambition and for the many to defend liberty through their active participation in 
political power.6  
Machiavelli’s materialist constitutional analysis begins with his interpretation of 
the Roman plebeian experience recorded in detail in the Discourses, work that according 
to Gabrielle Pedullà aims at recovering “the actual political prudence of the Romans 
through a hermeneutics of the ancient historical narratives,” achieving with his republic 
of tumults an alternative to “the classical and humanistic tradition of concord.”7 In 
Rome’s ordini, while the authority of the Senate and the Consuls rested in tradition, the 
authority of the Tribunes was not based on the sacred, original foundation of Rome, but 
on the force exerted by the plebeians due to their crucial role in defending the republic. 
The authority of the people was thus rooted in their actual power to extract political 
concessions from the elite by deserting and, thus, paralyzing the city.8 Machiavelli’s 
critical engagement with the Roman republic evidences the need to account for different 
forms of power and authority in the mixed constitution springing from the fundamental 
split of society between the great and the people. While authority based on tradition, 
seniority, knowledge, or wealth rested with the Senate, which legitimately directed 
government action, the authority to protect liberty, through the right to legislate and veto 
government action laid with the organized multitude. The authority of the Consuls, who 
were co-administrators of government with the Senate, was based upon the recognition of 
leadership through election. As commanders of the army, the Consuls wielded legal 
power —the right to execute policies within the boundaries of the law and the counsel of 
the Senate. The other source of power was the people, who could only command the 
power of presence, the sheer power of numbers, which is exerted through extra-legal 
means (e.g. mobilization, occupation of public space, violence). Different from the power 
of the army —a hierarchical command structure susceptible to cooptation and 
                                                
6  Gabriele Pedullà, Machiavelli in Tumult: The Discourses on Livy and the Origins of Political 
Conflictualism (New York: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming 2019); K.M. Brudney, “Machiavelli 
on Social Classes and Class Conflict,” Political Theory, 12 (1984), pp. 507-19; A. Bonadeo, Corruption, 
Conflict and Power in the Works and Times of Niccolò Machiavelli (University of California, 1973), pp. 
37-71. 
7 Pedullà, Machiavelli in Tumult, Introduction. 
8 In 494 BC, while Rome was at war with two neighboring tribes, plebeian soldiers refused to march 
against the enemy, and instead seceded to the Aventine Hill, leaving the city to its fate. Mommsen, 




instrumentalization— the power of the people, being inseparable from their physical 
presence, cannot be commanded. It can certainly be invoked and demanded, but the 
response is always uncertain. Soldiers have proper weapons and training to risk their 
lives; common citizens have neither, which means that while the influence of the Senate 
over the Consuls gives the elite the power of the army, the assembled people of Rome as 
guardians of liberty armed their Tribunes only with a “sacrosanct” authority and an 
uncertain threat of collective violence.9  
Despite their institutional and material weakness, plebeians were successful in 
extracting concessions from the few. Plebeians gained access to lawmaking and 
magistracies through open conflict, but these gains were lost because institutional means 
were not enough to back up plebeian legal authority after corruption had taken root. I 
would argue this is for Machiavelli the tragic element of the Roman republic. While the 
institutionalized conflict between the elite and the people constituted for him the 
republic’s normative energy, yielding “all the laws made in favor of liberty,”10 it was also 
the cause of its ruin11 because the authority of the Tribunes was never entirely severed 
from the popular force through which it had originated, and thus never entirely respected 
by the ruling elite. Therefore the evolutionary way in which the Roman republic was 
constituted created a precarious dynamic balance of power between the few and the many 
that was finally upended with the complete disregard of plebeian institutional power by 
the Senate. The ruin of the Roman republic was brought about by conflict, by the refusal 
of the Senate to sanction the reforms to the Agrarian Law12 passed by the people in 133 
and 122 BC, and the violent upheavals that ensued, in which the Tribunes Tiberius and 
Gaius Gracchus were murdered. I would argue Machiavelli wants to correct the 
institutional imbalance created in a constitution made through class struggle —on popular 
authority conceded through active resistance— by constitutionalizing what in Rome was 
grounded on the physical power of the people. Consequently, Machiavelli would be 
                                                
9 Andrew Lintott, The Constitution of the Roman Republic, p. 33, 121–124. A promise of protection from 
violence against the Tribunes. 
10 Machiavelli, Discourses 1.4. 
11 Machiavelli, Discourses 1.4. 
12 Machiavelli, Discourses 1.37. For a politico-historical analysis of the period see Fergus Millar, The 




seeking to perfect the Roman republican experience by formally constitutionalizing the 
power of the many to resist the domination coming from the few.  
Rome is both a model of a tumultuous republic and a warning, the tragic example 
of a free republic apparently ruined by its own effective cause: conflict. According to 
Althusser Machiavelli is a materialist philosopher who inaugurates a conjunctural 
approach to politics and the law in which liberty is attained only through conflict.13 
Machiavelli’s “aleatory materialism”14 begins for him from the foundational theoretical 
premise of the ontological split of society between the few and the many, the grandi and 
the popolo, animated by two unequal battling humors: to oppress and resist oppression.  
A small part of them wishes to be free in order to rule; but 
all the others, who are countless, wish freedom in order to 
live in security.15  
 
The rich desire to dominate the people, the people desire not to be oppressed by 
the rich, and the perpetual struggle in a republic between these opposing desires, argues 
Machiavelli, generates liberty. The power of the organized few to direct government is 
checked by the power of the organized multitude to initiate legislation and stop 
governmental action. Liberty is the result of this institutional conflict between the few 
and the many; desires and conflict are expressed through institutions and procedures, and 
in this way tamed and oriented for the good of the republic. However, liberty is not 
caused by the institutional balance of two unequal forces, but by the periodical pushback 
of the many against the inevitable, constant overreach of the powerful few. While 
theoretically a precarious balance could be achieved between the few and the many, the 
crucial guardianship of liberty —the right to make the last decision— must always rely 
on one side. Machiavelli chooses the people over the elite as stewards of liberty because 
the former merely long not to be ruled,  
                                                
13 Louis Althusser, Machiavelli and Us (London: Verso, 2011). For an analysis of Althusser on Machiavelli 
see Banu Bargu, “Machiavelli after Althusser” in The Radical Machiavelli: Politics, Philosophy and 
Language, Del, Lucchese F, Fabio Frosini, and Vittorio Morfino, eds. (New York: Brill, 2015); Miguel 
Vatter, “Machiavelli After Marx: The Self-Overcoming of Marxism in the Late Althusser” Theory & Event, 
(2005) 7.4.  
14 Althusser theorizes an aleatory materialism he derives from Machiavelli in Écrit Philosophiques et 
Politiques I (Paris: Librairie générale francaise, 1999), p. 543–8. 




and as a consequence [have] greater eagerness to live in 
freedom, since they can have less hope of taking possession 
of it than the great can.16  
Even though it is a difficult task to completely separate Machiavelli’s description 
of the Romans from his own ideal model in the Discourses, his general statements 
suggest the Roman republic would have benefited from a formalization of the role of the 
people as guardians of liberty. This interpretation implies not only Machiavelli’s plebeian 
partisanship —which was already evident to John Adams who described him as the 
founder of a “plebeian philosophy”17— but also implies a mixed constitutional structure 
in which the power of both the few and the many are institutionalized, with the few ruling 
and the many properly armed with legal and military power to guard liberty.  
Despite certainly envisioning an active role for the common republican citizen in 
politics, I would argue Machiavelli is not a theorist of democracy, in the sense that he 
does not understand liberty as positive18 —the partaking in rule as an end in itself19— and 
does not support monocratic rule, not even that of a democratic assembly.20 Even if 
Machiavelli is certainly a critic of oligarchic republics, and explicitly advocates for direct 
participation of the people through lawmaking, voting for magistrates,21 judging in 
political trials,22 and choosing their own, exclusive representatives —the Tribunes of the 
Plebs— I would argue this does not mean that he is sponsoring unmixed, popular or 
democratic government. Even though he praises the specific characteristic of the people 
and their form of government, he advocates for an increase of popular power within a 
republican framework, which is based on his theory of humors in permanent conflict. In 
other words, Machiavelli does not envision the popolo ruling on its own, but for the 
                                                
16 Machiavelli, Discourses I.5. 
17 “Defence of the Constitutions and Government of the United States of America” in John Adams, Works, 
edited by C.F. Adams (Little & Brown, 1850-56), volume VI, p. 396. See J. Barthas, “Machiavelli in 
Political Thought from the Age of Revolutions to the Present,” in John M. Najemy (ed.), The Cambridge 
Companion to Machiavelli (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2010), pp. 265-66. 
18 Isaiah Berlin, “Two Concepts of Liberty” in Four Essays on Liberty (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1969). 
19 Democracy is to rule and be ruled, and the exercise of politics is a virtuous action, which is an end in 
itself. Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, I.8. 
20 Against this interpretation, see J. Barthas “Il pensiero costituzionale di Machiavelli e la funzione 
tribunizia nella Firenze del Rinascimento” in Il Laboratorio del Rinascimento, L. Tanzini (ed.). (Le Lettere, 
2016).  
21 Machiavelli, Discourses I.18; III.34 




popolo to have enough power to curb the power of the grandi and protect liberty. Liberty 
is for him non-domination and, therefore, different from the democratic ethos, in which 
active engagement in politics is an end in itself —the most virtuous activity the common 
man could ever perform—23 for Machiavelli citizen participation in everyday politics is 
functional, a necessary means for maintaining a republican structure conducive to liberty. 
Moreover, while liberty is enjoyed by all, he reserves glory for the few able to perform 
extraordinary actions aimed at benefiting the republic. In Machiavelli the many 




Figure 4.1 Machiavelli’s Roman Republic 
 
II. Remaking Florence as a Mixed Constitution 
Machiavelli’s preoccupation with oligarchy, corruption, and the active resistance 
of the people was embedded in the extraordinary democratic experiment of the republic 
of Florence, which begun in 1494 with the establishment of the Great Council, a form of 
direct democracy that allowed for extensive citizen participation in legislative, electoral, 
and judicial authority. During the brief democratic experiment in Florence, of which 
                                                




Machiavelli was a leading figure, the elites lost the monopoly over government and were 
constantly trying to regain their dominance. As Jérémie Barthas has argued, despite the 
extensive powers of the Council, the republic remained effectively dependent on the 
financial oligarchy due to its reliance on mercenary armies, and Machiavelli’s most 
important task as Secretary and Second Chancellor of the republic, was to liberate the 
republic from oligarchic control by introducing a project of mass conscription.24 
After the return of the Medici and the end of the Florentine democratic 
experience, Machiavelli argues to remodel Florence so at to give the city a lasting 
republican structure that satisfies all “those elements that must be contented”25 and 
creates a mechanism to “establish fear in great men.”26 He criticizes the institutional 
framework of the Florentine republic of 1494 because it neither adopted a form that 
would endure, based on the satisfaction of the fundamental elements of society, nor 
established the punishment of elites who set up factions to satisfy their own interests. 
Machiavelli argues there are three different kinds of individuals, “the most important, 
those in the middle, and the lowest.”27 Because some citizens are ambitious and desire to 
outrank others, this desire needs to be satisfied in the republican organization of power if 
the regime does not want to end up having the same fate as Florence democratic 
experiment which “fell for no other cause than that such group was not satisfied.”28 
Because the grandi seek glory, the best constitution is the one able to satisfy the interest 
of the elite in a manner conducive to liberty.29 Instead of satisfying their desire for social 
distinction through riches or power, the few should have an institutional space to attain 
glory and distinguish themselves in the service of the republic. Machiavelli uses this 
same argument of satisfaction of desires through institutional means to push for the 
reopening of the Great Council in Florence.  
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In his Discourse on Remodeling the Government of Florence Machiavelli argues 
that a constitution that does not satisfy the people after they have already experienced the 
exercise of political power, would be certainly short-lived.30 “Without satisfying the 
generality of the citizens, to set up a stable government is always impossible.”31 But even 
if Machiavelli is certainly sponsoring republican institutions and the reopening of the 
Great Council, his main argument is not that the council of the people should be the only 
institution, but that it should be restored because the common citizens also needed to be 
satisfied as well as the elites. Machiavelli’s proposal for Florence envisioned, on the one 
hand a consolidation of the executive councils into the Council of Sixty-Five32 from 
which the Gonfalonier of Justice would be selected, and the legislative councils into the 
Council of Two Hundred (of the Selected), and on the other a re-empowerment of the 
popolo with the reestablishment of the Great Council and the creation of a surveillance 
office: the Council of Provosts. In terms of its membership, the Great Council should be 
considered as a plebeian institution. While only guild members were eligible for the 
executive and legislative councils, and 80% of the members selected to serve were taken 
from the mayor guilds, which represented the riches merchants and artisans,33 the 
membership of the Grand Council was broader given the establishment of the beneficio 
dei tre maggiori, which allowed office holders of the three major offices and their 
descendants to serve. This meant that about a quarter of its members were drawn from 
either the Council of the People or the Council of the Commune,34 and thus from plebeian 
ranks.  
It is clear from this constitutional proposal that Machiavelli, as a theorist of the 
republic as mixed constitution, aimed at giving an appropriate place in the constitution 
both to the elite, so to channel their desire to rule (analogous to the ancient Roman Senate 
or the English Parliament), and to plebeians by creating stronger popular institutions to 
effectively censure and control those who rule. Reaffirming this republican line of 
                                                
30 Machiavelli, Discourse on Remodeling, p. 101-2 & 106. 
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32 The Council was divided in two groups, each governing alternate years. The council would be divided 
into groups that would carry on all executive functions, finance and trade, foreign and military affairs. 
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Florence. See John M. Najemy, “Guild Republicanism in Trecento Florence: The Successes and Ultimate 
Failure of Corporate Politics” The American Historical Review, Vol. 84, No. 1 (Feb., 1979), pp. 53-71 




interpretation, in addition to reopening the council open to the many, Machiavelli 
proposes to add a Council of Provosts: a popular surveillance office aimed at providing a 
tiebreak vote in matters of discord within political institutions and, more importantly, to 
oversee government officials, taking away their power and appealing their decisions, in 
case they do things opposed to the common good.35 The Council of Provosts, composed 
of sixteen Gonfaloniers of the Company of the People would take turns in supervising 
government action. This anti-oligarchic institution, whose members could not be part of 
the Council of Sixty-Five, was dedicated to control government officials and “make them 
abstain from actions that are not good.”36 In turns, the Provost would reside in the palace 
with the Signores to be witnesses of their proceedings. 
 
 
Figure 4.2 Machiavelli’s Republic of Florence, 1520 
 
According to McCormick, the Council of Provosts should be understood as being 
an improved version of the Roman Tribunate because the Provosts would function as 
“popular agents of elite accountability,” serving as “the people’s eyes and ears in both the 
republic’s executive committee and senatorial council and that explicitly wields veto or 
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referral power over the policies proposed within them.” 37   Even if the Provosts’ 
surveillance power is clear, their power to actually obstruct dominating motions coming 
from the few is far removed from the veto power wielded by the Tribunes in Rome, since 
the provosts “would not have other authority than to delay a decision” by the executive 
council by appealing to the legislative council, and “could not do anything other than take 
a case away from the Council [of Selected] and appeal it to the Grand Council.”38 Despite 
the weak powers Machiavelli gives to the Provosts, McCormick argues this office is 
radically democratic in the sense that it provides “invaluable political education” by 
allowing common citizens to “observe in close quarters the deliberations and decisions of 
the most powerful and prominent citizens of the republic.”39 
 The recognition of the need for popular institutions strong enough to control the 
ruling elite also makes evident in Machiavelli the relativity of law and the need for 
popular constituent power as a necessary condition for attributing an emancipatory 
character to the rule of law. Because corruption, which is linked to oppression, begins 
both in individuals —when “a citizen is allowed to get more power than is safe”— and in 
laws —“the nerve and life of free institutions”40— liberty cannot be equated with the rule 
of law, because laws can be manipulated and used as a tool for oppression. The rule of 
law is not necessarily conducive to liberty and, because of unavoidable corruption, even 
an originally emancipatory rule of law would tend to uphold and sustain domination 
instead of combating it, legalizing domination, allowing only for the mere illusion of 
liberty. Neither should freedom be reduced to the lack of arbitrary rule41 because, as 
Machiavelli argues, the reestablishment of freedom demands moments of arbitrariness —
of suspension of the law— to reorganize power and regain liberty by bringing greater 
equality and introducing new methods, institutions, and laws into the constitution.42 
Consequently, the principle of liberty must not be reduced to law, which is just a means 
to keep individuals free from subjection. Without the people being effective guardians of 
                                                
37 McCormick, Machiavellian Democracy, p. 106. 
38 Machiavelli, A Discourse on Remodeling, p. 112. 
39 McCormick, Machiavellian Democracy, p. 106 
40 Machiavelli, Discourses, I.33. 
41 Skinner, Liberty Before Liberalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). 




liberty, a constitutional framework would inevitably become corrupt, “a naked 
oligarchy.”43 
As I showed in Chapter 1, Machiavelli argues the procedure of election and the 
individual right to speak in the assembly ended up allowing for the people to be 
manipulated into decreeing their own ruin. But despite the perverse outcome of these 
corruption-enabling methods, Machiavelli does not want to eliminate them but to create 
new ones so as to counteract their negative, unintended results. Consequently, different 
from Rousseau, who entirely forsakes representation and deliberation in the sovereign 
assembly, 44  Machiavelli wants to keep equal access to election and isegoria, and 
complement it with new methods aimed at “enforcing” the foundation. He argues 
ordinary exercise of popular legal power is not enough, and that periodical extraordinary 
measures are needed to keep the oligarchic tendencies of the ruling class in check. In the 
next section I analyze the two extraordinary methods he proposes in the Discourses for 
the containment of corruption: 1) periodic revision and creation of fundamental laws and 
institutions, and 2) extraordinary popular punishment to remind elites of the founding 
fear in which plebeian liberty was gained through force.  
 
 
III.  Plebeian Constituent Power 
Even if Machiavelli is a theorist of extraordinary politics, concerned primarily 
with the mutation of the constitutional order,45 his work has not been seen as contributing 
to the theory of constituent power that developed within democratic thought.46 The 500-
year anniversary of The Prince in the aftermath of the 2008 financial and political crisis, 
however, allowed for a renewed engagement with Machiavelli’s work from which 
emerged a radical democratic interpretation concerned with extraordinary politics.47 
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Filippo Del Lucchese recently proposed to trace back to Machiavelli the genealogy of the 
concept of constituent power as a “living force within the social order,”48 highlighting 
Machiavelli’s theory of socio-political humors and the dialectic relation between laws 
and orders derived from it, as major contributions to the understanding of the conflictual 
nature of constituent power.49 Even if Antonio Negri and Miguel Vatter had already 
analyzed Machiavelli’s conception of constituent power,50 Del Lucchese offers the first 
systematic reading of Machiavelli’s thought on extraordinary politics. In what follows I 
argue that the attempt to read Machiavelli through a democratic theory lens, which begins 
from the premise of a community constituting itself, inevitably obscures the originality of 
Machiavelli’s republican conception of constituent power, which is predicated on the 
socio-ontological split between the few and the many, which Vatter briefly analyzes from 
the perspective of a “modified, ‘no-rule’ republicanism.”51 
Through a critical analysis of Del Lucchese’s interpretation of Machiavelli, in 
what follows I argue that the constituent power in Machiavelli is not a bridge between 
basic principles and politics, but rather the power to resist oppression by restraining 
oligarchic power. While in democratic theory the constituent power has been conceived 
as the autopoietic power of the community, a republican theory of constituent power 
would be defined functionally, determined by the goal of achieving liberty as non-
domination. Republican thought conceives of constituent moments happening within an 
already constituted reality in which the community is never whole or in a vacuum, but 
existing in the perpetual struggle between the few and the many, and the legal reality 
attempting to stabilize it. The constituent power is the power to establish liberty, and 
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thus, as Machiavelli argues, only the civil prince allied with the people is able to 
constitute a republic.52  
…though one alone is suited for organizing, the 
government organized is not going to last long if resting on 
the shoulders of only one; but it is indeed lasting when it is 
left to the care of many, and when its maintenance rests 
upon many.53 
While in extraordinary moments the founder would exercise constituent power by 
establishing lasting foundations for liberty that can be maintained after the founder’s 
death,54 the many should be the bearers of the power to resist oppression during ordinary 
politics, able to add anti-oligarchic institutions to the constitutional structure in order to 
deal with inequality and the corruption of older institutions. The constituent power is the 
power used both to establish a constitutional framework that liberates plebeians from the 
domination of the nobles, and to maintain it. While democratic constituent power 
presupposes the community as the subject of constituent power, republican constituent 
power would not be defined by the political subject and its sovereign will, but by its final 
cause (i.e. establishing liberty as non-domination) and the fundamental premise of a 
society that is irremediably split between the few and the many. While the one exercises 
constituent power by establishing a republic with lasting foundations for liberty, the many 
need to exercise constituent power to preserve this liberty, by recreating the founding 
through amendments to the institutional structure and extraordinary public trials.55 
Even though Del Lucchese recognizes the centrality of the division between “the 
people and the great” in Machiavelli, and duly criticizes the democratic theory of 
constituent power because of its focus on the “attribute of the will and the homogeneity 
of the constituent subject,”56 his analysis of Machiavelli does not escape the democratic 
tradition and the unitary conception of the constituent power connected to the original 
founding moment of the community. This lens leads him to miss the role of constituent 
power in counteracting corruption. According to Del Lucchese, laws would be 
“ineffective and incapable of resisting corruption” because of the inadequacy of their 
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enforcement, which is “anchored to the originary constituent situation.”57 Abstracting 
Machiavelli’s ideas from the material conflict between the few and the many, he argues 
that corruption derives from a disconnect between the founding principles and political 
contingency —rather than corruption arising from the ambition of the great. Even if he 
recognizes that for Machiavelli corruption is a systemic phenomenon, an “unavoidable 
mutation that all republics must endure,” Del Lucchese argues corruption in Machiavelli 
expresses not the overreaching of oligarchic power, but “a tension between laws and 
orders, or rather between constituent principles embodied in orders, and the juridical and 
political life of the republic, embodied in laws.”58 Therefore, the constituent power in 
Machiavelli would be a “bridge between the juridical and the political.” 59  This 
abstraction from material conditions, and the projection of the dualism between 
constituent and constituted power onto Machiavelli’s political philosophy seems 
misguided since in Machiavelli the fundamental “tension” is not between constituent 
principles embodied in orders and laws that arise conjuncturally, but between the desires 
and actions of the orders, which are legalized through political processes, and the 
effectiveness of basic institutions to counteract the natural tendency of the republic to 
drift into oligarchy.  
The lack of engagement with the threat of oligarchy and the specific function of 
constituent power in a republic also leads Del Lucchese to inject into Machiavelli a 
pluralism that is not reflected in his political philosophy, which is predicated on the split 
between the few and the many. Despite acknowledging Machiavelli’s plebeian 
partisanship, “in favour of the many, and against the few,”60 Del Lucchese does not take 
this into account when analyzing Machiavelli’s conception of constituent power. For him 
the ‘people’ in Machiavelli is “irreducibly partial and partisan,” but only a part “among 
many, a humour among other humours.”61 Even if this is accurate and the popolo is only 
one of the umori62 in a republic, that the popolo is a partiality does not mean it is equal to 
other partialities, only one among many. Machiavelli is a plebeian thinker because for 
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him plebeians, due to their exclusion from political rule —“the condition that makes it 
possible for the plebs to act as a constituent power to make equal law”63— are the only 
legitimate guardians of liberty, and thus not simply a part among many.  
Giving constituent power to the people is what radically defines Machiavelli’s 
partisanship. It is clear that for him most of the “very great disturbances” in a republic are 
caused by the few, who fear to lose their position, not by the many, who hope to gain 
what they do not have; the rich need to secure their possessions by acquiring more in 
order to have greater resources to ignite rebellion and instill in the many the wish to 
possess and dominate.64 Consequently, the few must not have the final say on the liberty 
of plebeians, because they will try to undermine it and effectively enslave the many. The 
few, given the position of power they hold in society, could never be the bearers of 
constituent power. The regime the few would impose would not be a republic but an 
oligarchy. 
Because for Machiavelli liberty is to not be dominated —a state that is gained 
through conflict and tumults— the preservative power of free government would be the 
power of the people to replicate this gaining of liberty, to redraw the boundaries of what 
is considered permissible and what is deemed oppressive. Only the many —who desire 
not to be oppressed and do not partake in ruling— should be the guardians of liberty. The 
constituent power belongs to plebeians “in so far as it maintains itself as that part which 
does not participate in rule,” and thus is not something plebeians posses due to their class 
per se; to resist oppression the many must not be in a position to dominate.65 The case of 
the Ciompi revolt in 1378 and the betrayal of plebeian leadership should then be seen as a 
warning. The wool workers overthrew the government and installed a plebeian 
revolutionary regime under the leadership of Michele di Lando, a comber from humble 
origin, who Machiavelli depicts as “barefoot and wearing little clothing.” 66  After 
becoming the Standard-Bearer of Justice and Podestà, di Lando “became a Thermidorian 
figure, clashing with the radical wing of the workers and thwarting their more egalitarian 
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demands,”67 and ultimately unleashing the slaughter of the Ciompi by reformist forces.68  
The plebeian origins of di Lando did not make him a plebeian partisan; it was his ruling 
position, in which he had the ability to dominate, which ended up determining his anti-
plebeian behavior. 
According to Machiavelli, Plebeians, given the position of no-rule they occupy in 
the political structure, should not merely the guardians of the constitution or the founding 
principles, as it is today the judicial branch, but the defenders of liberty itself, which 
could run against established law. Consequently, we should consider the many as the 
bearers of constituent power, the power to amend the basic institutional and juridical 
structure of society. During the normal functioning of free government only the many are 
the bearers of the self-emancipatory force wielded by the plebeians against oligarchic 
domination in Rome; only the common people are the rightful bearers of this “conflictual 
power that precedes, drives and exceeds constituted power, not moving beyond law, but 
rather occupying its centre and transforming its nature.”69  
The constitutionalization of plebeian ordinary and extraordinary powers would be 
for Machiavelli a necessary condition for keeping a republic free from domination. In a 
republic the common people need not only to actively participate in deciding on motions, 
initiating and vetoing laws in plebeian assemblies, and selecting their Tribunes, but also 
by collectively offering fundamental changes to the constitutional structure and inflicting 
punishment on those who have become too powerful, so to bring the republic back to its 
beginnings and keep plebeians free from the domination of the great. Machiavelli argues 
citizens must periodically “examine themselves” (si riconoschino) and go back to the 
beginning, to their mighty republican founding. This self-examination of the people vis-
à-vis the legal and institutional order, which allows for the renewal of the republic, would 
happen either by an external “accident” or an internal change triggered either by law or 
the “striking words” and “vigorous actions” of a virtuous leader. At the beginning of 
Book III of the Discourses, Machiavelli identifies these two means —law and virtue— as 
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the appropriate ones for a republic to periodically be brought back to its beginnings and 
remain free. There is nothing more necessary for a republic than to regain  
the reputation as it had in the beginning, and to strive that 
either good regulations or good men may produce this 
effect and that it will not need to be done by an external 
force.70 
Since the birth of republics is marked by creation and punishment —
institutionalization of popular power and foundational violence—71 Machiavelli proposes 
a periodic renewal of the republic through law, triggering a periodic constituent moment, 
and an extraordinary public impeachment of those who have transgressed the egalitarian 
foundations of the republic.  
Basing his observations in Rome, Machiavelli argues in favor of the reconciliation 
of law and liberty through the creation of new institutions such as the “Tribunes of the 
People, the Censors, and all the other laws that opposed the ambition and pride of the 
citizens.”72 Machiavelli’s response to corruption and oppression is thus not to get rid off 
institutions and procedures that have become corrupted but to add new institutions and 
legal means of popular censure to restrain the ambition of the few. However, he cautions 
that the mere establishment of anti-oligarchic institutions does not guarantee liberty since 
they would be ineffective if they were not “brought to life by the wisdom of a citizen who 
courageously strives to enforce them against the power of those who violate them.”73 
Consequently, even if laws and institutions against corruption are established, the 
courage of extraordinary popular leaders to enforce them appears in Machiavelli as 
inescapable. Legal means without virtù would amount only to “parchment barriers” 
against oppression, as James Madison referred to the Bill of Rights of the U.S. 
Constitution.74 
In addition to institutional innovation to create new means of controlling the few 
backed by adequate enforcement, Machiavelli adamantly argues for the need for 
extraordinary instances of punishment as necessary violence exerted against those who 
have violated liberty. The republic needs to deal harshly with those who have machinated 
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against liberty such as the sons of Brutus, who conspired against the republic to “profit 
unlawfully,”75 the Decimviri, who usurped political power and became tyrannical, and 
Melius the grain dealer, who sought to buy the favor of the masses by feeding the people 
at his own expense.76 From his experience in the Florence of the Medici, Machiavelli 
identifies fear77 as a crucial emotion that must be present both in the founding of liberty 
and in renewal moments. Going back to the beginnings is not only reconciling law and 
liberty through the creation of new institutions, but also about instilling the same fear of 
punishment to those who “had done wrong” as it was experienced during the founding. 
Thus, Machiavelli conceives of this foundational power as essentially creative and 
avenging, as a constituent power able to create institutions and laws in favor of equality, 
and ruthlessly punish individuals profiting from the corrupted constituted order. This 
constituent power as extraordinary enforcement of liberty should be according to 
Machiavelli legally convoked with  
a lapse of not more than ten years, because, when that time 
has gone by, men change their habits and break the laws; 
and if something does not happen to bring the penalty back 
to their memories and renew fear in their minds, so many 
offenders quickly join together that they cannot be 
punished without danger.78 
Because Machiavelli, as I have argued, wants to constitutionalize the evolutionary 
political institutions of Rome, he argues for normalizing these instances of constituent 
creation and punishment, so to avoid the overgrowth of inequality and the extreme 
violence necessary to check it. He proposes to imitate the Romans, who periodically 
established new institutions and laws in favor of liberty, and were “accustomed to punish 
large numbers of those who did wrong.”79 Therefore, a good republican constitution 
should codify these instances of constituent power to periodically examine and reconcile 
the legal framework with social reality through the creation of new methods of 
adaptation and deterrence to periodically curb corruption and the overgrowth of 
                                                
75 “…there is no more powerful remedy [against the troubles of a new republic], none more effective nor 
more certain nor more necessary, than to kill the sons of Brutus.” Discourses, I.16. 
76 Machiavelli, Discourses, III.1. 
77 This constitutive fear is different from the fear in God that Numa, the second founder of Rome, had to 
establish in order for the citizens to obey the law. Civil religion and fear of the divine are part of the 
constituted order.   
78 Machiavelli, Discourses, III.1. 




oligarchy. Only through the constitutionalization of periodic instances of constituent 
creative and avenging power the republic could remain free from domination.  
In addition to this periodic reactivation of constituent power as creation and 
punishment through law, Machiavelli argues a periodic refounding is also possible 
through “the mere excellence of one man.”80 Citizens are able to recognize good leaders 
by their reputation, and nothing gets individuals greatest reputation than extraordinary 
political action. Machiavelli’s new methods thus would work in synergy with elections 
and free speech, rules and procedures that are crucial for allowing extraordinary, virtuous 
leadership to arise.  
Men born in a republic should, then, follow this formula, 
and early in life strive to become prominent through some 
unusual action… either by proposing a law for the common 
benefit, or by bringing a charge against some powerful 
citizen as a transgressor of the laws…81  
Excellent men are able to accomplish a renewal of the republic based only on 
their virtue, “without reliance on any law,” by their extraordinary reputation and example 
that lead other good men “to imitate them.”82 For Machiavelli elections —which imply 
the possibility of attaining glory through virtuous action, allowing for the moralizing 
authority of kingly power83 to emerge in defense of liberty— and the equal access to 
political speech—the equal right to propose a law and speak in favor or against it in the 
assembly—are necessary, but not sufficient methods to maintain liberty overtime. Adding 
new methods for adaptation and deterrence through periodic popular creation and 
punishment would make the republic incorruptible:  
if such instances of enforcement as I mentioned above, 
together with such individual examples, had appeared at 
least every ten years in that city, their necessary result 
would have been that Rome would never have become 
corrupt.84 
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 Nicolas de Condorcet was one of the most progressive and creative thinkers of the 
18th century. He was a radical egalitarian who vigorously advocated for the abolition of 
slavery, citizenship rights for women, equal protection for homosexuals and sex workers, 
equal and free public education, and active political participation of the masses.1 As a 
materialist political philosopher,2 Condorcet was particularly adept at seeing the gap 
between formal rules and procedures, and the actual exercise of rights and their 
consequences in society. Living in a moment of intense revolutionary activity, in which 
the old corporate structures of the ancien régime, already hollowed out by incipient 
capitalist markets and secularism, were crumbling, Condorcet sought to play an active 
role in the making of new ‘enlightened’ institutions. Based on his own experience as a 
legislator as well as the radical change coming out of the Paris Commune and the 
storming of the Tuileries, he came to comprehend that equal liberty needed strong 
popular institutions to properly channel protest coming from the masses and to limit the 
domination coming from representative government. His constitutional project was 
therefore designed to protect the republic against what he identified as a new form of 
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domination: “indirect despotism,” a regime in which there is a procedurally sound 
representative government, but in which representation is “neither equal nor real,”3 a de 
facto oligarchy within the bounds of the rule of law. Given our ongoing ‘crisis of 
democracy,’ in which there is a general sensation that ‘the game is rigged’ even if the 
rules are generally being followed, revisiting Condorcet’s constitutional theory, which he 
constructed against the threat of de facto oligarchy concealed through proceduralism, 
appears timelier than ever. 
Even if his contributions to the application of probability theory to voting have 
been sufficiently acknowledged,4 his contributions as a political philosopher have “been 
judged from the point of view of defeat,” 5 and therefore have mostly gone unappreciated 
and understudied.6 Raised as part of the nobility but advocating for equality, the Marquis 
de Condorcet was a class traitor, an aristocrat who betrayed his class interest and 
embraced democracy. Because he was a nobleman of letters, and thus part of the 
intellectual structure of the monarchical regime,7 the Jacobins saw him with suspicion, as 
a “timid conspirator,” despite his radical egalitarian agenda.8 And even the most liberal 
part of the bourgeoisie, the Girondins, did not trust him, seeing him “as a weak reed at 
best, and as a tool of the Jacobins at worse.”9 As a result, Condorcet’s 1793 constitutional 
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proposal was first discarded by the Jacobins and then disavowed by the Girondins, and 
has remained largely dormant since then.10  
As the only philosophe who was an active participant in the French Revolution, 
Condorcet’s ideas on how to harness the revolutionary spirit against systemic corruption 
from the point of view of praxis are of special interest. As a journalist and political 
pamphleteer, Condorcet followed closely the proceedings of the newly elected French 
constituent assembly (1789–1791). In 1790 he became a member of the municipal 
council in Paris while keeping up “a deluge of criticism and advice to the Assembly.”11 
After the 1791 Constitution was unveiled, he strongly criticized it for establishing 
property qualifications for suffrage and holding public office.12 In October of 1791 he 
was elected to the Legislative Assembly, of which he served as President. His most 
important achievement (even if tabled) was to introduce a report on public education that 
recommended the establishment of equal, secular, and free public education from 
elementary school to college.13 Given his legislative track record and his furious defense 
of equality in the press, Condorcet gained the reputation of being “a champion of the 
people, without being tainted by violent demagoguery,” which made him become elected 
in 1792 to the National Convention, and then appointed to preside over the commission 
that would draft the new republican constitution.14  
The constitutional proposal that came out of that commission established a 
‘popular branch’ composed of local primary assemblies with the power to elect, censor, 
and reconstitute the republic. The project was endorsed by the Girondins, which were the 
majority in the commission, presented by Condorcet to the Convention in February, but 
only discussed for about a month in mid April 1973. Le Girondine, as the constitutional 
project is commonly known, was bitterly opposed by the Jacobins, who saw in 
Condorcet’s proposal for establishing a system of primary assemblies a scheme devised 
to bolster conservative strongholds in the provinces and dilute the power of the Paris 
Commune. Seeing their material power under threat by this radically democratic, de-
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centralizing proposal coming out of a Girondin-dominated commission, in June the 
Jacobins expelled the Girondins by force, took over the Convention, and approved (but 
never implemented) a mutilated version of Le Girondine that although instituted primary 
assemblies it limited their capacity for opposition and binding decision-making power, 
and did not include procedures or ways to enforce the popular will.15 It also did not 
include the right to education, which was for Condorcet a necessary condition for the 
proper exercise of sovereign power in these assemblies. If implemented by the Jacobins, 
primary assemblies would likely end up having a toothless “advisory” role with no 
incentive for commoners to participate, and no procedural or material educational support 
for them to exercise political judgment. During the referendum on the new constitution 
Condorcet published a pamphlet condemning the project and urging citizens to vote 
against it.16 The Jacobins denounced this as a seditious act, and the Convention decided 
to arrest him on treason charges in early July. After escaping arrest for eight months, 
Condorcet was finally apprehended, dying on a prison cell while awaiting to be 
guillotined.17 The revolutionary experience, unable to produce a stabilizing constitutional 
framework, would end five years later in the coup d’état of 18 Brumaire and the return of 
kingly power to France.  
In what follows I seek to recuperate Condorcet’s neglected wisdom during this 
revolutionary period in which old structures were being destroyed and there was no 
suitable blueprint for a post-revolutionary future. I engage first with Condorcet’s critique 
of separation of powers and the American constitution, and then analyze his 
constitutional plan, focusing on his proposal to institutionalize the popular protest power 
that arose with the revolution. I argue we should understand Condorcet’s proposal as a 
mixed constitution that institutionalizes the power of the many within the framework of 
the modern state. His proposed popular institution does not share in government —as a 
branch along side the executive, legislative, and judiciary branches— but is conceived as 
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censorial, as exerting control over government through political judgment. Because 
“nothing could be easier than to devise forms which would create and then preserve bad 
laws,”18 representative constitutions need a non-ruling power able to periodically judge 
—from outside of government— law and policy. The constitutionalization of this no-rule, 
protest power appears for Condorcet as the only reasonable guarantee against systemic 
corruption and slow-moving, relentless oligarchic domination. 
 
I. The Modern Mixed Constitution 
While the first to write on a mixed constitution in which the people had the final 
say on law, policy, and punishment was Machiavelli, who sketched a plebeian republic in 
which good laws are the result of the conflict between the few and the many, Condorcet 
was the first one to write a full-fledged plebeian framework constitutionalizing the power 
of the many and giving them constituent power. Building his project on old participatory 
structures, his 1793 constitutional plan for the French republic seek to reform and 
entrench the village assemblies that were convened for the elections of the Estates-
General,19 and the self-governing experience of the communes to establish a ‘popular 
branch’: a decentralized network of radically inclusive local assemblies with the power 
not only to elect officials but also to initiate and veto legislation, and exercise periodic 
constituent power.   
As a republican thinker, Condorcet’s main concern was to prevent systemic 
corruption, the process in which “slow and secret abuses” take hold of institutions, 
allowing for the few to control representative government.20 Even if for him “the true 
                                                
18 Condorcet, Letters from a Freeman of New Haven to a Citizen of Virginia on the Futility of Dividing the 
Legislative Power among Several Bodies (1787), Letter Three, in Condorcet: Foundations of Social Choice 
and Political Theory, edited by Iain McLean and Fiona Hewitt (Cheltenham: Elgar, 2007) p. 316. 
19  Communal gatherings for putting together cahiers de doléances. After the electoral statute was 
promulgated, local assemblies were convoked to elect delegates and put together a list of grievances. See 
Peter Murray Jones, The Peasantry in the French Revolution (Cambridge University Press, 1988), p. 62–4; 
Malcolm Crook, “The Persistence of the Ancien Régime in France: The Estates General of 1789 and the 
Origins of the Revolutionary Electoral System” Parliaments, Estates and Representation (1993) 13:1, 29-
40. For the importance of popular reunions and committees at this time see Alain Dalotel, Alain Faure and 
Jean-Claude Freiermuth, Aux origins de la Commune (Paris 1980); Jean Dautry and Lucien Scheler, Le 
Comité Central Républicain des vingt arrondissements de Paris (Paris 1960); and Martin Philip 
Johnson, Paradise of Association (1997); Ross, Kristin. The Emergence of Social Space (London: Verso, 
2008). 




perfection of man” was certainly a central duty of society,21 his constitutional project was 
not so much aimed at the “enactment of political autonomy” but rather, based on a 
negative conception of political liberty, at enabling resistance against tyranny. 22 
Following Machiavelli, for whom corruption is enabled by the methods of selection and 
decisionmaking,23 Condorcet criticizes Montesquieu’s doctrine of separation of powers 
and its proceduralism,24 and rejects the constitutional framework put in place in America, 
designed based on this doctrine, as not sufficient for controlling corruption and 
guaranteeing liberty.25  
In Montesquieu’s constitutional model, liberty is an individual “tranquility of 
spirit” based on the absence of fear and the sense of security26 that result from good 
procedures that presuppose a division of functions and a balance of power. For 
Condorcet, this separation of powers does not provide an adequate mechanism for 
maintaining liberty because “only tend[s] to separate and complicate individual 
interests.”27 Condorcet argues that seeing the executive, legislative, and judicial powers 
as independent forces that, by seeking their own interest, balance and regulate one 
another against the encroachment of liberty, denies the possibility of domination 
happening despite this formal division of government functions.28  
What becomes of public freedom if, instead of 
counterbalancing one another, these powers unite to attack 
it?29  
 
James Madison, too zealous against the tyranny of the majority and too confident 
on public opinion and electoral procedures, did not provide in the constitutional structure 
any recourse against oligarchy and the corruption of foundational institutions, except for 
a constituent process requiring supermajorities and excluding the direct participation of 
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23 Machiavelli, Discourses, I.18 
24 Condorcet, A Commentary and Review of Montesquieu's "Spirit of Laws" 
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the people.30 For him, separation of powers was an “auxiliary precaution” to prevent 
corruption and the negative effects of factions,31 which together with a free press would 
protect the republic from vicious political leaders.  
 According to Condorcet’s account of the principles that should undergird 
republican institutions —“equality, economy, and simplicity”32— the new American 
constitution, which chose “identity of interests rather than equality of rights” as 
organizing principle,33 and enshrined the separation of powers as the best design to keep 
the republic uncorrupted, would stray too far from the republican tradition and thus was 
unlikely to serve as a real bulwark of liberty. While embracing interest over equality of 
rights would increase rather than ameliorate ‘artificial’ inequalities and the forms of 
domination they reproduce,34 Condorcet criticized the system of separation of powers 
because it “disfigured” the simplicity of constitutions. Separation of functions would not 
only be unsuccessful in keeping corruption at bay, but it would also allow for its 
concealment and reproduction. 
Experience everywhere has proved that these complicated 
machines destroyed themselves, or that another system 
emerges alongside the legal one, based on intrigue, 
corruption and indifference; that, in a sense, there are two 
constitutions, one legal and public but existing only in the 
law books, and the other secret but real, resulting from a 
tacit agreement between the established powers.35  
 
Separation of powers is thus not only an inadequate framework to keep corruption 
in check, but would also serve to obscure the actual domination being exerted “off the 
books” through the actual collusion of representative institutions against equal liberty. 
Without a popular censorial power making sure elites are not self-serving, the American 
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constitution put “the fate of the State dependent on the degree of stubbornness or 
corruption in each branch.”36  
When the people of a nation are reduced to fearing the 
errors, passions or corruption of their own representatives, 
they have to entrust other men, chosen just as much by 
chance, with the authority to prevent these representatives 
from abusing their power. The nation’s fate is not therefore 
in the hands of the reason, virtue and identity of interest of 
its citizens and their representatives. On the contrary, it is 
prey to the balance of opposing passions, of conflicting 
interests and clashing prejudices. In both administration 
and legislation, we must try to find a way of binding men to 
their duties when it is only chance, masquerading as free 
choice, which has endowed them with power in the first 
place.37 
 
For Condorcet representative government without a proper surveillance power 
censoring it, is equivalent to trading one form of despotism for another, “suffering under 
several types of oppression rather than fearing just one.”38 And even if not all of those in 
power have oligarchic tendencies or are inept at protecting the interest of the people 
against them, having a few good leaders does not guarantee the dismantling of structures 
of domination. Condorcet learned through his experience in politics that reasonable 
arguments and truth are unlikely to carry the day, and thus the fate of the system cannot 
be place on representative institutions. 
…indeed, the major defect of all known assemblies is not 
that they lack talented men and virtuous citizens, but that 
they are full of stupid and corrupt men.39  
 
From a critical engagement with the American constitutional model, especially 
the Constitution of Pennsylvania, which instituted a checking power in the Council of 
                                                
36 Condorcet, “Letters From a Freeman of New Haven,” Letter Three, p. 322. For further analysis of 
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Censors in its article 47, and Turgot’s plan of local assemblies,40 Condorcet proposed a 
republican organization of political power aimed at addressing the inevitable erosion of 
law and its democratic foundations. As an alternative to the liberal constitution 
established in the United States, Condorcet proposed a mixed constitutional framework in 
which the ruling power of making laws and decisions about administration and foreign 
affairs would be concentrated in a government that would be constitutionally bound to 
obey decisions reached in local assemblies. In this way, he made “the sovereign 
unencumbered and thus the best candidate to be the judge of government and its agents.41 
Different from Madison’s theory of factions, in which ambition counters ambition and 
the most effective way to deal with the pernicious effects of factions is to multiply 
them,42 Condorcet proposes a government composed of different bodies (administrative, 
executive, legislative) that are not designed to check each other but to fulfill a particular 
role at different levels of government, and an external popular power to check corruption 
and avoid oligarchic domination.43 While the American constitutional structure gave 
citizens the individual right “to petition the Government for a redress of grievances”44 
without providing any enforcement mechanism to see that petitions were taken into 
proper account in governmental action, Condorcet’s popular branch would constitute an 
institutionalized popular power aimed both at electing the members of government and 
censoring their decisions. Rather than embracing the idealist position of trusting on elite 
self-policing, Condorcet follows a materialist approach to the constitution and gives the 
censoring power to popular primary assemblies, which are conceived as the 
institutionalized form of collective protest power.  
Because spontaneous assemblies appear as constitutive to a free society born out 
of revolution, they should be considered as the central pivot of Condorcet’s constitutional 
plan to stabilize the thrust of the French Revolution and preserve its recently gained, 
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fragile liberty. 45  Given that he recognized that such a decentralized institution of 
decision-making would not be able to enforce its own decisions against the centralized 
power of government, Condorcet saw the need for another institution dedicated to 
oversee that the law was properly applied and enforced: a council of national overseers 
selected by the people. In the following sections I first analyze the scheme of primary 
assemblies, then focus on the procedures to initiate a constituent process, and finally 
analyze the council of overseers from a plebeian point of view. 
 
II. Constitutionalizing the Revolutionary Spirit: Primary Assemblies 
Condorcet was ahead of his time and was very aware that unveiling truth would 
make him a target of “ridicule.”46 He was one of the first to call out the absurdity of 
excluding women from active citizenship and of the legality of slavery. His materialist 
approach to law allowed him to understand the mechanism behind these exclusions and 
the justifications that are constructed based on the material conditions of dependency of 
women and slaves. For him the same as men have negatively determined women’s 
education and aptitudes by making “oppressive laws against them,” establishing a “huge 
inequality among the sexes,”47 and then sanction their incapacity for active citizenship, 
“we deprived the Negro of all his moral faculties and then declare him inferior to us, and 
consequently destined to carry our chains.”48 For Condorcet the causes of inequality are 
not individual faculties, but the social structures that condition human development.  His 
project is therefore aimed at eliminating the man-made distortions of the natural equality 
of “being capable of reason and moral ideas,”49 by establishing an egalitarian legal and 
institutional infrastructure in tune with the principle of equal rights coming out of the 
French Revolution.   
Our hopes for the future condition of the human race can be 
subsumed under three important heads: the abolition of 
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inequality between nations; the progress of equality within 
a single people; and true perfection of man.50 
 
Given Condorcet’s radical egalitarian worldview and his materialist constitutional 
lens, the framework he proposes is not aimed at suppressing the revolutionary spirit and 
demobilizing the people by reserving political action for the enlightened few, but at 
creating the institutional infrastructure necessary to harness the emancipatory nature of 
popular politics for the benefit of the republic.  
Grouping the citizens into primary assemblies is more a 
means of reconciling peace with freedom than a threat to 
public tranquility.  
 
Because this foundational framework would need to accommodate his egalitarian 
position, Condorcet’s model is a radically inclusive one in which the state had the duty to 
provide for basic welfare and education, and all adult residents could participate in 
politics at the local level, which all together would guarantee the minimal conditions for 
adequate human development. In his constitutional proposal all males who were 21 years 
old and residents for more than a year could become active citizens,51 even if to his mind 
there was no reason beyond social dependence to exclude women from education and 
active citizenship.52 Despite Le Girondine not giving the franchise to women, in terms of 
the degree of inclusiveness and participation, its proposal is quite radical since it argued 
not only for equal civil rights, but also for equal political rights, which were previously 
restricted to property-owning citizens in the 1791 Constitution. Even if Condorcet 
considered legitimate the exclusion from the franchise based on a state of dependence in 
which an individual “no longer obeys his own will,” he denied the legitimacy of social 
relations perpetuating dependence in society and denounced the 1791 legal framework as 
not only unable of “destroying all vestiges of this dependence” but also as “helping to 
consecrate it in our new laws.”53 He found wealth requirements for voting and holding 
public office a baseless malice:  
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we could be neither stupid nor contemptible enough to 
believe that rich men are less prone to vice and corruption 
than poor ones. The only justification for a condition of this 
kind would be the advantage of choosing men who had 
received a better education and who could therefore be 
assumed to be more enlightened. We would consequently 
have to require a fortune of some considerable size. 
Clearly, all conditions of this kind are either illusory or lead 
to oligarchy.54  
 
The only requirement Condorcet endorses for the exercise of political rights, in 
addition to local residency, is a proper “theoretical education” enabling individuals to 
enjoy their rights, the very exercise of which forms part of a second, “political 
education.”55 Because without knowledge and the skills to judge critically we do not have 
the capacity to recognize truth from falseness, ignorance undermines the “genuine 
improvement of the human person,” and therefore proper education must be a 
constitutional right, guaranteed by the state to every citizen.56  
Society thus has another duty—to provide all individuals 
with the means of acquiring the knowledge of their 
intelligence and the time they are able to spend on 
educating themselves put within their reach. The probable 
result is that the scales will be weighted in favor of those 
who have more natural talent and those with private means, 
giving them freedom to spend longer on their studies; but if 
this kind of inequality does not subject any individual to 
another, and if it affords support for the weak without 
imposing a master on them, it is neither an evil nor an 
injustice; indeed, a love of equality that is afraid of 
swelling the ranks of the enlightened and adding to their 
knowledge would be a most sorry thing.57 
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The expansion of general instruction to all citizens was so crucial for Condorcet 
that a year before his constitutional proposal he presented to the French National 
Assembly a project to make education compulsory to men and women —a necessary 
condition for his participatory constitutional project. Because for Condorcet true political 
liberty entails being free from ignorance, having the necessary knowledge to enjoy our 
rights and be truly independent, compulsory instruction would be the “price for liberty,” 
and the duty of society is “to provide all individuals with the means of acquiring the 
knowledge of their intelligence and the time they are able to spend on educating 
themselves put within their reach.”58 This necessary learning process does not only take 
place in classrooms but also in political assemblies where political knowledge is created 
and shared, and political judgment is exercised and perfected through decisionmaking.  
The radical inclusion of Le Girondine in terms of citizenship was coupled with a 
participatory institutional framework aimed at forming the general will of all assembled 
citizens to elect and check representative government. Primary assemblies of between 
450 and 900 citizens would be established by law in every district alongside 
representative government,59 which means that the nascent French republic could have 
had about seven million active citizens organized in as many as 16,000 local assemblies60 
if Le Girondine would have been established. This bottom-up process of will formation 
based on a multiplicity of times and spaces of sovereignty and deliberation61 would not 
only be superior in terms of determining the general will than having only district or 
national representatives, 62  but also would provide the opportunity for the political 
education of the people, which is necessary for the full enjoyment of their rights. 
Condorcet’s materialist approach to the constitution directed him to build on 
already existing popular organization as a springboard for radical change. His intention 
was to formalize the “partial, spontaneous protests and private voluntary gatherings” that 
arose with the revolution into primary popular assemblies, which “following legally 
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established procedures, [would] carry out precisely determined functions.”63 Condorcet is 
against allowing for private forms of protest to drive government action because it would 
be a source of inequality: 
sporadic protests and the rebellions or movements which 
may result from them will have more influence if they 
occur in or near the town where the national powers are 
based.64   
  
Because his constitutional framework was designed to “suit a people in the final 
stages of a revolution” by bringing order “without weakening the public spirit,”65 he 
acknowledges these extra-legal popular councils born out of the revolutionary experience 
as existing outside of the constituted order and in need of institutionalization.  
Even if as a rationalist Condorcet was primarily concerned with good deliberation 
and decisionmaking, I would argue his primary assembly system is not democratic in the 
sense that his constitutional scheme does not give primary assemblies ruling power 
(kratos), but only the power to check government, as a reactive power responding to the 
(in)actions of the representative body. His constitutional proposal conceived of the power 
of lawmaking and passing administrative measures as a monopoly of the national 
representative assembly;66 “all other authorities will be required simply to execute the 
laws and resolutions which this assembly produces.”67 In this way, Condorcet “liberated 
the citizens of all governmental burdens” so they could adequately judge governmental 
action.68  
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Besides giving primary assemblies the power of electing candidates for the 
national assembly, and thus the power to constitute government, Condorcet conceived of 
local assemblies as the site for the people’s institutionalized form of appeal, a “legal 
means of protest which could cause any law to be re-examined.”69 This “right of censure” 
could be exercised by any citizen, who after collecting 50 supporting signatures, could 
request her primary assembly to review an existing law or consider proposing a new 
one.70 These proposals would not be immediately debated in the assembly but first 
analyzed and reformulated to become what Condorcet calls a “simple proposition.” 
Following Rousseau, Condorcet argues there should be no formal debate in primary 
assemblies, but only a yes/no vote on questions that have “already been reduced to their 
simple component propositions.”  
Let us call a proposition which may only be accepted or 
rejected, but not amended, a ‘simple proposition’. It is on 
propositions like these that voters should be asked their 
opinion, and not on the reasons which make them accept or 
reject the various propositions. The analysis should stop 
there.71 
 
However, despite his stance against structured deliberation and in favor of silent 
voting, Condorcet conceives of primary assemblies as permanent sites of deliberation, 
where “members can, of course, debate freely in the assembly rooms in between the 
proposal and resolution of a question, but these debates remain completely private.”72 
Assemblies must be opened every Sunday to enable for citizens’ deliberations.73 By 
understanding politics as political judgment Condorcet positions assembled citizens and 
their “reasoned opinions” as the core site of sovereignty and legitimacy.74 Primary 
assemblies, because of their capacity to aggregate particular knowledge and relate it to 
the general interest, would allow for a recursive relation between local and national 
politics and the truest expression of the general will.  
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To allow for primary assemblies to be self-governing, Condorcet proposed a 
council composed of one member for every 50 citizens registered in the primary 
assembly records (9–18 members per assembly). In addition to keeping the voting roles 
up to date, convening the assembly in the cases determined by the Constitution, and 
making the necessary demands to other assemblies or the regional government for the 
exercise of the people’s right of petition and censure,75 the council must also reduce 
citizen’s petitions to simple propositions —the answer to these statements would allow an 
individual to “arrive at a true expression of his own opinion.”76 The council would be in 
charge of analyzing the subject and bringing all the necessary information to the 
assembly. This power to frame the discussion by analyzing that subject and reducing all 
the different opinions about it to a series of “basic propositions and their 
contradictories,”77 “must not be confused with giving any group of men, or even any 
individual, the right to suggest a subject for debate.”78 Condorcet does not give agenda-
setting power to the council; its prerogative would be limited to bringing to the assembly 
the initiatives of citizens, presenting the “whole subject of debate and a table of all 
propositions in which they had to vote.” 79  After being presented with a simple 
proposition, citizens would have eight days to deliberate on the matter and cast their vote 
during the next session.  
Given his aversion to anti-progressive forces in society driven by “fear of 
innovation,” what for him is “one of the most damaging scourges of the human race,”80 
Condorcet devised a constitutional plan in which legal, policy, and constituent change 
could originate at the neighborhood level, in any corner of the republic. Progressive 
reform could be put into motion organically, spreading through the network of assemblies 
at the district and regional levels. If a resolution passed in one assembly, this assembly 
would have the right convoke all other assemblies in the district to decide on the 
particular motion. If the majority of assemblies in the district agree to go forward with it, 
all assemblies at the regional level would decide on the matter. If they are also in 
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agreement, then the national representative assembly must consider if the proposition is 
“worthy of examination.” If the representative assembly agrees with the motion agreed 
upon by a majority of primary assemblies at the regional level, it is then transformed into 
law. But if the will of the representative assembly (based on a simple majority of its 
members) contradicts that emanating from the primary assemblies in a region, all primary 
assemblies in the republic are called to decide on the question. If the majority of primary 
assemblies is in contradiction with the representative assembly, then the latter “would 
seem to have lost the nation’s trust and must be replaced”81 by new representatives who 
would carry out the general will. In this way, Condorcet builds into the lawmaking 
process an enforcement mechanism of the popular will. If the legislature deviates from 
the popular will and writes a law that does not track the people’s will, it is recalled. 
Therefore representatives have a strong incentive to track the will emanating from 
primary assemblies.   
Even if the representative assembly is the ruling power, in charge of legislating 
and directing government, Condorcet gives the ultimate decision over any matter to 
primary assemblies, setting his project apart from those of ‘aristocratic’ republicans such 
as James Harrington82 and liberal republicans such as Thomas Paine.83 In Condorcet’s 
constitutional structure the assembled multitude has the power to oppose change and to 
generate it, autonomously and effectively setting the direction that government must 
follow. Moreover, in addition to the functions of electing representatives and 
repealing/initiating law through censorship procedures, Condorcet gives to primary 
assemblies the role of approving or rejecting drafts constitutions, as well as to decide 
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IV. Proceduralizing Plebeian Constituent Power  
By constitutionalizing non-governmental political activity Condorcet’s 
constitution sought to be more than a mere regulatory document such as the American 
framework, which mostly contained detailed functions and limits to government.  Le 
Girondine established also a creative institutional framework enabling the exercise of 
popular constituent power. In addition to the “protest power” of primary assemblies to 
censure government during normal politics, through binding motions for repealing and 
initiating legislation, Condorcet argued that for the republic to stay free and stable, the 
constitution needed to provide for procedures to periodically activate the constituent 
power. In the declaration of rights of his constitutional draft, echoing his friends Jefferson 
and Paine, he stated that “a generation has no right to subject its laws to future 
generations” and thus a people “always has the right to review, reform and change its 
Constitution.”84 The same as Machiavelli, for whom a periodic activation of constituent 
power is necessary to push back against oligarchy and protect liberty, for Condorcet the 
periodic revisiting of fundamental laws is also a necessary condition for the legal system 
to remain productive of liberty. Because no legal structure is immune to corruption, the 
constitution must provide for ways “to regulate the way in which a nation can establish a 
new constitution if citizens feel that the first poses a threat to their freedom.”85 Moreover, 
the appropriate procedures for activating the constitute power should take into account 
both the “profound indifference which often follows revolutions” and “the slow and 
secret abuses which eventually corrupt human institutions.”86  
Following the premise that even the “best organized constitution” will eventually 
become corrupted if it is not periodically reformed, Condorcet pushes for 
constitutionalizing the constituent power, for normalizing extraordinary politics through 
institutions and procedures. 
The only way to bring regular and lasting order to a society 
whose members have just retrieved their jealousy guarded 
rights, and who fear that they may lose them once again, is 
for the citizens explicitly to adopt a constitution which 
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contains an orderly means of correction and reform. This 
will also eliminate enthusiasm and exaggerated suspicion, 
partisan frenzy and the fear of factions, the faintheartedness 
which says that all disruption will destroy the State, and the 
fear which constantly sees tyranny in peace and order.87  
 
Condorcet offers a model in which the initiation of the constituent process is not 
the monopoly of an institution or invoked through a single procedure. Le Girondine 
established three ways to activate the constituent process: 1) periodically through law (in 
intervals of 20 years), 2) by individual citizens through their primary assemblies, and 3) 
by the national legislature after approval of a majority of primary assemblies. 
Condorcet’s multidimensional strategy to allow for the activation of the constituent 
power, which proceduralizes individual, institutional, and constitutional methods, is 
perhaps the most radical, comprehensive proposal to integrate the constituent power into 
the constitutional structure.  
In addition to mandating a constitutional convention to review and improve the 
constitution every 20 years, Le Girondine gave to every citizen the right “to lead the call 
for a Convention for the reform of the Constitution” through the same “forms and rules 
established for the exercise of the right of censorship.”88 With 50 signatures of its 
members, primary assemblies would be forced to vote on weather or not amending the 
constitution would be necessary and desirable. Guaranteeing the individual prerogative to 
initiate a critique of the constitution would foster a dynamic constitutionalism in which 
change could be initiated at the local level through a capillary system89 of political 
judgment. The question to initiate a constituent process would then spread organically 
through the network by triggering discussions and decisions one district at a time. If a 
majority of assemblies agrees, then the legislature would be required to call a National 
Convention.90 This extraordinary assembly would be composed of two members per 
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region, elected in the same way as members of the Legislature.91 This would mean that 
each citizen would have to select and rank six candidates for the Convention, which 
would have one year to complete a draft to send to the primary assemblies for 
ratification.92 
If we take into account that for Condorcet the only requirements for citizenship 
are one-year residence and being 21 years old, giving the right to initiate a constituent 
process to citizens is quiet revolutionary in terms of its radical inclusiveness and the 
possible articulation of subaltern forms of political judgment this would allow for as well 
as of its post-national implications. To be a resident is for Condorcet to be a citizen, and 
the exercise of political rights, including the right to amend the constitution, is done 
directly, at the local level, where reference to the “national will” are not connected to the 
ethnic conception of the people developed under the nation-state, but to the decisions 
reached in a majority of primary assemblies. This majority decision is constructed 
locally, which allows for the integration of local contexts and conjunctures into the 
“national will.” However, that this national will is constructed from the aggregate 
reasoned decisions taken in primary assemblies does not mean that Condorcet wants to 
“federalize the sovereign or particularize the law.” 93  The people are a collective 
sovereign and therefore individual citizens need to exercise their sovereign rights 
assembled, in a material and procedural space conducive to deliberation and decision-
making.94 Generality is only achieved through a collective process of opinion formation 
that originates at the local level. Therefore the people would operate not as a centralized 
system of command, but as a grid of political judgment in permanent flow. The people as 
network would be a subject with as many brains as assemblies, in which collective 
learning, reaction against domination, and social change would happen organically and 
independently from representative government and political parties. 
                                                
91 Each assembly would send its list of candidates to the regional administration, which would make all the 
lists public and put together a definitive regional list with the six candidates who obtained the most votes.  
This list is sent back to the primary assemblies, in which the second, definitive vote is cast. The results are 
sent again to the regional government and published. The two candidates with the majority of votes would 
be selected as members to the National Convention. 
92 Le Girondine, Title IX, art. 16. 
93 Urbinati, “Condorcet’s Democratic Theory of Representative Government,” p. 67. 






IV. The Council of Overseers as Plebeian Institution 
According to Condorcet, under any system in which government legitimately 
makes law, the right to resist a law that is “clearly unjust,” even if procedurally sound, 
must be confronted. For him, only the “direct majority of the people, limited only by the 
laws” can legitimately “judge weather this [legal] injustice is real” because the assembled 
people —not their representatives— are the “primary political power.”95 Only the people 
themselves, exercising their right to censure in their primary assemblies, are able to 
legitimately and properly judge if a law is unjust. Because the probability of 
approximating the best judgment increases in proportion to the number of people 
deciding on an issue within appropriate rules of engagement,96 decisions reached in a 
majority of primary assemblies would have the highest probability of being correct. It is 
within this argument of popular sovereignty as a form of judgment passed on the injustice 
of law and the power to resist laws that enable domination, that Condorcet proposes a 
popular surveillance institution. This censorial institution, “the council of national 
overseers,” however, was not included in the final draft of Le Girondine and thus is not as 
detailed in terms of its procedures.97 
In the interest of uniform action and theory, the constitution 
needs to establish a council of national overseers in 
between the legislature and the citizens who must obey the 
law, and the public officials who must execute the laws or 
supervise the detailed application of general administrative 
measures. The council will supervise (surveiller) the 
observance and execution of the laws and arrange the 
details of general administrative measure, so that they can 
be applied. It will carry out the will of the nation (volonté 
nationale) and inform the people’s representatives of 
anything which may require new resolutions to be made.98 
 
 Condorcet conceives this Council of Overseers as a liaison (lien) both between the 
citizens and the legislature, and between the legislature and the executive and 
                                                
95 Condorcet, “A Survey of the Principles,” p. 204. 
96 Condorcet, “An Essay on the Application of Probability Theory to Plurality Decision-Making” (1785), in 
Condorcet: Foundations, pp. 131–8. 
97 More research needs to be done on the reasons why this proposal was not included, and what was 
Condorcet’s original constitutional proposal before presumably being outvoted by the rest of the 
commission.  




administrative organs. According to Condorcet, such an office, “necessary for social 
order,” is aimed both at enforcement and surveillance, at supervising that the will of the 
people “is carried out precisely, in an orderly and safe fashion.”99  
Even if Condorcet’s council of overseers does not appear as a straightforward 
plebeian institution —defending the will of the people against the government of the 
few— but rather as an office that only claims allegiance to the law, I would argue that it 
should nevertheless be seen as a form of tribunician power akin to Machiavelli’s Council 
of Provosts. 100 Following John McCormick’s interpretation through which plebeian 
institutions would provide not only protection against oligarchic power but also popular 
learning of the internal functioning of government, I would argue Condorcet’s Council of 
Overseers, as a “popular agent of elite accountability”101 that observes and supervises 
elected representatives, should also be analyzed as part of a plebeian tradition of 
institutionalized tribunician power.102   
 
 
Figure 5.1 Condorcet’s Constitution for France, 1793 
                                                
99 Condorcet, “A Survey of the Principles,” p. 204–5. 
100 For an analysis of Machiavelli’s proposal see Chapter 4. 
101 McCormick, Machiavellian Democracy, p. 106 
102 Even if Condorcet did not support the dual-authority model of the Roman republic because it led to 
constitutional crises, the censorial powers he gives to his council of overseers are plebeian and in this way 




 To elaborate his popular surveillance office Condorcet’s closest example was the 
powerful Council of Censors that his friend Benjamin Franklin had introduced in the 
1776 Constitution of Pennsylvania. Article 47 established that the members of the 
Council would be selected directly by the people and would have the duties to:  
enquire whether the constitution has been preserved 
inviolate in every part; and whether the legislative and 
executive branches of government have performed their 
duty as guardians of the people…For these purposes they 
shall have power to send for persons, papers, and records; 
they shall have authority to pass public censures, to order 
impeachments, and to recommend to the legislature the 
repealing such laws as appear to them to have been enacted 
contrary to the principles of the constitution.103 
 
In addition to their power to subpoena and impeach, and the right to recommend 
the repeal of laws to the legislature, the council had the power to call a Convention to 
amend the constitution.104 Therefore, the censors would not only oversee that government 
is performing appropriately and recommend the repeal of corrupting laws, but also would 
serve as a constituent board, calling a Convention when the constitution needs an 
overhaul. While Condorcet agrees with Franklin that the duty of a censorial institution 
should be to oversee that representative government is acting in accordance with its duty, 
and that its members should be selected by the people, he disagrees on the prerogatives 
such a council should have. Condorcet gives the power to repeal and propose legislation 
as well as to initiate the constituent process to primary assemblies, and therefore his 
proposed censorial institution is narrower in terms of the scope of its powers than the one 
established in Pennsylvania, but potentially more effective given its sharper focus on 
surveillance of representative government and closing the gap between law and its 
application. 
 Condorcet frames his council of overseers as an enforcer of the law, and its 
members as “agents of the legislature” and thus “subordinate to those with legislative 
                                                
103 Constitution of Pennsylvania (1776), Art. 47. The Council of Censors was in operation in Pennsylvania 
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office see Lewis H. Meader, “The Council of Censors,” The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and 
Biography, Vol. 22, No. 3 (1898), pp. 265-300. 
104 The calling of a convention required a supermajority of 2/3. All other decisions were taken by simple 




power.”105 However, despite the subordination of the members of the council to the 
legislature —which “must be able to force council members to obey the law and to curb 
their deviations”106— the office itself is not the tool (créature) of the legislature, but acts 
independent from it; its main task is to enforce the national will (volonté nationale), 
which emanates from primary assemblies. Moreover, members of the council of 
overseers would be elected not by the legislature but by the assembled people, since they 
are “officers of the people and not of the representatives.”107 Consequently, I would argue 
Condorcet’s surveillance council —selected by the people and aimed at enforcing the 
people’s will by examining every law approved by the legislature and seeing it is 
appropriately applied— should be analyzed as a plebeian institution of accountability.108  
As a liaison between the people and the legislative, the council resembles the 
office of the Tribunate as an institution elected by the plebeian council that served as the 
link between plebeians and the seats of power, where law and its application were 
decided. The tribunes were the representatives of plebeians, and therefore acted as 
brokers between the ruling class and the common people as well as defenders of the 
people against the ruling class.  
Even if from the point of view of primary assemblies the council has a tribunician 
character, as an “agent of the legislature” (and not of the people), overseers are conceived 
as an extension of the legislature: “the hand which enables the legislators to act and the 
eyes with which they can observe the execution of their decrees and the effects they 
produce.” In this manner, this popular censorial office is invested with the role to be the 
hands and eyes of the Legislature in the execution of the law, and force the executive to 
apply the law in a determined manner. Condorcet’s council, as the agent of the 
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Legislature, could be conceived as a popular accountability office aimed at enforcing the 
law against the oligarchic tendencies of the executive organs. Seen from this perspective, 
the Council of Overseers is a popular anti-corruption institution checking that oligarchic 
domination does not creep into the gap between formal rules and their material 
application.  
To avoid the corruption of this plebeian council without undermining its strength, 
Condorcet proposes that half of the council should be renewed each year.109 This high 
rotation would “prevent any habitual opinions or procedures being formed which would 
inhibit useful reforms and make everything a matter of routine.”110 In addition to 
preventing bureaucratic logics to become encrusted, high rotation of members would also 
work to avoid oligarchic takeover of the council and to provide for collective learning, 
not only of law but also of how the government operates. The council acts not only as the 
eyes of the Legislature in the process of execution of law, but also as the eyes of the 
people in the places of power. The same as Machiavelli’s provosts, who would reside in 
the palace to witness all proceedings, Condorcet’s overseers would observe and analyze 
how the government implements the law. His overseers seem more powerful than 
Machiavelli’s provosts since they would not only observe, but also direct and enforce; as 
agents of the Legislature they would have the institutional power to set limits and 
expectations for the executive branches in terms of the correct application of the law. 
Seen from a plebeian perspective, Condorcet’s Council of Overseers appears as a 
potentially strong popular accountability institution, playing the role of liaison between 
the people and government, and of enforcer of the people’s will against the corrupting 
tendency of the few. While primary assemblies are conceived as sovereign organs of 
judgment that function as a check on representative government, the Council of 
Overseers is a delegate censorial institution that does not have a will of its own, but is 
tasked with making sure popular judgments get codified into law and are properly applied 
by the executive and administrative organs. Put together, Condorcet’s ‘popular branch’ 
composed of a network of primary assemblies and a surveillance council appear as a 
powerful counterpower to representative government, which would be able not only to 
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prevent systemic corruption and the gradual decay of the republic into an indirect 













Even if she was mislabeled as an idealist1 —an ideological position she decried as 
working against proletarian emancipation— Rosa Luxemburg’s thought is deeply 
materialist. From her assessment of the Social Democratic Party in Germany to 
revolutionary politics in Russia, she was able to unveil power relations and their 
trajectories, and analyze them from the impact they had on the material conditions of 
subordination of the working class. She comes early to the understanding that Marx and 
Engels’ insight after the experience of the Commune was correct: that the “working class 
cannot simply lay hold of the ready-made state machinery and wield it for its own 
purposes.”2 The socialist state needs to be constructed from the bottom up, apart and 
distinct from the bourgeois seats of power, through its own class-based, local organs of 
proletarian power. For Luxemburg if the material conditions for exercising collective 
power do not exist, there is no possible path to socialism and thus no real freedom for the 
working class. To think otherwise is indeed to be clouded by “illusions” that lead to an 
untenable idealist position: the belief that socialism could be realized by decree. 
                                                
1  Norman Geras argues her thought has also been mischaracterized as determinism, fatalism, and 
spontaneism. The Legacy of Rosa Luxemburg, (New York: Verso, 2015), p. 21. 
2 Karl Marxand Frederick Engels, [1848] “The Communist Manifesto” in Robert C. Tucker, ed. The Marx-
Engels Reader (New York: Norton, 1978). Quoted in Luxemburg [1918], “Our Program and the Political 
Situation” in Hudis and Anderson (eds.), The Rosa Luxemburg Reader (New York: Monthly Review Press, 




Following Marx, for Luxemburg representative democracy is not a deficient political 
system, unable to properly channel working class priorities, but the political structure of 
the ruling class that could never deliver socialism through legal reform.3 Even if this 
realization made her deny the possibility of proletarian law within the capitalist system, 
something Evgeny Pashukanis would develop in 1924,4 her thought transcended critique 
as she focused on the conditions that were necessary for proletarian law to become a real 
possibility. The popular sectors needed to create their own revolutionary institutional 
infrastructure; without it, the path to socialism and proletarian law would be foreclosed.  
 In this chapter I suggest that focusing on Luxemburg’s critical assessment of 
legal reform and her proposal to incorporate councils as a foundational democratic 
institution, could guide us in thinking about effective ways to counteract the increasing 
corruption and oligarchic domination developing within the contours of our constitutional 
democracies. In both her structural analysis of law and her endorsement of the council 
system she offers a materialist reading of politics that is refreshing, given the 
predominant non-materialist, abstract theory that the Left has tended to produce in the 
last four decades.5 I approach Luxemburg’s work through a constitutional theory lens, 
and argue her ideas on the futility of reform and the need to institutionalize working-class 
power to achieve social change are part of the plebeian materialist strand of constitutional 
thought that embraces conflict as productive of liberty, and sees the institutionalization of 
popular power as a necessary condition for emancipation.  
Even if Luxemburg’s primary concern was not with constitutional theory, a 
constitutional interpretation of her political philosophy gives another point of entry not 
only into her assessment of the revolutionary processes taking place in Russia and 
Germany in the first decades of the 20th century, but also on the structure of political 
power she envisioned for the transition period in between the capitalist and socialist 
society. In what follows I first provide an analysis of Luxemburg’s legal thought, and 
after laying out her arguments on the inadequacy of representative government to 
establish emancipatory, proletarian law, I focus on her support for worker’s councils as 
the necessary material ground for a new legal system that would express a socialist 
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instead of a capitalist society. The politics of collective power, organized and 
deliberative, appear through the lens of Luxemburg’s thought as the only one able to 
guarantee emancipation, being able not only to break with the current legal expression of 
society but to create a new socialist one, based on the political activity of workers’ 
councils.  
 
I.  Legal Reform as Regulation of Exploitation 
Luxemburg’s critique in Reform or Revolution of Eduard Bernstein’s revisionist 
theory of socialism gives an insight into her general critique of law, which she developed 
further in her final speeches, written in the aftermath of the German Revolution of 1918. 
Not only does she denounce revisionism as an opportunistic shift away from the socialist 
goal, but also its contribution to fostering the “illusions” and “self-deceptions” that 
undermine the power of the working class.6 According to Luxemburg, revisionism “lifted 
the program of the socialist movement of its material base and tried to place it on an 
idealist base,”7 in which the antagonism between capital and labor can be “adjusted” to 
attenuate exploitation by “bettering the situation of the workers and by the conservation 
of the middle classes.”8 This “regulation of capitalism” is certainly not the same as 
socialism,9 which for her cannot emanate from the existing legality. “Socialism will not 
and cannot be created by decrees; nor can it be established by any government, however 
socialistic.”10  
According to Luxemburg, Bernstein is able to deliver this illusion of “socialism 
by decree” because his theory “abandons the materialist conception of history”11 and 
pulls “details out of their living economic context. It treats them as disjecta 
membra (separate parts) of a lifeless machine.”12 By treating factors as separate from the 
structure instead of as organic links, as “indispensable gear in the mechanism of capitalist 
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economy,” Bernstein misinterprets them as “means of adaptation” able to suppress the 
internal contradictions of capitalism. Within revisionism the credit system, instead of a 
“means of destruction,” is seen as a possibility for “patching up the sores of capitalism.” 
In the same way, legal reforms, which appear as an effective way to achieve socialism 
from within the capitalist system, should be seen for what they really are: “surface 
modifications” to “reform capitalism” and forgo the socialist project.13  
Luxemburg reminds us that legislative reform was from the beginning a bourgeois 
strategy, serving “to strengthen progressively the rising class till the latter was 
sufficiently strong to seize political power, to suppress the existing juridical system and 
to construct itself a new one.”14  The new political constitutions, born out of the 
bourgeois revolutions, legalized a type of class domination that “does not rest on 
“acquired rights” but on real economic relations,”15 and since there is no “single legal 
formula for the class domination of today,” 16  it is impossible to suppress it the 
“legislative way.” While in the past domination was expressed in “distinctly determined 
juridical relations” that were connected to feudal privilege, bourgeois liberalism codified 
equal liberty while keeping the material conditions for domination intact. 17  For 
Luxemburg the liberal rule of law is the “political expression of the life of a society that 
has already come into being,”18 and therefore, emancipation from exploitation and 
domination existing within this framework cannot be achieved through the law.  
Labor legislation, a main goal of revisionist socialism, is a form of “social 
control” that is “enacted as much in the immediate interest of the capitalist class as in the 
interest of society in general.”19 As such, laws that are championed as socialist, as 
protecting workers, are “simply the regulation of exploitation.”20 But even if labor laws 
are not emancipatory —with much socialism as “a municipal ordinance regulating the 
cleaning of streets or the lighting of street lamps”21— this regulation of exploitation 
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coming out of the “attempt to increase the share of the social wealth going to the working 
class,” is indispensable as it is marginal to the socialist cause.22  In her analysis of the 
“industrial constitutionalism” promoted by revisionists in Germany, which incorporated 
trade unions and industrialists, she argued it is not a socialist type of constitutional 
project, but a mere regulation of labor relations. Even if born in the political action of the 
masses, the industrial constitutional project would develop a form of legality aimed at 
controlling labor without including the “material standard of life as a permanent stage of 
well-being” as part of its core reasoning.23  
Luxemburg’s denial of the possibility of enacting proletarian, emancipatory law 
within the existing capitalist legality is predicated on her assessment of parliamentarism 
—as an elitist organ in which the interests of capital predominate— and of democratic 
proceduralism as a way of masking oligarchy.  
In this society, the representative institutions, democratic in 
form, are in content the instruments of the interests of the 
ruling class.24  
 
After the Social Democratic Party obtained a plurality in the German Parliament 
in 1912, and then decided to switch its position and vote in favor of the war, the “illusion 
of unity under the socialist banner” began to vanish. Luxemburg denounced the 
government as not only placating the bourgeoisie with the adoption of a “policy of 
compensation” and “diplomatic conciliation,” but as a “government representing the 
bourgeois counterrevolution.”25  
In a rather paradoxical move, at least from a democratic theory perspective, 
Luxemburg condemns the decision of the socialist government to convene a constituent 
national assembly. Her structural argument against setting up such a constituent body is 
based on the irreducible antagonism between capital and labor, the power of the few to 
oppress and the many to resist oppression. Because political institutions are forms of 
power that either reproduce capitalist society or oppose it, she condemns the decision by 
the socialist government to convene a national constituent assembly because it would 
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develop the power of the bourgeoisie (the selected few) and do nothing to advance the 
interest of the working class (the organized many). Luxemburg saw the National 
Assembly as an institution constitutive to bourgeois revolution, a symbol of the triumph 
of the new bourgeois social order over the feudal structure of power. 
The National Assembly is an outmoded legacy of bourgeois 
revolutions, an empty shell, a requisite from the time of 
petit-bourgeois illusions of a ‘united people’ and of the 
‘liberty, equality, fraternity’ of the bourgeois State.26 
  
According to Luxemburg, through the wielding of state power the revolutionary 
government was establishing a “bourgeois counter-weight to the workers’ and soldiers’ 
representatives,” 27  and thus rather than empowering the workers, it diverted “the 
revolution on to the track of a bourgeois revolution,” which is not only unable to threaten 
the “capitalist class rule”28 but also effectively works “against the proletariat and against 
socialism.” 29  Instead of consolidating the power of working-class councils, giving 
constituent power to the masses, the government, following the bourgeois track of 
constitution making, established an institution for the selected few to decide on the rules 
for the new “socialist” society. This was for Luxemburg a counterrevolutionary act that 
was legitimized under a narrative of democracy and the fantasy of the people-as-a-whole. 
All the “people,” the whole “nation” should be called to 
decide on the further destiny of the revolution by majority 
vote. This slogan is, for the open and disguised agents of the 
ruling classes, self-evident. We shall discuss neither in the 
national assembly nor about the national assembly with the 
guardians of the capitalists’ safes.30 
 
The belief that the leaders of the working class could negotiate in a bourgeois 
institution with the “guardians of capital” to legally suppress capitalism is for her a 
dangerous illusion. Proletarian law challenging the political and economic systems is 
impossible to achieve within the structure of representative government, which legislates 
to reproduce the system (for which it needs labor laws in order to regulate exploitation 
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and prevent violence). Law coming out of workers’ council would not aim at relatively 
empowering the many within the current structure, but to radically emancipate them from 
the domination of the few, a form of revolutionary reform that subverts the predominant 
structure of class domination. Different from the minimal program of social reform 
sponsored by Bernstein, the maximal program of the socialist society advocated by 
Luxemburg was aimed at the subversion of capitalism. Even if this subversion would be 
attempted through a new form of legality, its force would not be grounded on procedural 
legitimacy but on the power of the working class.  
Because proletarian law can only come out of the councils, through class 
consciousness and the performance of emancipatory politics, the legal subversion of the 
system would be grounded on material conditions, backed up by the collective power of 
the organized masses. This is why, when proletarian law finally arises out of the 
proletarian councils to challenge the economic system, and the capitalist class reacts, a 
civil war between the ruling forces and the organized masses would inevitably ensue. For 
Luxemburg a peaceful transition from capitalism to socialism is impossible, not because 
the working class would need to take governmental power by force (elections have 
already placed the SPD in government), but because of the violent response of the ruling 
class to proletarian, anti-capitalist law. Barbarism thus comes from the counterrevolution, 
from the pushback of the ruling class to the radical social change initiated in the workers’ 
councils. 
 Red Rosa —as her antagonists called her— did not advocate for violence; 
Luxemburg recognized the inevitability of bloodshed and the need to plan for it. For her, 
the ideal of a peaceful transition advocated by SPD leaders, “profound Marxists [who] 
have forgotten the ABCs of socialism,” is another pernicious illusion that undermines the 
proletarian emancipatory movement. 
[They want] to spare themselves the revolution, the use of 
force, the civil war with all its horrors. Petit-bourgeois 
illusions! They imagine that the mightiest revolution since 
the beginning of mankind will develop in such a form that 
the various social classes will come together, engage in a 
pleasant, calm and ‘dignified’ discussion with each other, 
and will afterwards hold a vote, perhaps even one with a 
famous ‘division’. When the capitalist class sees that it is in 




will declare with a sigh: There’s nothing we can do! We 
see that we are outvoted. All right, we shall submit and 
hand over all our lands, factories, mines, all our fire-proof 
safes and our handsome profits to the workers…31 
  
Given that oligarchs would never give up their wealth willingly and peacefully, 
proletarian authority is bound to be disavowed, and blood to be shed. Institutional 
popular power within a system in which the organized few run the state inevitably leads 
to competing authorities, an unsustainable dual-sovereignty model that ends in a 
constitutional crisis. Is in this moment when the power of deadly violence breaks through 
the constitutional scaffolding of rights and democratic institutions, negating the 
legitimate authority of the people to make anti-capitalist law.  
These gentlemen Junkers and capitalists will remain quiet 
only so long as the revolutionary government is content to 
whitewash over capitalist wage relationships. They will be 
good only so long as the revolution is good, that is, long as 
the vital nerve, the artery of bourgeois class pile— 
capitalistic private property, wage relationships, profit— 
are left undisturbed. If profit is called to account, if private 
property is to be done away with, then this is going too 
far…. Once the bourgeoisie is touched in the heart —and 
its heart beats from within a fire-proof safe— it will fight a 
life-and-death battle for its rule and will develop thousands 
of open and covert methods of resistance against the 
socialist measures.32 
 
Given their class interests, ruling elites are bound to disregard legitimate popular 
authority, and the resulting constitutional crisis would then radicalize and accelerate the 
course of the revolution. 
 
II.  Democratic Rights and Workers’ Councils  
Luxemburg was a creative thinker who did not “profess” any particular 
ideological position other than the evidence she discovered from the historical materialist 
method she learned from Marx. Her prescient, sharp critique in 1904 of the “ultra-
centralist” strategy pursued by Vladimir Lenin, which she further developed in her 1918 
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analysis of the Russian Revolution, was unpopular and relegated her to the margins of 
socialist thought. 33  She accused Lenin’s revolutionary party of strengthening “the 
conservatism that springs inevitably” from social democratic parties, which tend to 
defend what they have gained against “further innovation at a greater scale.”34 She saw in 
Lenin’s centralism not the creative, constituent energy of the masses, but the “sterile 
spirit of the night-watchman state.”35 She argued that the party’s attempt to control the 
movement, to ‘oversee’ the revolution instead of fostering it, would end up stifling it. 
According to Luxemburg, Lenin’s aim at controlling the party was concerned “with 
narrowing and not with broadening, with tying the movement up and not with drawing it 
together.”36 
Fourteen years later, in her analysis of the Russian Revolution, she denounced the 
progression of the centralist strategy and the “cool contempt” the revolutionary 
government had for democratic rights such as suffrage and freedom of the press and 
assemblage.37 Luxemburg argued that it was necessary for these rights not only to be 
formally respected, but also to be backed by material conditions and exercised through 
political action. Her analysis of democratic rights was not informed by liberalism,38 but 
by the conclusion she drew from her critical approach to women’s political rights: that 
formal equal rights “conform quite harmoniously with the bourgeois state.”39 Women’s 
political rights, because they do not “encroach upon the domination of capital,” do not 
bring the emancipation of women from the exploitation of domestic labor or overturn the 
state.40 This coexistence of formal rights and domination in the case of women came to 
reinforce what she had learned from Marx’s analysis of individual rights: that formal 
rights are not only an inherently partial form of freedom but that they also contribute to 
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the endurance of relations of domination that are presupposed even if legally abolished.41 
For rights to be emancipatory they need to be grounded on material conditions and 
relations of power. The same as giving the right to vote to women does not bring their 
emancipation from domestic domination, giving formal political rights to the masses 
without actual collective political activity, would not only not contribute to the 
emancipation of the proletariat from the capitalist state, but would allow for the 
endurance of relations of domination while giving the appearance of liberty.  
Political activity is for Luxemburg crucial for developing class consciousness 
among the proletariat. She argues that the active exercise of democratic rights42 is for the 
proletariat indispensable not only because it renders the “conquest of power 
both necessary and possible,”43 but more importantly “because only through the exercise 
of its democratic rights, in the struggle for democracy, can the proletariat become aware 
of its class interests and its historic task.”44 This does not mean that the exercise of 
democratic rights should be the final goal of the revolution. Even if Luxemburg sees 
value on parliamentary activity and trade unionism due to the class awareness it promotes 
through party organizing, and as a means for advancing workers’ interests, she sees grave 
danger in trading means for ends, and conceiving the party as the main goal of socialist 
politics.45 When the means are “separated from the movement” and “made an end in 
themselves, then such activity not only does not lead to the final goal of socialism but 
moves in a precisely opposite direction.”46 Even if the party appears as an indispensable 
means to conquer the state, neither the conquering of the bourgeois state nor the 
maintenance of the party structure are connected to the final goal of a socialist society, 
which can only be built from the ground up, by the workers themselves. Consequently, 
actions by the party to control the movement by undermining democratic rights are 
ultimately self-defeating. 
To be sure, every democratic institution has its limits and 
shortcomings, things which it doubtless shares with all 
other human institutions. But the remedy which Trotsky 
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and Lenin have found, the elimination of democracy as 
such, is worse than the disease it is supposed to cure; for it 
stops up the very living source from which alone can come 
the correction of all the innate shortcomings of social 
institutions. That source is the active, untrammeled, 
energetic political life of the broadest masses of the 
people.47  
 
The “deprivation” of democratic rights under a socialist government is especially 
damaging for the revolution because it undermines the collective power of the proletariat 
and therefore the internal checking power to correct for inevitable institutional 
weaknesses of the political and economic systems. Luxemburg also observed in the anti-
democratic tendencies of centralism the revolutionary party’s contempt for local 
proletarian organizations. The Bolsheviks saw the soviets —the incipient revolutionary 
popular infrastructure that spontaneously emerged in Russia— with suspicion, and 
designated them at first as “reactionary” because the majority of council members were 
peasants.48 Even if Lenin was a strong supporter of the soviets in the aftermath of the 
1905 revolution, arguing that “politically the Soviet of Workers’ Deputies should be 
regarded as the embryo of a provisional revolutionary government,”49 his embrace of 
centralism once in power stifled the autonomous development of the worker’s councils. 
According to Luxemburg only the correct organs of the workers were conceived as valid 
interlocutors, and even those were being deprived of the necessary liberties to operate 
autonomously. By suppressing grassroots politics the revolutionary government, 
occupying the oligarchic state machinery, had established not a dictatorship of the 
proletariat (soviets) but a dictatorship of the selected few (party leaders) to which the 
masses were forced to support. 
…with the repression of political life in the land as a whole, 
life in the soviets must also become more and more 
crippled. Without general elections, without unrestricted 
freedom of press and assembly, without a free struggle of 
opinion, life dies out in every public institution, becomes a 
mere semblance of life, in which only the bureaucracy 
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remains as the active element. Public life gradually falls 
asleep, a few dozen party leaders of inexhaustible energy 
and boundless experience direct and rule. Among them, in 
reality only a dozen outstanding heads do the leading and 
an elite of the working class is invited from time to time to 
meetings where they are to applaud the speeches of the 
leaders, and to approve proposed resolutions unanimously 
—at bottom, then, a clique affair— a dictatorship, to be 
sure, not the dictatorship of the proletariat but only the 
dictatorship of a handful of politicians, that is a dictatorship 
in the bourgeois sense…50 
  
In Germany, the incipient council system also came under attack from the ruling 
socialist party. Even if Luxemburg prioritized the mass strike over workers’ councils in 
her early writings, after the SPD was voted into office and turned against the workers, 
Luxemburg goes back to the councils, conceiving them as fundamental institutions of the 
socialist revolution. This shift in her focus from the mass strike to the councils appears 
not only as a strategic move after the state machinery had been seized by the SPD, which 
would have made a mass strike more difficult to pull off, but also as a political project 
coming out of her critical analysis of Russian centralism and the death of public life. 
To push back against the debasement of worker power and continue to oppose the 
war through revolutionary methods, Luxemburg founded in 1916 the Spartacus League51 
together with Karl Liebknecht, Clara Zetkin, and Franz Mehring. In a series of speeches 
published in the League’s newspaper Die Rote Fahne —within the two months after she 
was released from jail and shot by the government-sponsored Freikorps52— Luxemburg 
denounced “the systematic destruction of the system of workers’ and soldiers’ councils” 
and called for reinvigorating the council system by spreading its mode of organization to 
the peasantry.53 For her, because the revolution aims “at the foundation and base of the 
social constitution” it needs to “work from beneath,” and the duty of the revolutionary 
party should be to support councils as part of a revolutionary democratic constitution.54 
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The path of the revolution therefore is not centralization, but the strengthening and 
spreading of the council system. 
All power in the hands of the working masses, in the hands 
of the workers’ and soldiers’ councils, protection of the 
work of revolution against its lurking enemies —this is the 
guiding principle of all measures to be taken by the 
revolutionary government.55  
 
Luxemburg sees as an imperative to first dispel the illusion that to achieve 
socialism it is only “necessary to overthrow the old government, to set up a socialist 
government at the head of affairs, and then to inaugurate socialism by decree.”56 The 
proletarian masses need to realize that they cannot be liberated from the top, but need to 
emancipate themselves through political action. The “essence of socialist society” is that 
“the great laboring mass ceases to be a dominated mass” —a collection of “dead 
machines assigned their place in production by capital”— and workers become agents 
giving “conscious, free, and autonomous direction” to the life in common.57 This requires 
a transformation of the proletariat. Because “one cannot realize socialism with lazy, 
frivolous, egoistic, thoughtless and indifferent human beings,” individual men and 
women have to cultivate “inner self-discipline, intellectual maturity, moral ardor, a sense 
of dignity and responsibility,” what Luxemburg deems “a complete inner birth of the 
proletarian.”58  
Socialism, which appears constitutively tied to local councils as sites of self-rule, 
cannot be established by decree but “can only be won by a long chain of powerful 
struggles, in which the proletariat, under the leadership of the Social Democracy, will 
learn to take hold of the rudder of society to become instead of the powerless victim of 
history, its conscious guide.”59 The only way for workers to undergo this transformation, 
from a dominated to an empowered class, is by exercising power in the “school of 
action,”60 “through constant, vital, reciprocal contact between the masses of the people 
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and their organs, the workers’ and soldiers’ councils.”61 The masses need to be educated 
in the art of power by wielding power, and in this process transform “themselves into the 
free and independent directors of this process,” with the sense of “responsibility proper to 
active members of the collectivity.”62  
Our motto is: In the beginning was the act. And the act 
must be that the workers’ and soldiers’ councils realize 
their mission and learn to become the sole public power of 
the whole nation.63  
 
Because without the material conditions for local worker power, “the naked 
decrees of socialization by the highest revolutionary authorities are by themselves empty 
phrases,”64 the main revolutionary task is to promote a proletarian institutional structure: 
the councils as constituent institutions.  
…the symbol of the new socialist social order borne by the 
present proletarian revolution, the symbol of the class 
character of its true task, and of the class character of the 
political organ which is meant to execute this task, is: the 
workers’ council, based on representation of the urban and 
rural proletariat.65 
 
If the final objective of the movement is the socialist society, in which the 
working classes are free from domination, not being ‘ruled over’ but ruling themselves, 
the immediate objective of the movement should be to “replace the inherited organs of 
bourgeois class rule” that rule over the working class, with a working-class political 
infrastructure aimed at self-rule, at cultivating the proper political character and activity 
among the proletariat so to adequately train them to “occupy all the posts, supervise all 
functions, measure all official needs by the standard of its own class interests and the 
tasks of socialism.”66 To accomplish this, Luxemburg argues for active organizing and 
institution-building at the local level, “down to the tiniest parish.”  
It is a question of fighting step by step, hand-to-hand, in 
every province, in every city, in every village, in every 
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municipality in order to take and transfer all the powers of 
the state bit by bit from the bourgeoisie to the workers and 
soldiers councils.67  
 
 Among the first necessary steps the revolutionary government should take to 
foster the council system68 are 1) to improve the councils “so that the first chaotic and 
impulsive gestures of their formation are replaced by a conscious process of 
understanding the goals, tasks and methods of the revolution;” 2) to ensure that they have 
regularly scheduled meetings and adequate power-sharing processes, and 3) to establish a 
“national council of workers and soldiers in order to establish the proletariat of all 
Germany as a class, as a compact political power, and to make it the bulwark and impetus 
of the revolution.”69 The revolutionary government would have therefore the task not 
only to systematize and standardize the procedures of self-rule used in the councils, but 
also to establish a new national institution that would further construct the workers’ class 
identity, empowering them to keep energizing the revolutionary process. 
Without the conscious will and action of the majority of the 
proletariat, there can be no socialism. In order to intensify 
this consciousness, to steel this will, to organize this action, 
a class organ is necessary: a national council of the urban 
and rural proletarians.70 
 
The organized masses are for Luxemburg the agents and guardians of their 
emancipatory process, and therefore the duty of the revolutionary government, elected by 
the masses to take control of the state and wield its power, is to foster the institutional 
organization of the proletarian masses. The party should not be guided by centralist or 
revisionist strategies, but by the need to strengthen the council system.71   
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III.  Luxemburg’s Transitional Constitutional Structure 
 Luxemburg’s materialist approach made her understand that revolution, the 
political action that is the origin of constitution, is conditioned by the current stage of 
class struggle and the legal and extra-legal means available to the masses. Political 
action, the “deed,” is the starting point of the revolution, and the factors conditioning 
these actions become a constitutive part of it. Being not only a materialist thinker, but 
also very much a realist like Engels, Luxemburg envisioned a period of transition 
between the capitalist and socialist societies, a regime in which both bourgeois and 
proletarian institutions would coexist. Even if she did not propose a proper constitutional 
structure for this transition period, her material legal thought reveals two basic elements 
the revolutionary constitution must have in order to enable the path to socialism: 
democratic rights to free speech, assembly, and suffrage to assure the conquest of 
representative structures, and local, autonomous working-class councils as constitutive 
institutions of the new socialist society. As I discussed above, democratic rights need not 
only to be formally respected, but also equally exercised, which would require the 
socialization of burdens preventing proletarians from engaging in political action. In the 
case of proletarian women, for example, the socialization of child-care and domestic 
labor would be a necessary condition for their equal access to politics.72  
According to Luxemburg, what makes the proletarian revolution radically distinct 
from bourgeois revolutions is the spontaneous organizing of the masses in councils, “the 
stamp of a proletarian socialist revolution.”73 Even if she does not mention the exercise of 
constituent power in this spontaneous self-constitution of the councils, this is the power 
workers and soldiers are actually wielding when defying the existing structures of power 
and setting up their own autonomous political institutions of self-rule. Consequently, the 
establishment of local worker councils marks the origin of a constituent revolution “from 
below,” and therefore its fate is tied to the strength of the council system, which is 
supposed to replace the bourgeois ruling structure in the long run. This transitional phase 
in which the new proletarian institution is added to the existing political structure, 
corresponds to the type of ‘composite’ constitutionalism endorsed by Machiavelli; 
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because it is realist, it does not seek to abolish current oligarchic structures of power, but 
to add new autonomous institutions resting on plebeian authority rather than on existing 
legality. The mere existence of an institutional source of proletarian authority, even if not 
properly “constitutionalized,” would imply the recognition of organized proletarians as 
political agents, and establish the institutionalization of class conflict. The continual 
agonistic opposition of the councils to the liberal representative structure appears 
moreover as the effective cause of the revolution in this transition period, which would 
only be completed when proletarian institutions acquire supreme authority and decision-
making power, and a new legality expresses a socialist society rather than a capitalist one.  
 
 
Figure 6.1 Luxemburg’s Workers’ Council Republic, 1919 
 
  I would argue Luxemburg’s transitional regime constitutes a hybrid constitutional 
framework in which two sources of authority —the liberal democratic order and its 
proceduralist justifications, and the proletarian order based on the collective activity of 
the councils— compete for power. This combination of legal and extra-legal forms of 
authority within one political system should moreover be interpreted as a Marxist 
iteration of the republican mixed constitution, in which the legal power of the oligarchy is 
checked by the constituent power of the proletariat as a universal agent of emancipation. 




proletarian organs of power, far from being an idealist position, appears as the necessary 















Hannah Arendt’s first encounter with Rosa Luxemburg and revolutionary action 
was in 1919 when her mother took her to a public discussion circle about the recent 
uprising of the Spartacus League.1 Luxemburg became for Arendt a role model, not only 
because of their shared cultural Jewish heritage and gender, but also in what respects to 
her position as an ideological pariah, an outsider bound to be misunderstood and even 
demonized. 2 In this chapter I analyze Arendt’s most controversial, understudied, and 
misunderstood work, On Revolution, which was conceived after her engagement with 
Luxemburg’s critical essay on the Russian Revolution.3 Most Arendt specialists have 
tended to neglect or dismiss her proposal to establish a republic of councils as an 
anomaly in her thought —an idealist move in a rather realist thinker,4 critique that was 
also raised against Luxemburg. Through a materialist analysis of Arendt’s thought, I 
conceive of her proposal for a council system not as a marginal thought experiment, but 
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as central to her political philosophy, as inseparable from her conception of political 
freedom as action, and her critique of the liberal republic, and in this way very much in 
tune with Luxemburg’s own theory of political action and critical assessment of 
constitutional democracy.  
In her review of J.P. Nettle’s 1966 biography of Luxemburg, Arendt claims that 
Luxemburg’s “insight into the nature of political action” came out of her experience in 
the 1905 Russian revolution.  
The main point is that she had learned from the 
revolutionary workers’ councils (the later soviets) that 
“good organization does not precede action but is the 
product of it,” that “the organization of revolutionary action 
can and must be learnt in revolution itself, as one can only 
learn swimming in the water,” that revolutions are “made” 
by nobody but break out “spontaneously,” and that “the 
pressure for action” always comes “from below.” A 
revolution is “great and strong as long as the Social 
Democrats [at the time still the only revolutionary party] 
don’t smash it up.”5 
 
Arendt not only adhered to Luxemburg’s basic idea that political action precedes 
organization, springing from the people who necessarily perform their own political 
emancipation, but also to the grave threat revolutionary parties posed for the councils. 
She argues that what made Luxemburg a real outsider within the revolutionary left was 
her staunch commitment to the republic and its guarantee of democratic rights such as 
free speech and assembly. 6  Even if she is right about this assessment, Arendt’s 
‘republican’ reading of Luxemburg makes sense only if we understand republicanism in 
its plebeian strand, as an ideological framework that conceives of the political action of 
the people as a necessary condition for liberty. If by a republic we mean a system in 
which basic democratic liberties are protected and there are institutional spaces for the 
people to engage in political action, then yes, Luxemburg was very much a republican. 
This does not mean that Arendt is trying to deny Luxemburg’s revolutionary 
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commitments or, on the contrary, that Arendt is a closeted Marxist,7 but that Arendt’s 
interpretation of republican thought attempts to be purely political, stripped from socio-
economic considerations. This reduction of republican constitutional thought to a 
political framework of democratic rights and spaces of freedom makes it possible for it to 
be compatible with Luxemburg’s strand of revolutionary socialism without necessarily 
sharing its Marxist ideological commitments, and even challenging the dominance of 
Marxism in the study of revolution.  
The failure of the revolutionary tradition to give any serious 
thought to the only new form of government born out of 
revolution can partly be explained by Marx’s obsession with 
the social question and his unwillingness to pay serious 
attention to the questions of state and government.8 
 
Arendt claims that the council system, as a political structure, has been neglected 
by the Left primarily because of its “obsession with the social question” in the study of 
revolutions. Setting aside the issue of this obsession with exploitation and material 
necessity being reasonable, Arendt’s critique of Marxist interpretations of revolutions is 
that they neglect what is fundamental about them: the establishment of a constitutional 
order where freedom can dwell. This approach to Arendt’s work certainly does not solve 
the contradictions and paradoxes in it, but certainly sheds new light on the council system 
as a space of freedom in which the revolutionary spirit can be preserved, a strictly 
political realm of appearances that needs to remain distinct from the administration of the 
social. 
Despite Arendt’s political commitments appearing as quite different from those of 
Luxemburg’s, I would argue their political philosophies are connected at the root:9 in the 
understanding that political liberty is only possible in political action, and that 
revolutionary action is the source of political liberty.10 Reading Arendt’s constitutional 
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proposal as well as her critique of the modern revolutions and their outcomes through 
Luxemburg’s “prophetic words of warning against the suppression of political freedom” 
in the name of revolution,11 allows us not only to better understand Arendt’s intellectual 
position as a pariah but also to distinguish her unique contributions to a plebeian 
constitutionalism in which equal access to political action and new beginnings is to be 
guaranteed and fostered. Even if Arendt’s project was not to advance the socialist 
revolution but to recuperate politics from the murky waters of the social, nor to organize 
the working class but to abstract the councils from their historical roots in the labor 
movement, I would argue her consistent support for a system of inclusive councils as an 
alternative form of government —from the late 1940s12 until her last major publication 
The Life of the Mind in 1971— should be interpreted as a development of Luxemburg’s 
political project. Arendt, picking up where Luxemburg left off, developed novel 
philosophical justifications for the council system, detaching it from Marxism and the 
primacy of necessity, and decisively connecting it to ‘democratic’ republicanism and the 
primacy of politics, without in any way betraying Luxemburg’s project of proletarian 
emancipation through political action. In this chapter I analyze Arendt’s move away from 
the social and towards the political through her critical engagement with the French and 
the American revolutions, and how her particular analysis of the political nature of the 
councils allows for a new interpretation of the mixed constitution as a framework 
combining parties and councils, administration and politics. 
 
I.  Freedom and New Beginnings 
Arendt’s thought has two gravitational poles, constantly competing for primacy, 
but open to the possibility of synergy. On the one hand, her conception of the political as 
the realm of appearances, informed by the Greek political experience of the polis, is 
based on natality, the capacity of human beings to initiate something anew, a creative 
force capable of transcending the limits of the constituted reality. On the other hand, her 
conception of politics as the common world of institutions, informed by the Roman 
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political experience of the republic, is based on authority, the source of stability and 
permanence that makes possible the preservation of freedom. This dualism between 
Greek and Roman political traditions —innovation and stability, power and authority— is 
brought to the fore and synthesized in Arendt’s theory of new beginnings, as “something 
new [that] comes into an already existing world.”13  
Arendt’s interpretation of the political is intrinsically linked to her conception of 
freedom as action. Following Aristotle, the political realm is also fundamentally ethical; 
the good life is the political life, a life of freedom marked by action in the public sphere.  
In the polis to be free 
…meant both not to be subject to the necessity of life or to 
the command of another and not to be in command oneself. 
It meant neither to rule nor to be rule… Equality, therefore, 
far from being connected with justice, as in modern times, 
was the very essence of freedom: to be free meant to be 
free from the inequality present in rulership and to move in 
a sphere where neither rule nor being ruled existed.14  
 
Equality is then the precondition for freedom; without equality men’s ability to 
act in concert for the common good is compromised. Freedom as action is only reserved 
for the ones who are free from the yoke of rulership —those who already have negative 
freedom in the republican sense, freedom as non-domination,15 and do not exercise 
command over others. In addition, Arendt’s conception of freedom also presupposes 
plurality, which demands in turn the actualization of individuality, for which it is 
essential to be free from interference.  
As Patchen Markell suggests in his interpretation of Arendt, beginning is for her 
an “action, whether disruptive or not, [that] involves attention and responsiveness to 
worldly events,”16 and therefore “what makes a beginning a beginning for Arendt, what 
lends it its eruptiveness, is not its degree of departure from what preceded it, but rather 
our attunement to its character as an irrevocable event, which also means as an occasion 
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for response.”17 The condition of natality, the capacity of beginning something anew, is 
what makes men able to engage in action, which is the political activity par excellence.  
For Arendt humans differ from animals in their tendency to strive for immortality; 
men are capable of attaining immortality through their deeds and their collective 
remembrance, which gives them a “divine” nature.  
Only the best (aristoi), who constantly prove themselves to 
be the best… are really humans; the others, content with 
whatever pleasures nature will yield them, live and die like 
animals.18  
 
Even if her embrace of excellence in politics has certainly fueled an interpretation 
of Arendt as a conservative, elitist thinker, I would argue her realist assessment of 
common individuals under a system devoid of politics should not be confused with 
elitism.19  
Freedom in a positive sense is possible only among equals, 
and equality itself is by no means a universally valid 
principle but again, applicable only with limitations and 
even within spatial limits.  
 
Similar to Condorcet, for whom structures of dependence autonomy made the 
exercise of autonomy nearly impossible, Arendt’s spatial conception of freedom allows 
her to peg the incapacity of political action to the lack of spaces of freedom. How can one 
determine the capacity of individuals to be political if there are no spaces in which they 
can exercise freedom?  An assessment of the structural conditions of domination in which 
the masses are atomized and deprived of political spaces, and how these conditions 
impede political action, is not an argument for the inherent incapacity of the masses to be 
political. Quite the contrary. Arendt’s critique pushes her to envision a necessary political 
infrastructure to realize equality.  
The same as acknowledging that the majority of workers, who lack class 
consciousness under a capitalist system, are similar to cogs in a machine does not make 
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Rosa Luxemburg less of a revolutionary, recognizing that without politics we are just 
animals —instead of political animals— does not make Arendt less committed to equal 
liberty in politics. For Arendt, as for Aristotle, politics is what makes us human, and can 
only be attained collectively, by engaging in speech and action in the polis. Even if one 
could argue that valuing the aspiration for excellence is a form of elitism, because her 
political philosophy is not aimed at preserving the privileges of “the best,” this elitism 
should be conceived as inclusionary since she does not conceive of any exclusion to 
participation in political action. She supports a self-selected political elite, an organic 
political class springing from popular councils that are open to all.  
The joys of public happiness and the responsibilities for 
public business would then become the share of those few 
from all walks of life who have a taste for public freedom 
and cannot be ‘happy’ without it. Politically, they are the 
best, and it is the task of good government and the sign of a 
well-ordered republic to assure them of their rightful place 
in the public realm.20  
 
Close to Luxemburg, who gave to the revolutionary government the crucial task 
of organizing and strengthening the council system, Arendt argues a well-order republic 
needs to institutionalize spaces for freedom for anybody who feels drawn to politics to be 
able to engage in political action. Recognizing that the majority of individuals would 
choose not to engage in voluntary politics despite having the spaces to do so, and that 
therefore there would inevitably be a political elite, exposes her as a skeptical realist but 
hardly an elitist thinker. 
Even if it is clear that Arendt’s drive was to elevate politics from the realm of 
necessity and underscore the collective essence of political freedom, her relentless 
inquiry into the realm of appearances drove her work in multiple directions, sometimes 
obscuring extraordinary insights in topics as neglected as political foundings. Arendt’s 
first major discovery regarding new beginnings was that plurality is at the core of the 
human essence. In Origins of Totalitarianism —thought and written during increasing 
domination of Stalinism and Nazism within their respective borders— Arendt encounters 
the quintessence of the human condition as it was gradually being destroyed by the first 
totalitarian movements of the twentieth century. According to her, the driving force of 
                                                




totalitarianism revealed itself as a constant “organization” of plurality, as the elimination 
of what makes every human being unique and a potential agent of change, “for to destroy 
individuality is to destroy spontaneity, man’s power to begin something new out of his 
own resources.”21  
Arendt expands this finding in The Human Condition and in her essays in 
Between Past and Future, where plurality is defined as the condition of human action, the 
prerequisite of all political life, which appears intrinsically connected with political 
liberty. According to Arendt, it is the capacity of new beginnings inherent in natality 
what gives us the capacity to act, to initiate something anew, to create and reproduce 
liberty. 
Every act, seen from the perspective not of the agent but of 
the process in whose framework it occurs and whose 
automatism it interrupts, is a “miracle” —that is, something 
which could not be expected. If it is true that action and 
beginning are essentially the same, it follows that a 
capacity for performing miracles must likewise be within 
the range of human faculties… It is in the very nature of 
every new beginning that it breaks into the world as an 
“infinite improbability,” and yet it is precisely this infinite 
improbable which actually constitutes the very texture of 
everything we call real… the very impact of an event is 
never wholly explicable; its factuality transcends in 
principle all anticipation.22  
  
The faculty of new beginnings is that infinite improbability that breaks into the 
probable, an action that cannot be fully explained by common practices and that 
actualizes “miracles” that come to interrupt current patterns of behavior and structures of 
interaction. Despite the importance she gives to the individual aspect of freedom ―the 
liberty of the moderns or negative freedom as lack of interference―23 Arendt heavily 
leans towards a collective liberty, a freedom that is the raison d’être of politics,24 a 
freedom that presupposes liberation ―emancipation from empire, religion, oppression, 
necessity― and the entering into the realm of appearances “into which each of the free 
                                                
21 Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (New York: Harcourt, 1985), p. 455. 
22 Arendt, “What is Freedom?”, p. 169. 
23 B. Constant. “The Liberty of the Ancients Compared with that of the Moderns” Political Writings. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988). 




men could insert himself by word or deed.”25 Individuality and action, the highest 
manifestation of human life, are only possible in the public realm allowed by political 
freedom, which is actualized through its collective performance.26 Consequently, it is not 
the regularity of norms per se what undermines individuality, freedom, and the capacity 
for new beginnings, but “the erosion of the contexts in which events call for responses 
and, thus, in which it makes sense to act at all.”27 
As a republican, Arendt understands political freedom not as a good that can be 
acquired and maintained in degrees, but as a state of being in which one partakes in 
through action.28 For her, freedom as action can only be therefore conceived in absolute 
terms, in its exercise, within a given space. Within this space in which individuals can 
act, freedom is both relational, because we can only perceive it in our intercourse with 
others through action or disclosure in the realm of appearances, and inherently limited, 
because the possibility of action and disclosure presupposes a politically-guaranteed 
public realm, which “entails the recognition that no man can act alone, that men if they 
want to achieve something in the world must act in concert… [that] political freedom is 
always limited freedom.”29  
Even if plurality and the possibility of the improbable are part of the human 
condition, this does not mean that freedom, the necessary premise of plurality, is natural 
and should not be interfered with. In other words, action and interaction, “the patterns of 
engagement and responsiveness” allowed within a certain constitution are not 
“accidental” but arise within a framework of “social and political practices and 
institutions, which structure and mediate people’s experiences of the world.”30 Freedom 
is not natural or accidental; it needs an extraordinary event to be actualized and an 
artificial infrastructure enabling plurality and the possibility for the improbable, to be 
materialized.  
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II. Revolution as the Foundation of Freedom 
 
Arendt recognizes that only rarely does freedom become the direct aim of 
political action, that only “in times of crisis or revolution” freedom is revealed through 
action.31 Her consequent interest on the extraordinary politics of foundings32 explored in 
On Revolution should then be seen not as a secondary theme inserted in a text plagued 
with controversial and sometimes cryptic arguments regarding the social question and the 
political, but as a fundamental theory, a milestone in her thinking on freedom and the 
necessary foundation needed for enabling political action.  
Arendt begins her exploration of revolution from Aristotle’s “materialistic view of 
history,” which connected economic and political power, and embraced the role of 
interest in politics.33  Even if “overthrows and upheavals” against oppression were 
common in pre-modern times, Arendt follows Condorcet in arguing that to properly label 
a popular rebellion as revolutionary it needs to directly aim at freedom:34 at dismantling 
hierarchies and achieving emancipation, and not simply at the bettering of social 
conditions within a system of domination. Only in modern times, she argues, is the 
materialist view of history able to be deployed for the direct emancipation of the masses. 
According to Arendt, only after social hierarchies are de-naturalized and “men began to 
doubt that poverty is inherent in the human condition” did the “social question and the 
rebellion of the poor come to play a truly revolutionary role.”35 Only after the poor 
acquired the appropriate epistemic grounds to overturn the current hierarchy —by 
learning about the pre-modern American experience as a “society without poverty,” and 
demanding to actualize the paradigm put forward by John Locke and Adam Smith in 
which labor is the source of all wealth— could a popular rebellion be properly called a 
revolution.36   
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Machiavelli, the “spiritual father of revolution,” is for Arendt the first thinker to 
“visualize the rise of a purely secular realm,” a realm of human affairs in need of periodic 
renewal.37 Arendt follows Machiavelli and the Roman notion that all foundations are “re-
establishments and re-constitutions,” 38  in arguing that new beginnings are always 
relative, a renovation of what exists, the irruption of something new that comes from 
within an existing world to change the world through its active engagement with it. 
Revolution understood as new beginning then necessarily defies the opposition between 
rules and the liberal interpretation of liberty as lack of interference; a new beginning is 
for Arendt a revolutionary political action able to transform the world by precisely setting 
a normative structure in which the conditions for freedom as action and the possibility of 
the improbable are re-established and preserved. A new beginning therefore is not 
defined by its degree of rupture from the present condition of the world, but by its 
capacity to generate and preserve juridical and physical spaces for a political freedom 
that is conceived as inherently limited.39 
Having experienced directly the violence and arbitrariness of Nazism, Arendt 
seems to construct her theory of new beginnings against an almost inescapable original 
crime, searching for a peaceful new beginning, a bloodless birth of the political. 
However, she acknowledges that because liberation is the conditio sine qua non of 
freedom,40 violence is present during the revolutionary experience. Whereas violence 
assures liberation ―the necessary first step for a potential place for politics― if it 
endures past this initial stage and becomes internalized, it could bring the political to its 
demise.  Therefore, while she argues that the “aim of revolution was, and always has 
been, freedom,”41 the realization of this pursuit through violence could easily turn into its 
opposite, the elimination of the political and the negation of plurality. Consequently, one 
could argue that even if violence and politics can coexist chronologically, they cannot be 
performed within the same space. While violence could be exerted ‘outside’ of the 
political realm, against an oppressive ‘other’ from which the community must be 
liberated, it should not permeate the political because if violence is exerted within the 
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realm of appearances, politics inevitably becomes mute. Persuasion and force cannot 
spatially coexist. 
Despite the fact that both the American and the French Revolutions began with a 
violent liberation ―from the British Empire and the French monarchy, respectively― 
Arendt does not dwell in the analysis of this common act of emancipation, which she 
states comes from the desire “to be free from oppression,” but rather concentrates in their 
abysmal differences regarding what she calls the “foundation of freedom,” the 
establishment of a republic as a “new, or rather rediscovered form of government.”42 
While the French Revolution was for her an utter failure due to the revolutionaries’ 
fixation with the fictions of an absolute break with the ancien régime and the sovereignty 
of the people-as-one, Arendt praised the American Revolution as the highest political 
moment of the modern age due to its acknowledgement of previous shared political 
practices and the cooperative essence of the constituent power it enacted.  
With the death of the king and the evacuation of theology as the source of 
political power and authority in France, the most emblematic modern revolution 
destroyed the old order in the name of popular sovereignty and attempted to create ex 
nihilo a new body politic, “abolish[ing] the sequence of temporality,”43 to redefine the 
‘people’ and the basic principles that would allow for the new political unity to come into 
existence. Arendt explains that even though this new beginning as absolute rupture from 
a regime based upon divine royalty allowed for the creation of a secular constitutional 
order and popular self-determination, the price for this type of revolution was the 
elimination of transcendental sources of authority and the consequent groundlessness of 
the new legal framework:  
Those who get together to constitute a new government are 
themselves unconstitutional, that is, they have no authority 
to do what they have set out to achieve.44  
 
The juridical void in which the non-authorized, arbitrary act of founding took 
place created the space for rightlessness and violence where the individual had no legal 
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protection against the revolutionaries, who became the official voice of an abstract and 
never finalized popular will.  
The direction of the French Revolution was deflected almost 
from its beginning from this course of foundation through 
the immediacy of suffering; it was determined by the 
exigencies of liberation not from tyranny but from necessity, 
and it was actuated by the limitless immensity of both the 
people’s misery and the pity this misery inspired. The 
lawlessness of the ‘all is permitted’ sprang here still from 
the sentiments of the heart whose very boundlessness helped 
in the unleashing of a stream of boundless violence.45 
 
According to Arendt, this situation of total arbitrariness that characterized the 
French Revolution was a consequence of the attempt to resolve the perplexity of 
foundations by deriving both power and authority from the same immanent source: the 
people. However, the need for a new absolute to become the fountain of legitimacy, the 
need for “a divine principle, for some transcendent sanction in the political realm,” 
proved difficult to resolve and drove the revolutionaries to deify ‘the people’ and believe 
that “like the absolute prince, the nation, in terms of public law, could do no wrong.”46 
Yet, the excesses of the Terror made explicit the dangers of tyranny lurking beneath the 
supreme power of such formless and unorganized subject. 
…to find a new absolute to replace the absolute divine 
power, is insoluble because power under the condition of 
human plurality can never amount to omnipotence, and laws 
residing on human power can never be absolute.47  
 
Absolute authority cannot be derived from the will of fallible human beings, and 
therefore laws need to remain limited and open to contestation and the improbable. What 
made the incipient structure unstable and ultimately terminated the republican experience 
in France was not its openness to plurality and new beginnings, but its grounding on the 
will of an unorganized multitude in need of material welfare 
The French Declaration of the Right of Man, as the 
Revolution came to understand it, was meant to constitute 
the source of all political power, to establish not the control 
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but the foundation-stone of the body politic. The new body 
politic was supposed to rest upon man’s natural rights, 
upon his rights in so far as he is nothing but a natural being, 
upon his right to ‘food, dress, and the reproduction of the 
species’, that is, upon the right to the necessities of life. 
And these rights were not understood as prepolitical rights 
that no government and no political power has the right to 
touch or violate, but as the very content as well as the 
ultimate end of government and power.48 
  
The extreme volatility of the will of the unassembled multitude could never have 
yielded a stable constitutional order because it “is ever-changing by definition, and that a 
structure built on it as its foundation is built on quicksand.”49  
The violent resistance to the imposition of social rights was, on the other hand, 
met with the violent reaction of the Terror. Following the argument of the impossible 
coexistence of violence and politics within the realm of appearances, one could argue that 
for Arendt Robespierre betrayed the revolution by bringing the violence (and 
arbitrariness) that was exerted against the oppressive ‘other’ ―the king and his Court― 
into the political sphere, through the imposition of the social question as a political 
project, which precluded deliberation, and the insistent search for traitors and the purging 
of the body politic.  
The direction of the French Revolution was deflected almost 
from its beginning from this course of foundation through 
the immediacy of suffering; it was determined by the 
exigencies of liberation not from tyranny but from necessity, 
and it was actuated by the limitless immensity of both the 
people’s misery and the pity this misery inspired. The 
lawlessness of the ‘all is permitted’ sprang here still from 
the sentiments of the heart whose very boundlessness helped 
in the unleashing of a stream of boundless violence.50 
 
Seen under this light, the French Revolution, through its constant creation of an 
“objective opponent,”51 the recognition of an internal enemy as existential ‘other,’ against 
which the nation’s virtuous identity was permanently constructed, degenerated into a 
movement that seek to impose a fictional unity based upon an ever-changing popular 
                                                
48 Arendt, On Revolution, p. 99. 
49 Arendt, On Revolution, p. 154. 
50 Arendt, On Revolution, p. 82. 




will, a revolutionary subject in permanent becoming. But for Arendt this degeneration of 
the French revolutionary experience due to the lack of proper foundations, even if close 
at the height of the Terror to the totalitarian experiences of the twentieth century, was not 
a form of totalitarianism. It was clear to her that the aim of the French Revolution was 
freedom, and that the violence of the Terror was not in the essence of the movement but 
“the reaction to a series of broken oaths and unkept promises that were the perfect 
political equivalent of the customary intrigues of Court society.”52 The excesses of the 
revolution were in part responses to a counterrevolutionary enemy that threatened the 
revolutionary party and therefore the securing of the republican project.53 Violence 
seemed inevitable within a framework of lawlessness in which the revolutionary party 
concentrated power, and spaces of freedom were weak or non-existent.  
I would argue we should understand Arendt’s controversial analysis of the French 
Revolution through Luxemburg’s critique of Lenin’s centralism after the Russian 
Revolution, criticism which in part inspired On Revolution. Neither the French 
Revolution nor Lenin’s Soviet Republic respected free speech and assembly, or fostered 
autonomous organs of the people, and therefore both failed at constituting appropriate 
foundations for freedom. While the French Revolution degenerated into Terror and its 
inchoate republic was quickly overthrown, the Russian Revolution degenerated into a 
collectivist statism that morphed into a full-blown totalitarian regime under Stalin. While 
the critique of Lenin and bolshevism relegated Luxemburg to the margins of socialist 
thought, Arendt’s critique of the French Revolution made her a pariah within the 
intellectual Left, especially because she not only was critical of the most emblematic 
revolution in the popular imaginary, but also seemed to uncritically embrace the 
American Revolution, which yielded a constitution not based on the principles of 
equality, fraternity, and solidarity, but on free enterprise.  
While in her critique of the French Revolution Arendt denounces the will of the 
multitude as an inappropriate foundation for freedom, her charitable assessment of the 
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American founding is based on the revolutionaries’ respect for individual rights and 
political institutions.  
The direction of the American Revolution remained 
committed to the foundation of freedom and the 
establishment of lasting institutions, and to those who acted 
in this direction nothing was permitted that would have 
been outside the range of civil law.54 
 
It is only from the American founding experience that she is able to extract 
positive lessons for the establishment of “artificial structures that are more permanent and 
durable than the unpredictable actions of human beings” as the proper foundation of 
freedom.55 In contrast to the French constituent attempt, Arendt praises the American 
revolutionaries because they acknowledged their previous political and legal practices as 
a common base for creating a common future, thus performing a relative, rather than an 
absolute beginning, as “something new [that] comes into an already existing world.”56 In 
addition, Arendt sees the American Revolution as the first truly political revolution, one 
that was not about the social question but fundamentally aimed at constituting a new 
enduring political structure. According to Arendt, when signs of conflict emerged 
between the American colonies and the British Empire, representatives from newly 
constituted bodies of the thirteen colonies were selected to assemble and discuss a 
possible common response. The soon-to-be revolutionaries, informally authorized by 
their respective self-organized communities, decided by virtual unanimity to declare 
independence from the British Empire and embark in the creation of a legal framework 
for the new body politic. As I showed in Chapter 2, this narrative neglects the acute social 
conflict that prompted the setting up of a counterrevolutionary constitutional convention 
in which the legal framework was deliberated and crafted in secrecy by a group of 
selected few. Even if Arendt’s omission of conflict serves her project because it allows 
her to focus on the constructive elements of the founding, her sanitized assessment and 
strategic deployment of the American founding experience, completely detached from its 
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socio-political conjuncture, is not only historically inaccurate but also obscures the 
particular pitfalls of the new, liberal beginning.  
Arendt dismisses the materialist analysis of the American Revolution, criticizing 
Charles Beard’s economic interpretation of the founding as a matter of “sheer” history of 
ideas obsessed with “unmasking [the hypocrisy] of the Founding Fathers and by the hunt 
for ulterior motives in the making of the Constitution.”57 She argues that it was precisely 
a “war upon hypocrisy” what brought the French Revolution to the Terror “as an 
institutional device, consciously employed to accelerate the momentum of the 
revolution,” and that American historiography was only mimicking in paper what the 
French had done with blood.58 This quest to unveil the hypocrisy of the founding, of the 
original “vice through which corruption becomes manifest,” appeared to her more as an 
echo from the old world than a productive immanent critique of the liberal republic’s 
origins.59 Even if applying the most charitable interpretation of Arendt’s analysis of the 
American and French revolutions, as aiming to “defend the notion of political freedom 
against the usurpation of the public sphere by powerfully organized private interests,”60 
her rejection of an ‘economicist’ approach to politics blinded her to the material 
conditions determining the constitutional convention, the Constitution, and its 
implementation. Arendt’s attempt to rescue the politics from the managing of necessity 
did not leave much room for considering socio-economic conditions during the founding 
or the exclusion and lack of freedom of those not present or represented in the constituent 
process. Nevertheless, from the relative and cooperative aspects of the American 
foundational experience, Arendt, in an attempt to escape the inherent arbitrariness of the 
founding act,61 and against the voluntarism of popular sovereignty, elaborated a theory of 
new beginnings that introduced the distinction between power and authority.62 For her, 
the contrast between the French and American experiences evidenced that even though 
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the people is the source of power in modern republics, it cannot be the foundation of 
authority for the new legal order.  
What saves the act of beginning from its own arbitrariness 
is that it carries its own principle within itself, or, to be 
more precise, that beginning and principle, principium and 
principle, are not only related to each other, but are 
coeval… The way the beginner starts whatever he intends 
to do lays down the law of action for those who have joined 
him in order to partake in the enterprise and to bring about 
its accomplishment. As such, the principle inspires the 
deeds that are to follow and remains apparent as long as the 
action lasts.63 
  
Through a formal argument that traces the source of authority to the principles 
contained in the act of founding itself, Arendt seeks to solve the perplexity of new 
beginnings and situate political action at the foundation of freedom.64 Through this lens, 
the unthematized, implicit immanent principles of the constitutive act become explicit 
through performance, guiding the revolutionaries during the founding moment and giving 
stability and endurance to the constitutional project. Arendt’s theory of principled action 
would then allow for the exercise of political freedom at the moment of founding without 
any external limitations and, at the same time, preclude the dangers of boundless action 
by conceptualizing normativity as internal to the act of foundation.65 If the founding is 
done through collective political action, in which equals come together to create 
something new and incorporate it into their existing world, the foundations of the new 
constitution should maintain and reproduce this freedom by allowing for the actualization 
of liberty through political action. 
Even though Arendt’s theory gives a promising alternative to both absolute 
beginnings and mere evolutionary change by placing authority in the principles inherent 
in the act of founding, what are these principles and how can they be recognized and 
correctly codified, remains undertheorized. If every act of founding has its own principles 
within itself, does this mean that every collective attempt at a new beginning will have 
the necessary authority to endure? Is the establishment of a new constitutional order 
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enough evidence of a successful revolution? If so, can principled action only be 
acknowledged in retrospect, after a considerable amount of time has passed, allowing us 
to judge if the framework put in place by the founders managed to successfully stabilize 
and channel the revolutionary thrust? Even if clearly “the character of one act as a 
beginning hangs on its future reception,”66 and stability and endurance could be the 
appropriate categories to assess the success of revolutionary foundings, Arendt’s theory is 
normative, which demands bringing substantive criteria into evaluation. 
Despite the absence of an unequivocal identification of which are the desirable 
principles and how a successful post-revolutionary political order should look like, 
Arendt’s focus on the American Revolution seems to suggest that the only “good” 
principles that would create the necessary authority for political freedom to thrive are the 
ones derived from mutual promise and common deliberation, and that a successful 
constitutional order is the one that allows for these principles to be permanently enacted. 
The central idea of revolution for Arendt “is the foundation of freedom, that is, the 
foundation of a body politic which guarantees the space where freedom can appear.”67 
Thus, for a revolution to be successful, it is not only fundamental for promise and 
deliberation to become part of the legal structure, but it is also essential that spaces where 
people can meet, deliberate, and act together are recognized and legally established. 
The founding act of constitution making finds its authority not in a previous legal 
framework or in the collective will, but in its performance, in the collective endeavor of 
the people who create, in action, a new constitutional framework allowing for freedom to 
be preserved, enlarged, and strengthened. This action, for Arendt, is first an act of mutual 
promise.  
…power comes into being only if and when men join 
themselves together for the purpose of action, and it will 
disappear when, for whatever reason, they disperse and 
desert one another. Hence, binding and promising, 
combining and covenanting are the means by which power 
is kept in existence; where and when men succeed in 
keeping intact the power which sprang up between them 
during the course of any particular act or deed, they are 
already in the process of foundation, of constituting a stable 
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wordly structure to house, as it were, their combined power 
of action. There is an element of world-building capacity of 
man in the human faculty of making and keeping 
promises.68  
 
Because there is only political power in collective action, and power can only be 
sustained within the appropriated structure, then the capacity to make promises to sustain 
that structure is essential to the world-building capacity of humans. Promise is inherently 
relational, a faculty that is necessarily based upon previous experiences among 
individuals. For a promise involving a whole community to be binding, individuals need 
to believe that others will respect their allegiance, and that their membership is too 
valuable to decide to break it. Therefore, the basic condition underpinning a mutual 
promise would be social trust, an informal and “invisible institution”69 that according to 
Pierre Rosanvallon has three dimensions: moral, substantive, and temporal.70 While the 
moral dimension of social trust would be “integrity in the broadest sense,”71 which would 
translate as honesty and wholeness, its substantive aspect has to do with the concern for 
the common good. The temporal dimension of social trust is what allows for a promise to 
endure pass the moment of initial allegiance, the aspect that projects past and present 
interpersonal relations into the future, allowing for a community to endure after its birth. 
Consequently, the constitutive promise is what makes the civil community possible, what 
allows for a diverse group of people to imagine themselves as a “‘We’” [that] is 
constituted as an identifiable entity,”72 into the future.  
If the substantive dimension of social trust is the common good, something that is 
socially constructed and that, at the same time, creates the people as an entity when 
acting upon it, promise —the temporal dimension of trust, the projection of the present 
into the future— is what makes possible the endurance of the collective subject over time 
and the creation of a legitimate constitutional structure. However, in order for the people 
to yield a legal framework in which plurality and freedom can flourish, the interpersonal 
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relations upon which social trust is based upon must rely on a commitment to political 
equality, the necessary premise of the Arendtian founding principle of deliberation. The 
same as mutual promise, which could only be understood in relation to the unity created 
based on already existing social trust, the principle of deliberation presupposes a realm of 
appearances based upon political equality. Political equality, under the rule of law, is the 
basic condition for the creation of the citizen, the symbolic projection of the members of 
a community as legal entities, which makes possible equality in the public sphere. 
However, the juridical category of the citizen by itself is unable to guarantee equal liberty 
if the promise remains at the formal level, without yielding an adequate infrastructure to 
house common power.  
In addition to political equality, deliberation also presupposes liberty understood 
both as the protection of individual rights and the space for political action. Besides 
positive liberty —freedom as participation in the public sphere aimed at judging and 
deciding on common affairs— the principle of deliberation requires the negative aspect 
of freedom to be present at the moment of disclosure. It is in the public realm where 
members of the community actualize, through speech and action, their individuality, the 
“unique distinctness” that allows for the second birth of man in the political.73 Therefore, 
while positive freedom, the acting together, is essential for the maintenance of spaces for 
deliberation, it is through the actualization of individuality in action that plurality is able 
to exist. Consequently, in addition to political equality, both positive and negative 
freedom must be fostered through the founding performance and codified in the 
constitution.  
For Arendt, the spaces for freedom in a modern republic are bounded areas 
reserved for action, like “islands in a sea or as oases in a desert.”74 These islands of 
freedom surrounded by the stale waters of administration and the desert of the non-
political life are for Arendt not natural but human-made infrastructures designed to house 
the revolutionary spirit. Freedom as action is more demanding than the republican 
notions of freedom as tranquility and non-domination75 because it requires the equal 
possibility of disclosure and performance of liberty, and consequently a revolutionary 
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founding à la Arendt would differ substantially from a republican founding à la 
Machiavelli, in which popular political action is demanded not as an end in itself, as a 
way of performing and actualizing liberty, but as a means to ward against domination. 
While for Machiavelli the founding of a republic justifies any means, for Arendt means 
and ends, new beginnings and political freedom, constituent process and constituent 
form, appear as intrinsically connected.  
The Arendtian founding is the highest political moment, the greatest expression of 
freedom, which demands extraordinary engagement by individuals in collective action. 
Since the French Revolution, revolutionary beginnings have taken the form of 
spontaneous popular councils, organs that “consciously and explicitly desired the direct 
participation of every citizen in the public affairs of the country.”76 For Arendt, without 
councils, a new beginning would be unable to properly constitute freedom. Because she 
learned from Luxemburg that political action —the deed— is the origin of revolution, 
and that there is no revolution without the self-emancipatory actions of the workers 
themselves, the constitution of freedom therefore needs to be the result of political action 
of the people themselves. In contrast, Machiavelli’s founding is the highest moment of 
virtù in which one man is able to seize power to make the republic anew.77 For 
Machiavelli, the republican founding demands an extraordinary leader able to transcend 
the inherent dualism of society, a kingly power able to overcome vested interests and 
bring the republic back to its foundations. The founder must remain autonomous, 
beholden only to his own judgment. Even if the leader allies with the people, the act of 
founding comes out of pure will; a one-man task, a triumph of virtue over fortune, only 
guided by the common good.78 While extraordinary virtuous action is required in both 
foundings, in Machiavelli this action is given to the new prince, the leader of the people, 
who concentrates all authority to establish the institutions of liberty; in Arendt the 
founding and the new order are intrinsically connected, the latter being the result of the 
particular constituent action being performed in the former.  
Even if her conception of liberty and its relation to political action would make 
Arendt’s new beginning democratic, in the sense that political action is a end in itself, 
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rather than strictly republican, her reverence for institutions and procedures, and the 
authority vested in them, gives to her model a distinctive republican character in which 
power and authority are separated. 
Power springs up whenever people get together and act in 
concert, but it derives its legitimacy from the initial getting 
together rather than from any action that then may follow.79  
 
By separating power and authority at the moment of founding, Arendt is able to 
ground the new beginning in institutions (such as the shared rules and practices of semi-
constituted political communities in the case of the American Revolution), while keeping 
the people’s constituent power open and productive of liberty. Republican authority, 
based upon the initial foundations of the republic, is in this way able to channel the power 
of the people by limiting it from within. The solution against the boundlessness and 
instability of action during the founding moment is for Arendt found within action itself, 
in the act of promising.  
The remedy for unpredictability, for the chaotic uncertainty 
of the future, is contained in the faculty to make and keep 
promises (…) binding oneself through promises, serves to 
set up in the ocean of uncertainty, which the future is by 
definition, islands of security without which not even 
continuity, let alone durability of any kind, would be 
possible in the relationships between men.80  
 
While republican authority is linked to the birth of the political community, to the 
binding, constitutive promise to respect and augment the foundations of the republic, 
democratic authority is expressed in deliberation, in the way the legal structure is decided 
upon, reproduced, and renewed. Then, from her theory of principled action, in which 
normativity is contained in the act of founding, one could argue that the initial promise of 
the political community is the source of republican authority, which in turn is conditioned 
by the democratic principle of deliberation. While republican authority is concerned with 
the relation between individuals and the political community they belong to, to the duty 
involved with preserving and augmenting the foundations,81 democratic authority has to 
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do with the relation among citizens within the spaces of freedom, with the way political 
freedom is exercised.  
This dual, more demanding conception of authority presupposes, in addition to 
social trust, rules of political engagement allowing for continued self-rule by the 
community and the permanent actualization of the degrees of freedom contained in the 
foundational political practices. In other words, for democratic-republican authority to be 
capable of maintaining a constitutional framework in which freedom can dwell, the 
political relation between individuals must be based on the principle of no-rule,82 which 
is actualized in the act of deliberation, in the disclosure of oneself in the realm of 
appearances and the persuasion of others in relation to the definition of the common good 
and how to achieve it. While republican authority is necessary for the community to 
codify and preserve its shared practices and rules, which allows for ongoing 
commonality, democratic authority demands a substantive character from political 
institutions.  
In what follows I focus on Arendt’s proposal to incorporate a council system of 
government as a necessary condition for freedom. Following Jefferson’s plan of 
“elementary republics,” which demanded continual interaction among citizens alongside 
representative government, Arendt puts forward a council system as an alternative form 
of government aimed at the continual reintroduction of freedom as action and expansion 
of the public sphere, so to carve out political space out of the dominance of the social. I 
argue that we should understand Arendt’s proposal as a novel interpretation of the mixed 
constitution, one in which the division between the few and the many is replaced by that 
of parties dedicated to administration, and councils dedicated to political judgment. 
 
III. Parties and Councils as Mixed Government 
 
Even if Arendt praises the relative new beginning of the American colonies 
because of its protection of civil liberties and respect for previous institutions, she 
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strongly criticizes the exclusively representative form of government of the new liberal 
republic. The combination of representative institutions and individual rights, conceived 
as restraints on the power of government, yielded a framework in which politics was 
reserved for the few while the many enjoyed freedom from politics.83 As a republican 
thinker, Arendt understands the decay of the public realm as a form of corruption 
associated with the pursuit of private interest against the common good. This decay is for 
her connected to the lack of spaces for political action and the political apathy that comes 
along with the neglect for the res publica and political action. Corruption is the result of 
the privatization of the public realm and the alienation of individuals from their political 
condition, “the atrophy of the space of appearances and the withering of common 
sense.”84 The process of estrangement from the world, the prevalence of the private, and 
the loss of a sense of togetherness that characterizes corrupt republics appears as 
intrinsically connected to a constitutional lack: the failure to institutionalize spaces of 
freedom where individuals could engage in political action. The American founding 
institutionalized a representative government selected by the people, mediated by a party 
system, but neglected to give institutional standing to the town-halls and local councils 
that were also part of the socio-political revolutionary realm. The aim to institutionalize 
representation and not assemblies of the people in which politics could be exercised was 
for Arendt the beginning of the end of the republic project. 
Arendt sees party and council as almost coeval, springing both from revolutions; 
while the councils are the organs of the people, parties are the organs of the selected elite. 
…parties, because of their monopoly of nomination, cannot 
be regarded as popular organs, but they are, on the contrary, 
the very efficient instruments through which power of the 
people is curtailed and controlled.85  
  
Parties are not only not representative of the popular will, but also are aimed at 
taming the masses. Close to Cicero’s assessment of the Plebeian Tribunate as an 
institution functional to the republic because it helped to tame and direct the people, 
Arendt sees in the party a means of elite control over the citizens instead of a vehicle 
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through which popular opinion could be formed and represented. 86  This negative 
conception of representation negates the benefits that Luxemburg saw on class-based 
representative institutions as enabling the identity of the oppressed through the clashes of 
the revolutionary party with state power. Since Arendt’s project is not to emancipate the 
working class from capitalist oppression but to purge politics from necessity, she sees the 
representation of interest —either of the working class or other groups in society— as 
non-political and therefore in no way beneficial for enabling freedom —even if 
representative government is indeed necessary for the operation of the modern state.  One 
could argue that in Arendt’s exchange of the working class for the citizen, representation 
completely losses its ‘political’ character —as partisan of the emancipation of the 
plebeian element. While for Luxemburg the revolutionary party’s task was to give a 
structure to workers’ councils, and in this way an agent of emancipation, by abstracting 
the plebeian subject the party becomes a mere vehicle of interest and not of freedom. In 
this way she accepts Schumpeter’s theory of representative government as based on 
interest,87 and denies the political nature of representation. 
Representation is for Arendt what distinguishes modern republics from 
democracies.88 In a constitution based on representative government, individual citizens 
may only wield —mainly through the vote— negative powers, which “claim not a share 
in government but a safeguard against government.” 89  For Arendt representative 
government precludes participation by the majority because it does not provide the space 
for public opinion to form.  
In this system the opinions of the people are indeed 
unascertainable for the simple reason that they are non-
existent. Opinions are formed in the process of open 
discussion and public debate, and where no opportunity for 
the forming of opinions exists, there may be moods —
moods of the masses and moods of individuals, the latter no 
less fickle and unreliable than the former— but no 
opinion.90  
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If there is no formal, instituted space for the multitude to organize and for opinion 
to form, there is no acting together and no freedom. Arendt’s material assessment of 
modern democracies comes close to the critical plebeian tradition that sees representative 
government not as a deficient form of popular government, but as a form of oligarchy.  
That representative government has in fact become 
oligarchic government is true enough, though not n the 
classical sense of rule by the few in the interest of the few; 
what we today call democracy is a form of government 
where the few rule, at least supposedly, in the interest of the 
many. This government is democratic in that popular 
welfare and private happiness are its chief goals; but it can 
be called oligarchic in the sense that public happiness and 
public freedom have again become the privilege of the 
few.91  
 
For Arendt representation is inimical to action, and the creation of a political 
system based upon representative government effectively vacated action from politics in 
the modern world.92 Where politics is transformed into administration, which demands 
the professionalization of representatives who are chosen according to non-political 
criteria, there is no space for the people to engage in politics and actualize political 
freedom. Even if representative governments have democratic ideals, they are de facto 
oligarchies because they reserve the privilege of politics for the selected few.  
Interestingly, the oligarchy Arendt unveils is not based on socio-economic privileges —
the few using state power to accumulate wealth by dispossessing the many— but on 
political privileges; politics are a de facto monopoly of a few, while the many, deprived 
from spaces of freedom, are relegated to the social sphere, incapable of exercising 
freedom as politics through the political system and left only with extra-institutional 
avenues of protest to reclaim that freedom through political performance.93  
The party system —which is supposed to aggregate citizens’ wills, providing 
shortcuts for decision making— is, the same as administration and management, not only 
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essentially non-political because its “business is dictated by necessity,” 94  but also 
instrumentalizes the people by turning them into supporters of parties instead of political 
agents. 
…the party, whether an extension of parliamentary faction 
or a creation outside parliament, has been an institution to 
provide parliamentary government with the required 
support of the people, whereby it was always understood 
that the people, through voting, did the supporting, while 
action remained the prerogative of government.95 
 
Even revolutionary parties, as organs of representation, have traditionally agreed 
that “the end of government was the welfare of the people, and that the substance of 
politics was not action but administration.”96 Following Luxemburg’s prescient analysis 
of the Russian Revolution, Arendt argues party and councils compete for authority. The 
revolutionary Russian leadership, after only “halfheartedly recogniz[ing] the councils as 
instruments of ‘revolutionary struggle,’ they tried even in the midst of revolution to rule 
them from within” and saw action after the conquest of the state as “unnecessary or 
subversive.” 97  
Arendt argues that the councils of the people “were bound to become superfluous 
if the spirit of the revolutionary party prevailed.”98 The Party wants to execute its 
program, apply it on the masses without discussion by the masses, which inevitably 
would make the councils rebel against the party because the “average citizen’s capacity 
to act and to form his own opinion” would be disregarded and negated. However, the 
rebellion of the councils against the party not only disregarded the necessity of 
administration, but also allowed for the confusion between management and politics, and 
led to attempts to make councils not only political organs but also managers in common.  
If it is true that the revolutionary parties never understood 
to what extent the council system was identical with the 
emergence of a new form of government, it is no less true 
that the councils were incapable of understanding to what 
enormous extent the government machinery in modern 
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societies must indeed perform the functions of 
administration. The fatal mistake of the councils has always 
been that they themselves did not distinguish clearly 
between participation in public affairs and the 
administration or management of things in the public 
interests.99 
 
For Arendt, the councils are political organs and must not engage in the 
administration of things, not because it is beyond their competence but because the 
contamination of political judgment by the social and its consequentialism is pernicious.  
Because for Arendt authority is vested on law and institutions, it is not only 
necessary to codify a strong Bill of Rights, as the Americans did, but also to create spaces 
were freedom could be exercised. Even if it was a republic what the framers were 
instituting —a political system in which the people are the ultimate source of power— 
and its Bill of Rights was for Arendt “the most exhaustive legal bulwark for the private 
realm against public power,”100 the lack of spaces of freedom in which individuals could 
engage in political action meant the ultimate failure of the republican project because 
unable to preserve the freedom exercised at the moment of the founding. 
This perplexity, namely, that the principle of public freedom 
and public happiness without which no revolution would 
ever have come to pass should remain the privilege of the 
generation of founders… has haunted all revolutionary 
thinking ever since.101  
 
The moment the founders focused on representation and neglected “to incorporate 
the township and the town-hall meeting into the Constitution,” the revolutionary spirit 
was lost and government became according to Arendt mere administration.102 As the 
people’s political space —the realm of appearances where all individuals could engage in 
public speech and deed— disappeared, so did the democratic principle of deliberation 
and political freedom itself. This is a challenge for Arendt’s theory of principled action 
because the authority inherent in the founding act, which she praises as political, did not 
ultimately shape the constitutional framework in the way one could have expected. Even 
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though the performed principles of the American Revolution were promise and 
deliberation, equal freedom as action was not institutionalized, codified, or respected as 
common law. Universal suffrage and equality under the law did not make up for the lack 
of spaces of freedom, where individuals could actively engage in politics. Despite the 
commitment to building a house were freedom could dwell, based on promise and 
deliberation among equals, “the Constitution itself provided a public space only for the 
representatives of the people, and not for the people themselves.”103 
I would argue the exclusive representative character of the constituent process,104 
in which delegates from representative bodies were appointed by their peers in a closed 
selection process, prevented the principles of mutual promise and common deliberation 
being actualized through performance in the convention from yielding adequate 
foundations for freedom. Political freedom was exercised not by the people themselves 
but by their representatives; representation (and not equal political freedom) is then 
replicated and reproduced in the constitutional structure. Consequently, one could argue 
that to establish adequate foundations the constituent process does not only depend on the 
authority inherent in the principles of promise and deliberation enacted in political action, 
but also the ‘membership’ of the deliberative body; who participates seems to be crucial 
in the collective building of spaces of freedom. Very different from the open spaces 
Arendt imagined for the ideal political founding —a founding that could establish strong 
foundations for freedom, “both in the negative sense of liberation from oppression and in 
the positive sense of the establishment of Freedom as a stable, tangible reality,”105 in 
which anyone could step in an engage in political action— the American constituent 
process was exclusionary and closed. The original exclusion based on discriminative self-
selection was coupled with a formalism in the constitutional text that allowed for the 
cohabitation of freedom and slavery within the polity without openly establishing 
exclusions from citizenship in the founding document. Even if the American Constitution 
did not explicitly specify who were ‘We the people’ —those who were equal, and entitled 
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to liberty and the pursuit of happiness— the fact that the framers were all property-
owning white males tacitly determined the characteristics of the members of the new 
body politic. This exclusiveness was then contested by a second liberation during the 
Civil War, liberation this time not from outside domination, but from slavery, the rule 
that plagued the American polity since its birth.106  
Despite the potentiality for inclusion of the constitutional document, which 
allowed for revolutionary legal reforms that ultimately extended citizenship to the 
majority of the population, freedom as spaces for action remained lost in the American 
polity. The new legal framework “had given all power to the citizens, without giving 
them the opportunity of being republicans and of acting as citizens.”107 The liberal 
republic set up a system of constitutional liberties that “the best it has achieved is a 
certain control of the rulers by those who are ruled,” giving no space for participation in 
the political life of the republic. 
The most the citizen can hope for is to be ‘represented,’ 
whereby it is obvious that the only thing which can be 
represented and delegated is interest, or the welfare of the 
constituents, but neither their actions nor their opinions.108 
 
Following Jefferson’s plan of ‘elementary republics,’ which demanded continual 
interaction among citizens, Arendt puts forward with the council system an alternative 
form of government aimed at reintroducing freedom as action and expanding the public 
sphere. As Andreas Kalyvas has convincingly argued, through the establishment of 
councils Arendt seek to insert extraordinary politics within the constitutional structure. 
Infusing the analysis of councils with “her theory of constituent power and the 
revolutionary spirit that survives the closure of the revolutionary period”109 she attempts 
to bring together “radical change and legal continuity, the extraordinary and the 
ordinary.”110 
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According to Arendt’ reconstruction of the history of the councils, a task both of 
“recollection and invention as she constructs a tradition that she believes, as a historical 
fact, has never really existed,”111 this type of assemblies is inherently modern. The 
councils are a new form of government that, at least partially, sinks its roots in the 
medieval towns, and makes its appearance with the French Revolution.112  Since then, 
different forms of councils have emerged spontaneously whenever there is a serious crisis 
of authority: the Paris Commune in 1871, the Russian soviets in 1905, the Bavarian 
Räterepublik in 1919, and the Hungarian councils in 1956. Despite its crucial role during 
revolutions, this spontaneous collective tradition of politics has been lost in modern 
democracy because it has not been properly institutionalized.  
The failure of post-revolutionary thought to remember the 
revolutionary spirit and to understand it conceptually was 
preceded by the failure of the revolution to provide it with a 
lasting institution.113  
 
More than focusing on the inner-workings of councils, on political action within 
those spaces of freedom, Arendt’s assessment of these assemblies seems almost strictly 
constitutional. The councils are for her institutions aimed at establishing a new order, at 
constituting freedom. 
The councils, moreover, were always organs of order as 
much as organs of action, and it was indeed their aspiration 
to lay down the new order that brought them into conflict 
with the groups of professional revolutionaries, who wished 
to degrade them to mere executive organs of revolutionary 
activity… [the councils] consciously and explicitly desired 
the direct participation of every citizen in the public affairs 
of the country…114 
  
The councils are the organized multitude that decides to bind itself by shared rules 
and procedures, an institution that allows for power and freedom to be exercised, limited, 
and protected. They embody a particular order in which power is generated in collective 
political action, in which the revolutionary spirit —the capacity for new beginnings and 
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the exercise of constituent power— is preserved and exercised. However, the council 
system is more than the “embodiment of constituent power in the new constitutional 
order.”115 Arendt saw these local assemblies not only as “the best instruments” to allow 
for the self-constitution of a truly political elite, as spaces open for everyone to exercise 
judgment on the affairs of the republic, allowing for those who want to be political to 
engage with others in the realm of appearances, but also as serving other purposes such as 
“breaking up the modern mass society, with its dangerous tendency towards the 
formation of pseudo-political mass movements.”116 
Despite the radical democratic implications of the council system, I would argue 
Arendt is not a radical democrat. Even though she saw as essential to freedom the 
preservation of the revolutionary spirit within the constituted framework, she did not 
intend for it to become supreme. The councils were an alternative form of government 
that ought to coexist with representative government, not replace it. She recognizes that 
what gives the new republics their stability is the party system and the recognition of the 
opposition as an institution in government.117 As Arendt implicitly concedes, the same as 
the Senate was the source of authority in the Roman republic, representative government 
based upon a party system is what still would make rule legitimate and stable in modern 
republics. In contrast to Rome, where the power of the elite was checked by the 
assembled people, modern republics lack a popular institution to counterbalance parties 
as the expression of elite power.  Thus, following a republican structure of mixed 
constitution, and building on Jefferson’s “elementary republics,” Arendt introduced a 
council system that she conceives as a ward-type structure in a twofold way: as local 
assemblies of the people —such as town-halls— as well as a containment of 
representative government through the constant performance of freedom as action.  
While we should consider Arendt’s constitutional model of parties and councils as 
a modern republican version of the institutionalized conflict between the elite and the 
people, the democratic principle inherent in the inner logic of the councils brings a new 
element into the analysis. I would argue that the introduction of the democratic element 
into a republican mixed constitution creates a complex political system in which different 
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conceptions of freedom and authority operate in different levels, coexisting but bound to 
conflict. While at the council level, deliberation is the source of authority and being free 
means to engage in speech and deed, at the system level authority would reside on the 
dual, republican institutional structure contained in the constitution, in which freedom is 
equivalent to security and balance of power. In order to preserve freedom, both as 
security and action, party and council must interact and coexist. Without the councils, the 
public-at-large is not free; only the representatives are equals engaging in deliberation 
about public affairs and yielding political power. But without parties, administration and 
continuity of government in large nation-states seems almost an impossibility.  
I would argue the conflict between parties and councils cannot be resolved by 
simply acknowledging the councils as bearers of constituent power.118 For the conflicting 
authority of parties and councils to avoid constitutional crisis, the institutional conflict 
would need to be managed through a distinction and separation based, on the one hand, 
on a division of labor between administration and politics, and on the other hand, their 
position within the constitutional structure. While the parties and representative 
government would have as main task to channel interest and administrate the state for the 
common interest, I would argue the councils would be aimed at allowing for the 
exercising of judgment, “the most political of man’s mental abilities,”119 at allowing 
citizens to collectively “judge affirmatively or negatively the realities they are born into 
and by which they are also conditioned.”120  
Even if she left inconclusive her work on judgment, Arendt is clear that for her 
the capacity of judging is one of the “politically most important, rational faculties”121 
that, following Kant, emerges only in praxis. Judgment needs to be exercised and cannot 
be learnt or arrived at by either deduction or induction.122 For Arendt the “condition 
prerequisite for all judgment”123 is the “deliberate withdrawal from involvement and the 
partiality of immediate interests”124 in order to judge “particulars [“this is wrong”] 
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without subsuming them under general rules.”125 Moreover, judging allows for the 
realization of thinking, “making it manifest in the world of appearances,”126 and therefore 
the aim of the councils, as the institutionalization of the realm of appearance is to enable 
the exercise of judgment, which in turn allows individuals to construct and discover the 
community and its limits. According to Lisa Zerilli, for Arendt judging is an activity that 
is “formative of the public realm” but that is not defined “in terms of the production of a 
normative basis for political action.”127 Judgment is a faculty that “at once expands our 
sense of reality and affirms freedom” instead of setting rigid standards of validity, when 
the imagination is allowed to be unrestrained from concepts and moral laws.128 
Because the object of judgment is the past,129 the role of the councils within the 
constitutional structure would be to pass judgment on the actions of government. In this 
way, the councils would not share in administration (doing) but only pass judgment on it 
whenever becomes necessary to deliberate on the particulars. The councils’ judging 
function moreover would acquire a censorial authority from the position of these 
assemblies outside of the governmental structure. It would be their no-rule position, their 
lack of a stake in administration, that would allow for the councils to play a negative role 
in judging the outputs of government (law and policy). In order for the councils to be 
strictly political and avoid the temptation of directly ruling, I would argue the realm of 
appearances would need to be mostly devoted to political judgment of representative 
government and the role of the state in the shared world. However, because judging the 
past is connected to thinking the future, “that is, to speculate meaningfully, about the 
unknown” and to “will the impossible,”130 arguing for the councils as organs of political 
judgment in no way precludes the possibility of the improbable and the capacity to renew 
the republic from within. Even if the councils are “the institutionalized embodiment of a 
stabilized, pacified, and thus de-revolutionized constituent power,”131 individuals in these 
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councils would be able to exercise constituent power in the form of judgment, actively 
participating in the renewal of the republic. 
 
 
















THE MIXED CONSTITUTION RELOADED. 
 














Given the degree of systemic corruption in liberal democracies and the increasing 
oppression ordinary people suffer at the hands of employers, landlords, lenders, insurance 
companies, and state bureaucracy, it is not surprising that the study of plebeian politics 
and ideology coming out of the resistance of plebeians against oligarchic power is 
becoming less of an oddity.1 The first academic work to directly deal with plebeianism is 
Martin Breaugh’s reconstruction of the intellectual history of plebeian politics in The 
Plebeian Experience, first published in 2007 in French. Breaugh traces what he calls a 
“plebeian principle” that resurges from time to time in history and that defines the 
plebeian experience as one of freedom and revolt, a refusing of “the limits of the possible 
present of the dominant order.”2 From the historical expression of the plebeian principle 
from Rome to the Paris Commune, to its philosophical roots in Machiavelli up to 
Rancière, Breaugh shows the discontinuous struggle for freedom of plebeians and argues 
for conceiving the plebian subject neither as a social category nor as an identity, but as an 
experience, “the passage from a subpolitical status to one of a full-fledge political 
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subject.”3 The plebeian experience only materializes when “people excluded from the res 
publica transform themselves into political subjects able to act in concert.”4 Plebeianism 
is therefore an experience of self-emancipation through political action that challenges 
the established hierarchical order in which plebeians are subordinate subjects. Even if 
plebeian experiences have tended to be ephemeral because unable to “found a sustainable 
new political order,”5 they have kept reappearing, irrupting spontaneously nevertheless.  
 Attempting to theorize the plebeian experience within liberal democracies, Jeffrey 
Green argues that plebeianism is defined by a “shadow of unfairness” resulting from 
plutocracy, “the inescapable incursion of socioeconomic inequality into civic spaces.”6 
This shadow, moreover, is a constant feature of our political systems —“a permanent mar 
on liberal-democratic regimes’ capacity to fully realize the norms of free and equal 
citizenship”— even in the most “enlightened and advanced.”7 Plebeianism recognizes 
that “within liberal democracy ordinary citizenship is second-class citizenship”8 and aims 
at “the identification and regulation of the most advantaged class.”9 According to Green 
the most significant contribution of adopting a plebeian lens to analyze liberal 
democracies is that it unveils the illusions of equal liberty that undergird the liberal-
democratic structure. 
The premise of plebeianism is that prevailing accounts of 
liberal democracy today suffer from unreality insofar as 
they take the ordinary citizen to be (or potentially become) 
fully free and equal vis-à-vis citizens with significantly 
greater amounts of wealth, fame, and political influence… 
Overcoming these various forms of unrealism is a chief 
value of a plebeian contribution to the study and practice of 
liberal democracy.10 
 
 Different from Breaugh, who analyzed plebeian politics as a discontinuous history 
of emancipation, Green sees plebeianism as a permanent feature of liberal democracies, 
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an ideology that does not prompt individuals to engage in political action, but rather to 
remain in a place of passive-aggressive resistance vis-à-vis oligarchy through what he 
calls “principled vulgarity,” a mode of behavior through which plebeians transgress the 
“well-established norms of civility.”11 According to Green, through the recognition of 
“reasonable envy” originating in the contestation of the “superior power of the 
superrich,” plebeianism could contribute to make liberal democracy’s “ideas and 
institutions even more just.”12 While in the past plebeian ideology and politics helped 
establish plebeian institutions able to veto and introduce legislation as well as self-
government assemblies, for Green plebeianism today means engaging in “classism” 
and “rancor” to regulate the most advantaged class, and in “extrapoliticism” as “solace” 
for coping with an inevitable state of subordination.  
Even if Green’s material diagnosis of second-class citizenship is certainly within 
a plebeian conception of the oligarchic republic, the moral philosophy that he derives 
from this condition of subordination is at best partial and at worst anti-plebeian. He 
argues that one of the purposes of plebeian theory is to “help ordinary citizens find solace 
in the face of the inevitable unease their second-class status will generate them.”13 He 
proposes to embrace a modern interpretation of Epicureanism —a philosophy teaching 
“to live unnoticed” and “avoid politics”— understood as form of extrapoliticism, which 
conceptualizes “egalitarianism in terms of a critical indifference toward politics,” but that 
would differ from antipoliticism and apoliticism. 14  Extrapoliticism challenges “the 
desirability of high political office” and offers coping mechanisms “whereby political 
longings temporarily might be sublimated in non-political form.”15  
Green argues that plebeian philosophy today should be understood as a form of 
Epicureanism, both because of the historical connection with this strand of philosophy 
and plebeians in the late Roman republic, and his own phenomenological study of the 
plebeian experience in contemporary liberal democracies. He argues that Epicureanism is 
a plebeian philosophy because it was one of the “dominant philosophical schools in late 
republican Rome” and “appears to have been especially popular among Roman 
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plebeians.”16 Green also references Cicero derogatorily labeling Epicureanism as a 
“plebeian philosophy” as proof. First, I would argue that not because a philosophy is 
popular among plebeians (understood as a social category) does it means that it is a 
plebeian philosophy. This is equivalent to saying that because liberalism today is one of 
the dominant political philosophies, it should be considered as a philosophy of the 
people. Apart from the “popularity” perspective, there is no necessary connection 
between Epicureanism and plebeianism —even if the majority of plebeians were indeed 
epicureans. 
In addition to the weak historical connection, I would argue this association 
between Epicureanism and plebeianism runs into a serious temporality issue, both in its 
initial attachment to plebeianism as well as in it transposition to current political systems. 
As I discussed in Chapter 2, during the late Roman republic the political power of 
plebeians was highly institutionalized in the Plebeian Council and the Tribunate, but due 
to the progressive oligarchization of plebeian leadership, plebeians saw a de facto 
retrenchment of their political prerogatives. It is in this context —in which plebeians had 
acquired legislative supremacy after the Senate’s pre-approval of legislation was 
eliminated, but plebeian magistrates had ceased to constrain oligarchic power— that 
Epicureanism becomes popular among plebeians. It is in the summit of plebeian 
institutional power, where decay of plebeianism as an ideology and political praxis of 
emancipation seems to have begun, when the popularity of a skeptical view of public 
office and the detachment from politics took hold of plebeians. To render Epicureanism 
—a philosophy that was popular at a moment of corruption and the retreat of plebeian 
political ideology— as a plebeian philosophy, is to my mind misleading given that it 
bears no resemblance with the plebeian principle that refuses the limits of the dominant 
order convincingly traced by Breaugh. Green argues that while Breaugh’s interpretation 
of plebeianism is based on revolution, his conception of plebeianism is based on an 
“already embraced political regime” and thus is inherently reformist,17 even if it is not 
clear how engaging in a Thoreau-type of civil disobedience in which plebeians withdraw 
from politics could achieve any meaningful reform. 
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Even if one grants that Epicureanism was indeed a plebeian philosophy that aimed 
at liberating plebeians from a political arena in which plebeian institutions had become 
oligarchic, the analogy Green makes with today’s plebeian experience brings its own 
temporal challenges. The political situation in which second-class, ordinary citizens are 
today —completely lacking institutional power— has little to do with the high degree of 
entrenchment of plebeian power in the late Roman republic. I would argue that for 
theorizing plebeianism as an ideology that could be useful to bring solace to the 
awareness of the subordinate status of ordinary citizens today, one would have to look at 
the philosophy prevalent during the long conquest of political power by plebeians: from 
the establishment of the Tribunes of the Plebs in 494 BC up to the passing of lex 
Hortensia in 287 BC, which eliminated the Senate’s veto power over plebeian law. 
Unfortunately, there are no surviving texts by plebeian philosophers, so the precise 
principles and postulates of the original plebeian philosophy that underpinned the 
plebeian struggle for political recognition and power in Rome cannot be retrieved.  
Nevertheless, it seems commonsensical that such a philosophy would not have embraced 
the withdrawal from politics, but on the contrary, the takeover of political power. If we 
compare plebeian power in Rome and in cotemporary democracies, the differences are so 
pronounced that it seems difficult to make a meaningful “analogical reasoning”18 and 
base a moral philosophy on it.  
The main political power ordinary citizens have today is the right to elect 
representatives, and therefore, compared to the late Roman republic, there is still much 
political ground to be gained by plebeians, advances that in the past have only resulted 
from political action. A contemporary version of Epicureanism seems odd as an adequate 
plebeian philosophy because it is unlikely to produce the results that philosophical ideas 
achieved during the plebeian conquest of political power. Even if the “shadow of 
unfairness” cannot be eliminated from liberal democracies, plebeianism should be aimed 
not only at “identifying and regulating” elites through the expression of “reasonable 
envy,” but also at gaining political power by institutionalizing the power of plebeians. A 
philosophy that teaches the withdrawal from politics and the expression of reasonable 
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envy instead, clearly does not contribute to reforming the system, at least not in a direct 
manner.  
Green’s phenomenological account of the emotions and behaviors prevalent 
among plebeians today seems close to what James Scott calls infrapolitics, the “low-
profile forms of resistance”19 against oppression that are part of the hidden transcript —
the discourse of “gesture, speech, and practices” that is excluded from the public 
sphere20— once it has become public. According to Scott when the oppressed assume the 
resistance of the hidden transcript as common and legitimate, the political 
subjectivization of the subaltern classes is possible. I would argue that “principled 
vulgarity” should be understood as providing the philosophical justifications for plebeian 
infrapolitics to be recognized in the open, and in this way allowing for the collective 
consciousness of plebeians and the discursive reenactment of the divide between the few 
and the many. However, if this type of infrapolitics is combined with a withdrawal from 
politics, as Green suggests as solace for the awareness of subordination, the result is not 
plebeianism —understood as the ideology and politics that aims at emancipating 
plebeians from oligarchic domination— but the sabotage of the process of plebeian 
subjectivization by discouraging and thus thwarting political action. 
 Following Breaugh’s plebeian principle, I would argue plebeianism as an 
ideology and politics that aims at the emancipation of plebeians, and not only at the 
constraint of elites, should rest on a political philosophy that embraces conflict as 
productive of liberty, such as the one proposed by Jacques Rancière. Even if Rancière 
does not make the explicit connection between the construction of the democratic people 
as “those who have no part” and the plebeian conception of the people, as those who do 
not rule and resist oligarchic oppression, the influence of plebeian ideology in Rancière’s 
thought is substantive and explicit. His political philosophy was heavily influenced both 
by his participation in Les révoltes logiques —a journal aimed at “reconstructing 
grassroots thought” while breaking away from “proletarian metaphysics”— and by 
Pierre-Simon Ballanche’s theorization of the ‘plebeian principle’ in the history of the 
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Roman republic,21 which Rancière uses as a foundational narrative in his theory of 
politics as disagreement.22 This plebeian principle, egalitarian and emancipatory, appears 
as intrinsically connected to democracy. 
Even if influenced by Lefort in terms of his conception of democracy being a 
space of power, Rancière, also a student of Althusser, rejects the connection between 
politics and the tendency to embody this empty place, and embraces instead alterity, 
dissent, and equality as the principles of politics. Democracy is not a form of government 
or juridical framework, but a “community that is defined by the existence of a specific 
sphere of appearance of the people.”23  Democracy is actualized when the people, 
understood as those who do not take part in the oligarchic structure of power, are able to 
become visible, modifying the realm of the visible with their mere existence, an irruption 
that “splits reality and reconfigures it as double.”24 Democracy allows for an alternative 
image of society by providing a stage for the people to become a political subject. For 
Rancière democracy is not part of the oligarchic structures of power —what he calls the 
“police order”— but consists on the materialization of the logic of equality that is anti-
hierarchical and conflictual.    
For the forms of democracy are nothing less than the forms 
in which politics is constituted as a specific mode of human 
being-together. Democracy is not a regime or a social way 
of life. It is the institution of politics itself, the system of 
forms of subjectification through which any order of 
distribution of bodies into functions corresponding to their 
‘nature’ and places corresponding to their functions is 
undermined, thrown back on its contingency.25 
 
Democratic politics are a politics of disagreement, “forms of expression that 
confront the logic of equality with the logic of the police order.”26 True political action is 
always democratic because it attacks inequality and seeks to dismantle patterns of 
oppression that have been naturalized through the discipline of the police logic. Because 
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politics as disagreement has been completely foreclosed by consensus democracy —a 
post-democratic regime in which there is an “absolute removal of the sphere of 
appearance of the people”27— instances of politics —popular performances of the 
egalitarian logic against the hierarchical logic of police— are only rare. The logic of 
police, which also structures the system of political representation based on the counting 
and aggregation of individual preferences and votes, floods the public space, making 
politics sporadic and ephemeral, outbursts of emancipation amidst the oligarchic structure 
of the police order. 
The political act of plebeians is grounded on conflict, but not a systemic conflict 
of “interest between constituted parties of the population,” “a discussion between 
partners,” but a conflict “over the very count of those parties” that “undermines the very 
situation of interlocution.”28 The political dispute challenges the foundations of the 
system of police through a radical egalitarian logic that does not speak to the system but 
disrupts it through the political performance of the people, of those who do not have a 
part in the system but nevertheless claim it. “Politics means the supplementation of all 
qualifications by the power of the unqualified,” the visible action of the people, those 
who are not supposed to act because ignorant and untrained.29 Through this lens, there is 
no freedom without politics, and the only solace for plebeians is to claim a part in the 
political process by engaging in political action and performing their equality. 
 
I. Reviving the Tribunate 
 While “reasonable envy” could serve as a springboard for raising class 
consciousness among plebeians, plebeianism also demands effective institutional 
mechanisms to control ruling elites and successfully contest their domination. The first to 
develop the strand of plebeian thought that aims at institutionalizing plebeian power was 
John McCormick, who in Machiavellian Democracy sketched “a revived tribunate, 
combin[ing] elements of randomization, wealth-exclusion, and direct plebeian 
judgment”30 as an institutional response “to the hegemony of elections in contemporary 
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republics.”31 Focusing his analysis in the political structure rather than on the plebeian 
experience in contemporary representative democracies, McCormick argues 
constitutional representative regimes lack two crucial elements: extra-electoral means to 
control elites, and a political distinction between elites and the common people.32 
…the aristocratic effect and the privileged access to 
resources and information enjoyed by magistrates in 
modern republics render elections inadequate mechanisms 
of elite accountability  and responsiveness; moreover, a 
sociopolitical definition of ‘the people’ that includes 
wealthy citizens, rather than one that sets the latter apart 
from or even opposed to the people, allows the wealthy to 
dominate common citizens in quasi-anonymous and largely 
uncontested ways.33  
 
Elections are not enough to disable oligarchic domination, and lacking a division 
between the few and the many, the ruling elite and the plebeians, allows the few to exert 
covert domination with impunity while plebeians are left without the possibility of 
resisting and combating that oppression. Taking inspiration from Machiavelli’s Provost 
office, designed both to control elites and “place ‘rank-and-file’ plebs in positions of 
political authority on a regular basis,”34 McCormick proposes the incorporation into the 
U.S. Constitution of a People’s Tribunate: a collective plebeian office with the power to 
veto, call referenda, and initiate impeachment proceedings against public officials. This 
plebeian institution would be composed of 51 nonwealthy citizens selected by lottery, 
who would serve for one-year nonrenewable terms.35 This proposal to add a plebeian 
institution to the constitutional framework of a representative democracy marks the origin 
of the theorization of a new form of mixed constitution. McCormick is therefore a 
twenty-first century pioneer within the institutional strand of plebeian constitutionalism 
to which I also attempt to contribute. In what follows I lay out his institutional proposal 
and analyze the challenges that arise from wealth exclusion, mode of selection, and 
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powers of the Tribunate.36 I also analyze McCormick’s most recent, highly controversial 
proposal: to establish “popularly judged political trials where public officials or private 
citizens, indicted for corruption or treason, face the penalty of death.”37  
 
a) Composition 
 The People’s Tribunate would be a political institution that excludes political and 
economic elites. While the exclusion of the political ruling class —defined as those who 
have held elected or appointed office— is not problematic because the exclusion is based 
on the temporary role performed by individuals, the exclusion of the wealthiest tenth 
percent of family households38 raises a liberal challenge. Even if the aim of the exclusion 
is to redraw the boundary between the few and the many, and keep the rich from 
capturing plebeian institutions, introducing a class-based political institution in which 
representation would be attached to (the lack of) wealth, would be, at least in principle, 
unconstitutional because it would violate the fundamental right to equal liberty all 
citizens should enjoy under a liberal republic. Discrimination using suspect categories 
such as race, national origin, and religion, are subject to strict scrutiny, which forces the 
state to prove a compelling governmental interest and to show that the use of the suspect 
category is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest. Even if the Supreme Courts could 
agree that class is not a suspect category, because the division would be formal (10/90), 
giving plebeians exclusive political rights that other citizens are deprived of would 
infringe on voting as a fundamental equal right. A strong argument would need to be 
made to claim that the exclusion of the rich from plebeian institutions is necessary, and 
that there is no other way to achieve the objective of the Tribunate without excluding 
individuals from political power based on their wealth. Perhaps, the exclusion could be at 
least partially based on the pernicious effects of having elites present during deliberation 
—which speaks to the difficulties of “challenging dominant discourses that privilege elite 
interests when members of such elites are present in the deliberations.”39 Given that the 
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mere presence of members of the elite could negatively affect the performance of the 
Tribunate, their exclusion would need to be categorical.  
 Even if the bending of the liberal framework to exclude the wealthy from political 
institutions could be construed as necessary and narrowly tailored, and therefore 
constitutional, and a class-based institution could be established in which the richest 10% 
of society is excluded from exercising a specific form of political power, this 
constitutional interpretation would give birth to a mixed constitution that does not 
embrace liberal principles as its overarching paradigm. In the illiberal beginnings of 
representative government, wealth requirements to participate in the political system, 
barring the poor from voting, were ubiquitous. Perhaps, after the franchise has been 
expanded to its maximal expression, and all discriminatory exclusions have been 
eliminated, the corrupted version of liberal democracies (already transforming into a new 
political form) could likely end with the reversal of the original gatekeeping rule with a 
twist: barring the wealthy from exercising political power in plebeian institutions. 
Although I agree that it is necessary to make the political distinction between the ruling 
elite and plebeians, as I argue in the next and final chapter, a class-based distinction is not 
the only way the division between the few and the many could be drawn. 
 
b) Selection 
Regarding the mode of selection for the Tribunate, McCormick endorses lottery 
because it “keeps economic elites from monopolizing public offices” and materializes 
“the principle of equitable political participation among citizens.”40 Even if as an anti-
corruption mechanism lottery is certainly not infallible since plebeians could be bribed or 
manipulated, in terms of offering equal opportunities for participation, sortition clearly 
delivers. While there is no empirical evidence to support that elections “are especially 
capable of providing good government or are significantly constrained in their behavior 
by retrospective voting patters,” selection by lottery guarantees the random distribution of 
offices among plebeians.41 Selecting members to the Tribunate office by lot for short 
periods of time would not only make it very difficult for political corruption to become 
entrenched in that office, but also would offer equal chances of exercising political 
                                                
40 McCormick, Machiavellian Democracy, p. 173. 




power, and in this way it would fulfill the role that Machiavelli’s Provosts played in 
allowing common citizens to see and experience political power.  
Even if lottery clearly is an equal-opportunity type of selection that seems most 
adequate to fill offices in plebeian institutions, the inclusion allowed by the Tribunate 
office sketched by McCormick would be, in real terms, marginal given the small number 
of tribunes selected every year. The extremely low probability of being selected to serve 
in office,42 or know someone who has served and could transmit that plebeian political 
experience,43 would allow only for limited political learning among plebeians and also 
potentially undermine the legitimacy of the office, especially if the motions pursued are 
controversial. Materially, the Tribunate office would be run by a group of selected few, 
who even if plebeian from a socio-economic perspective, might not represent the 
multitude in terms of their particular worldviews. Discrepancies of opinion could easily 
lead to an attack on the mode of selection and calls for electing ‘better qualified’ 
plebeians. In the Roman case, the establishment of a plebeian political elite was the first 
step towards cooptation and the undoing of the plebeian project, therefore the possibility 
of introducing elections to solve a legitimacy problem should be avoided at all costs. 
A final point regarding selection: McCormick endorses “institutional affirmative 
action for common citizens,”44 taking into account “the particular history of the United 
States” in which racial discrimination is systemic. He suggests to have the pool of 
citizens from which members of the Tribunate are drawn “altered to give African 
American and Native American citizens a greater chance of serving as tribunes.”45 Even 
if I sympathize with the redress of historic and current inequalities based on race, there is 
no reason, within the logic of the office, to give more chances of being selected to some 
groups of plebeians rather than others. If the intention of ‘weighted sorting’ is to achieve 
equity by over-representing oppressed groups, who gets to decide which groups suffer 
more oppression and therefore are deserving of special treatment? What about the historic 
and current subordinate position of women, whose domestic and reproductive labor is 
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extracted from them without compensation, who suffer pay discrimination, sexual 
harassment and violence?46 What about Hispanics, the new underclass of the American 
economy, who are constantly harassed by immigration police? What about Muslims, who 
are labeled as terrorists, victims of hate crimes and harassment? And members of the 
LGBTQ community, who are targets of homophobic violence and social discrimination? 
The list of different types and degrees of oppression within the plebeian ranks goes on. 
The challenge to positively discriminate without negatively impacting other oppressed 
groups is one of the reasons why the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in 1978 as 
unconstitutional the use of racial quotas in university admission processes: discriminating 
negatively or positively based on race violates the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th 
Amendment.47 While the goal of achieving diversity in the classroom is legitimate, 
special admission procedures or quotas in which race is a required category are not.  
‘Weighted sorting’ brings an element of arbitrariness into lottery that could also 
undermine the legitimacy of the office. Deciding on which social group would deserve 
higher chances to become selected to exercise political power is in itself a complicated 
political question that could unnecessarily intensify racial division among plebeians. 
Moreover, individuals from ethnic minorities and other oppressed groups are not 
necessarily in support of progressive politics. The example of Justice Clarence Thomas 
—the only African-American member of the Supreme Court— who is against any form 
of affirmative action (even if he was himself a beneficiary of it) is the most visible and 
paradoxical case. Even if McCormick states that a “a veto exercised by the American 
Tribunate ought to block oligarchically favorable as opposed to popularly progressive 
policy initiatives,” 48 there is no guarantee that the office would pursue a progressive 
agenda or a plebeian one. If due to random selection the Tribunate ends up with a 
majority of middle and working class racists, for example, or a majority of conservatives 
wanting to restricts women’s reproductive rights and discriminate against LGBTQ 
citizens, there is no mechanism to assure that the Tribunate would not be used for non-
plebeian ends. Given that in terms of the degree of identification individuals experience, 
                                                
46 As Roger Smith has pointed out “it is not clear whether a government that gave special governing powers 
to the less affluent would do more to promote transformations in those practices. Smith, Machiavellian 
Democracy, Differentiated Citizenship, and Civic Unity Good Society, 20.2 (2011), p. 243.  
47 University of California Regents v. Bakke, 1978. 




class is perhaps the weakest and most difficult identity to maintain,49 I would argue a 
plebeian infrastructure needs to have procedures enabling actions pursuing plebeian, 
emancipatory ends and limiting attempts to use plebeian power to support the subjugation 
of one group to another. I would argue plebeian law, even if aimed at restraining the 
power of the wealthy, should not contain the seeds of domination within it, since laws are 
always in need of interpretation and application, there to be deployed and exploited in 
social and political struggle. 
 
c) Powers 
Regarding the constitutional powers of the People’s Tribunate, upon a majority 
vote, this plebeian institution would have the prerogative to veto one law, one executive 
order, and one Supreme Court decision every year. Following the example of the gradual 
expansion of plebeian institutional power after the establishment of the Tribunate in 
Rome, and Machiavelli’s support for the gradual expansion of plebeian power in 
Florence, McCormick proposes a quantitative limit to plebeian veto power in terms of the 
amount of items that could be vetoed at any time. Even if strategically this would be a 
sound proposal, imposing such limitations would not only open the possibility for 
manipulation from representative government and render the office ineffective,50 but also 
needlessly restrict the anti-oligarchic prerogatives of the plebeian office, setting a 
procedural precedent that could stand oppose to plebeian reforms. It could be the case 
that several pieces of legislation, executive orders, and court decisions would need to be 
repealed at the same time to exert meaningful change. McCormick’s decision to restrict 
the amount of times the veto power can be exercised appears as strategically in tune with 
Machiavelli’s concessions toward the powerful few in his constitutional proposal for 
Florence.51 The same as Machiavelli attempts to put a plebeian foot in the oligarchic door 
of power, which eventually would allow for plebeians to finally push the door open, by 
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lowering the threat to the security of the few,52 McCormick proposes a Tribunate that has 
power to grow out of an unnecessary limitation.  
In addition, McCormick also restricts the power of the Tribunate to initiate law or 
policy through a national referendum to only once per year, restriction that does not seem 
as problematic as the limits on the veto/repeal, since it is unlikely that the office could 
propose more than one issue per year. If the referendum wins a majority, the Tribunate’s 
legal project would become a nationally binding plebeian law. However, in a rather 
unplebeian move towards legislative supremacy, McCormick gives the power to overturn 
a national referendum to Congress if supermajorities in both chambers “declare the 
statute to be unconstitutional.”53 This legislative supremacy in which Congress is the 
final sovereign interpreter of the constitution, would position the modern Tribunate in a 
subordinate position vis-à-vis representative government, equivalent to the position of the 
Roman Tribunate before lex Hortensia eliminated the Senatorial veto on plebeian 
legislation, or to the position of the representatives of the commons in Montesquieu’s 
model in which the Senate retains veto over legislation coming out of the lower house. 
This legislative veto power over plebeian law is especially troubling given that 
McCormick also gives the legal power to expand the basic powers of the Tribunate to a 
supermajority in the House of Representatives. These provisions would render the 
Tribunate innocuous if Congress turns out to be in the grip of oligarchy. If plebeian law 
could be vetoed by representatives of oligarchy, and the power to expand plebeian power 
and override the veto are to be granted by the same representatives, then the Tribunate 
could be procedurally disarmed and effectively neutralized by institutionalized oligarchic 
power. 
The third power assigned to the Tribunate is the prerogative, upon a ¾ majority, 
to initiate impeachment proceedings against one public official in each branch of 
government; impeachment procedures and decision-making would be directed by the 
Senate according to the Constitution. McCormick gives to the Tribunate the power to 
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exercise a prerogative that is today monopolized by the House of Representatives. This 
prerogative, however, is only to initiate proceedings and not to investigate and pass 
judgment. Even if initiating impeachment procedures in cases of political corruption is a 
great power to wield, it could be the case that impeachment cases brought up by the 
Tribunate would be tried in the Senate, and then dismissed. Given the increasing 
difficulty to materially prove political corruption, the Senate could easily let corrupt 
officials off the hook, rendering the Tribunate impotent as an anti-corruption office.  
Perhaps because aware of the limitation of impeachment procedures to effectively 
fight corruption, McCormick proposes another institutional innovation that relates to 
Machiavelli’s avenging power aimed at instilling the same fear of punishment to those 
who “had done wrong” as it was experienced during the founding: popular trials 
empowered to decide on corruption cases in which death is the ultimate penalty. Such 
popular trials would be modeled based on the “capital trials by large citizen juries like 
those that convicted Socrates in Athens and Coriolanus in Rome.”54 Even if progressive 
liberals have moved away from capital punishment, especially given discriminatory 
sentencing and evidence of cruel and unusual punishment in the way in which criminals 
are killed, McCormick follows Machiavelli’s insight that the fear of capital punishment is 
the only way of “deterring socio-economic and political elites from steering public policy 
toward their own private, self-enrichment. 55 ” According to Machiavelli, when only 
imprisonment and banishment were applied as political punishment, wealthy citizens 
circumvented penalties by using “their considerable resources to gain unwarranted 
pardons, to bust out of jail, or to return prematurely from exile.”56 Given the severity of 
capital punishment, the decision to apply the death penalty in cases of corruption should 
be reached through “institutional modes” in which a large number of common citizens 
decide “over the lives of elites indicted for political crimes.”57  
Even if McCormick’s method for adjudicating cases of political corruption is 
certainly unorthodox, it could be accommodated within current constitutional provisions 
either by defining corruption as a form of treason, and oligarchic domination as a form of 
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war against the republic, or by amending the constitution to give public juries the power 
to decide on impeachment cases, which today is prohibited by Article III section II. What 
is more difficult to accommodate within the liberal paradigm is McCormick’s suggestion 
for applying a form of penal reparations by “exempting the poor from the threat of 
execution” —given that individuals from lower classes are currently overrepresented in 
death row— and reserving capital punishment only “for wealthy citizens or public 
officials found guilty of political or economic corruption.”58 First, to consider the amount 
of wealth one has in the punishment one receives in court would be in principle a 
violation of the Equal Protection Clause, since every citizen should be given equal 
protection of the laws regardless of their socio-economic status. And second, exempting 
the poor from execution in cases of corruption would place a pernicious incentive to bribe 
plebeians into corruption schemes, given the lesser penalty they risk if caught.59 If 
corruption is conceived as treason to the republic because it is an existential threat to the 
liberty of plebeians, then it should not matter what is the socio-economic background of 
the person accused of enabling oligarchic domination. 
 
 
Figure 8.1 McCormick’s Machiavellian Democracy 
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II. Plebeian Representation and the Challenge of Competing Authorities 
With a South African republic still dealing with the aftermath of apartheid as his 
“contextual and imaginative context,” Lawrence Hamilton sets out to rethink political 
freedom from a more material perspective so to “deal comprehensively with the question 
of whether South Africans are now free.”60  Pushing against a formal conception of 
freedom, Hamilton argues that: 
states of domination are best overcome in practice by 
means of institutions of participation and power that take 
seriously the partisan nature of needs, interests and states of 
domination; and that therefore it is necessary to propose 
political institutions that act as counters to existing 
economic and political power balances in society and 
associated states of domination.61  
 
Attempting to lay out a philosophical justification for incorporating class-based 
institutions, Hamilton argues that, given the proper procedural and institutional 
infrastructure, “freedom is power through representation”62 because representatives have 
the power to “advance the needs and interests of the citizens and reduce states 
of domination,” and citizens have the power to restrain their representatives.  
Representation enables the two main forms of power 
necessary for freedom: the power of representatives to 
determine the general trajectory of a state’s macroeconomic 
path and thus the power of its citizens, and the power of the 
citizens to control representatives in positive and negative 
ways.63  
  
Following the Machiavellian idea that institutionalized conflict is productive of 
liberty, Hamilton argues that the freedom of individuals is better understood in relation to 
the group they are part of, and the power that the representatives of the group have to 
shape government policy. 
Given the complexity, division of labour and 
interdependence characteristic of modern conditions — 
freedom as power is not normally a matter simply of 
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individual power but of the power of group representatives 
and their power to influence political representatives, 
especially in the determination of macroeconomic policy.64  
 
With the aim of enabling usually dominated groups to exert power through their 
exclusive representatives to influence government, Hamilton proposes four institutional 
arrangements —two non-plebeian (a network of district assemblies and a conciliar 
system) and two plebeian (a tribune office and an electoral procedure/quota)— as well as 
a popular constituent process. Hamilton argues a new popular infrastructure based on his 
institutional proposal would help “keep states of domination to a minimum,” allowing to 
better identify common interests and to garner the “support for partisan interests of 
normally powerless groups.”65  
The first two institutions Hamilton proposes —district assemblies and a conciliar 
system— are not class-based, partisan institutions but rather institutions that are local and 
inclusive. Hamilton envisions a network of district assemblies, not as decision-making 
institutions but rather conceived mainly as aggregators of local knowledge, as spaces in 
which citizen could articulate and evaluate needs and interest. District assemblies would 
also be a forum for the “presentation” of amendments to existing legislation and for 
voting on proposals coming from other assemblies, even if decisions reached in these 
assemblies do not appear to be binding or demand any active response from 
government.66 From each district assembly one counselor would be selected by lot for a 
two-year period to serve in a conciliar system: a group of local delegates to the national 
assembly aimed at advising representatives on local needs and interests.67 Even if both 
district assemblies and the conciliar system only have non-binding, consulting power vis-
à-vis representative government, they are thought of as institutions that would allow for 
bridging the gap between representatives and their constituents, but without restricting 
the freedom representatives need to adequately advance the vital interests of the people.68 
Needs and interests would be first discerned and aggregated in district assemblies, then 
communicated by the counselors to representative officials, who then would have the 
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freedom to decide which needs and interests to pursue at any given time. This first non-
plebeian part of Hamilton’s model is perfectly compatible with a liberal constitutional 
framework, a complement to the existing representative structure, even if its exclusively 
consulting power would have to be met with political will by representative government 
to achieve meaningful reform.  
Hamilton also proposes two plebeian institutional arrangements: an “updated 
tribune of the plebs” and a plebeian election procedure/quota for the national assembly. 
Similar to McCormick’s Tribunate, Hamilton’s tribune would be a class-based institution 
composed of representatives selected by lot from “dominated groups and classes in 
society,” defined “either by a net-household-worth ceiling or associated measures.”69 
This collective office would have two powers: to propose and veto/repeal legislation, and 
to impeach national representatives. The same as McCormick, Hamilton places 
restrictions to the exercise of plebeian power by suggesting “strict and low” limits on the 
number of vetoes and impeachments that could be carried out every year.70  
The second plebeian arrangement, aimed to “offset the potentially merely reactive 
character” of the tribune, would be a “partisan, separate and independent electoral 
procedure” by which “the least powerful groups or classes in society” would elect 25% of 
the national assembly, “alongside the normal, open party-dominated processes of electing 
representatives within most existing representative democracies.”71 In effect, this partisan 
procedure would carve out a supposedly ‘plebeian quarter’ out of the national legislature. 
Similarly to the introduction of electoral quotas for women and indigenous people, this 
partisan procedure would introduce a class-based quota that not only would presumably 
require representatives to be from plebeian origin but also that only plebeians elect them. 
Even if electoral quotas would be unconstitutional in the U.S., they are perfectly legal in 
other democracies around the world, which provides international legal precedents and 
empirical evidence for supporting them to solve class-based inequalities.72 However, the 
effectiveness of having a plebeian section in the legislature, in terms of the advancement 
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of issues specific to oppressed groups, is questionable. Not because 90% of citizens lack 
privileges and therefore share an experience of second-class citizenship, does it mean that 
they would challenge class domination if elected, or elect a representative that would on 
her behalf. To guarantee the plebeian character of these reserved seats, special rules 
would need to be put in place to strengthen the partisan character of this ‘plebeian 
quarter’ by, for example, limiting the motions that could be initiated by these plebeian 
representatives only to plebeian-specific proposals.  
Even if having plebeian quotas in the legislature could potentially be 
accommodated within the liberal framework, what would be a harder sell in any 
constitutional democracy is the fact that some social groups would have the right to elect 
more representatives than others, which would constitute a violation of the principle of 
equal suffrage. To have reserved seats in Congress for plebeians to assure their adequate 
representation is not the same as allowing plebeian citizens to vote twice to select two 
representatives —one plebeian and one ordinary— instead of one representative like the 
other 10% of citizens. Moreover, even if the liberal challenge of attaching some political 
rights to only a part of the citizenry to the exclusion of others were overcome, this 
proposal would give the legislative body a dual source of authorization coming from the 
people-as-plebs and the people-as-a-whole, which could result with voters being 
represented by different officials taking opposing political stances. This added 
complexity could further dilute political responsibility and accountability. 
The most challenging issue raised by Hamilton’s proposal for incorporating a 
plebeian quota to the legislative power is that it creates competing authorities between the 
tribune and the plebeian representatives.73 What would happen if plebeian representatives 
in the legislature propose and pass a law that is then vetoed by the tribune? Or if the 
tribune proposes a law that is then not supported by plebeian representatives? Should the 
veto of the tribune —an office composed of randomly selected plebeian citizens to 
advance plebeian interests— be more authoritative than the vote of plebeian 
representatives who have also been elected to defend plebeian interests? This 
fundamental problem of competing authorities that comes along with the adding of 
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participatory decision-making institutional arrangements such as citizen assemblies, 
public juries, and direct democratic procedures into constitutional democracies, needs to 
be accounted for when deciding between the different options available (in praxis and 
theory) that could be included in a plebeian republic. Even if participatory democratic 
theory and practice strives to increase participation by multiplying the instances of 
deliberation and decision, I would argue participatory addendums could only be 
compatible if kept, as Hamilton suggests, at the consulting level, in which having a 
plurality of opinions and interests is beneficial. However, from the plebeian point of 
view, I would argue that having multiple loci of decision-making would blur the sharp 
distinction that should be drawn between the few and the many, and would also dilute the 
authority of plebeian institutions. In a plebeian republic, the authority of plebeians, as a 
part of the people that stands opposed to the ruling elite, should be unitary and must be 
final —even if decisions could be reached in a decentralized manner and certainly be 
reconsidered by plebeians.  
The final feature of Hamilton’s constitutional proposal is a participatory 
constituent process in which citizens would approve through a plebiscite a new 
constitution. The vote would be preceded by:  
a month-long carnival of citizenship —a public holiday— 
in which all citizens would have equal formal freedom and 
power to assess existing social, economic and political 
institutional matrices and their effects on the determination 
and satisfaction of vital and agency needs.74 
 
The constituent power, which could also be activated by any citizen through a 
“right of constitutional revision,” would also have “procedural safeguards giving priority 
to the satisfaction of vital needs.”75 Hamilton’s proposals for periodic constituent change 
attempt to institutionalize popular constituent power but its provisions are so vague and 
partial that it is not clear how could plebeians participate effectively and not be mere 
receipts of information; or if the role of plebeians in the process would be merely 
advisory, like the role citizens would play in district assemblies, or binding, being able to 
introduce and veto constitutional provisions through the tribune. As I argued in Chapters 
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2 and 3, the issue of who is the bearer of the final decision-making power in a given 
constitutional arrangement —the few or the many— is of crucial importance to properly 
classify a mixed constitution as plebeian. 
 
 

















 It is in times of crisis when political imagination is of absolute necessity —even if 
thinking outside of the constitutional box may seem for many simply ridiculous. This 
final chapter aims at contributing to the ideas and proposals I have analyzed in the 
previous five chapters, and in this way pay tribute to those who dared to think of ways of 
institutionalizing the power of the many —even if this brought them the contempt of 
those in power; Machiavelli was demonized as the teacher of evil, Condorcet was 
persecuted for treason and died in prison, and Luxemburg was shot to death and her work 
was vilified and marginalized. While the three of them wrote in moments of 
revolutionary upheaval, and thus the consequences for their intellectual deviance was 
more severely punished, Arendt’s proposal for a system of councils was written in a 
moment of relative expansion of individual rights and analyzed after representative 
democracy had become the only game in town, and thus was not viciously attacked but 
simply dismissed as a utopia, the product of a lack of realism on her part. Given our 
current political conjuncture, I would argue there is a possibility to move away from 
ridicule and dismissal, and towards a renewed, serious engagement with the idea of 
giving institutional form to the plebeian constituent power that Machiavelli identified as 





My proposal for constitutionalizing the power of those who do not rule is aimed at 
establishing a mixed constitution in which the people, understood as the assembled many, 
are the guardians of liberty. The juridical infrastructure I propose is meant as a 
contribution to the plebeian constitutional strand I have identified here, and takes core 
elements from proposals and insights for institutionalizing popular power from 
Machiavelli, Condorcet, Luxemburg, Arendt, and McCormick. I articulate these 
proposals aimed at addressing not only the liberal challenges raised by the introduction of 
class-based institutions but also the demands posed by a strong commitment to gender 
equality and the urgent challenge to deal with increased migration due to material 
deprivation, violence, and climate change.  
The proposal is informed by Machiavelli’s political philosophy, which is 
premised on the socio-ontological divide between the powerful few and the many —the 
grandi and the popolo— and that liberty-producing qualities of their conflict. A free 
republic would demand plebeian institutions able to exercise a constituent power that is 
both creative of law and institutions aimed at liberty, as well as avenging, being able to 
punish those who, by engaging in political corruption, have betrayed the republic. I 
propose a way to institutionalize this dual constituent power following Machiavelli’s 
‘composite’ approach to constitutionalism, which seeks to add new institutions and 
procedures while maintaining old forms and methods for the sake of stability. Therefore, 
these institutions, even if having a logic external to the current political framework, are 
design to conform to the basic principles of the liberal constitutional structure. I would 
argue that, the same as the introduction of an foreign object into a body could be accepted 
or rejected, plebeian institutions have a higher probability of acceptance by the liberal 
order if they are able to create as few anti-plebeian bodies as possible. Regardless, the 
successful establishment of plebeian institutions would presuppose a state of hegemony 
favorable for the introduction of a plebian political subject 
In what follows I first give arguments for dividing the few and the many based on 
the position they occupy in the political system instead of along class lines, and then 
introduce a sketch for a Plebeian Branch composed of two institutions: a sovereign 




the republic, and a Tribunate office aimed both at enforcing the will coming out of these 
assemblies and fighting corruption. 
 
I. Separating the Few from the Many 
 Even if having class-based institutions, such as the ones in the Roman and 
Florentine republics, is certainly an effective way of dealing with plutocracy, in the sense 
that it separates the wealthy from the rest of the people, making it easier to scrutinize and 
punish them, and would also promote the construction of a class-based identity among 
plebeians, I would argue the political division should be done based on political power 
rather than wealth. Even if the powerful few are almost always wealthy, it is not 
necessarily wealth what defines their umore but rather their power to exert domination 
over ordinary people. Domination can be exerted in many ways, and even if money is a 
required resource to exert domination at a grand scale, the power to dominate is distinct 
from the amount of money a person possesses —even if all wealth is a social product and 
thus created through direct and indirect modes of exploitation.1 Therefore the political 
division between the few and the many does not need to be along class lines but could be 
done based on the power individuals are able to exert given the role they occupy. I would 
argue that a division based on the governing position of the few instead of how much 
money they have is less arbitrary and reifying of class. While excluding the richest 10% 
cannot overcome the arbitrariness of cut-offs for wealth requirements (e.g. one year a 
person could be rich enough to be excluded from the many, and the next unwealthy 
enough to be included), excluding those who have the ability to formally exert power 
over others and unduly influence the creation of law and policy —e.g. public officials and 
their staff, lobbyists, judges, military commanders, and religious leaders— would 
establish a strictly political division between those who govern and those who do not, 
which would give an opportunity to members of the elites to become partisans of the 
people without the need to become ‘poor enough.’ Excluding only the powerful few 
should give plebeian institutions enough protection against direct oligarchic domination, 
since the wealthy individuals who would be eligible to participate in plebeian institutions 
would be so few that their influence in terms of promoting oligarchic interests would be 
                                                




marginal. The argument barring elites because they would negatively influence 
deliberation within plebeian institutions is a sound one, however the amount of money a 
member of the elite has does not necessarily track the capacity to persuade others in favor 
of supporting oligarchic interests. Moreover, alienating progressive elites —especially 
the new generations of political subjects who need to be socialized into politics— from 
becoming plebeian partisans would be, in my view, not only a strategic mistake but also 
against equal political rights. Nobody chooses to be born into a wealthy family or in a 
low-income one, and thus allocating political rights based on wealth would reify class 
differences in a way that could have detrimental effects for plebeian objectives.  
Exclusions cause resentment if they are not self-exclusions —giving away wealth 
just to be eligible to participate in plebeian institutions would require an a priori 
extraordinary commitment to the plebeian cause, something that does not come naturally 
to those born into wealth. Consequently, the wealthy are likely to resent the exclusion and 
therefore would be unlikely to support the introduction of plebeian institutions. Imposing 
wealth restrictions to participate in plebeian institutions seems unnecessarily contentious 
—even if this controversy would certainly prove beneficial to the plebeian cause, 
allowing for a stronger class consciousness to emerge among plebeians. As Rosa 
Luxemburg argues, working-class political experiences, even if it unable to establish a 
free society, are crucial because they allow for the workers to become a political subject 
and accumulate experience to be able to achieve the desired transformation in the future.  
 
II. The People as Network 
 Building on Condorcet’s institutional proposal for establishing primary 
assemblies and Arendt’s philosophical distinction between administration and politics, I 
propose to conceive the people-as-plebs as the assembled many who engage in political 
action: as a sovereign network of primary assemblies, making decisions based on the 
aggregation of decentralized and autonomous collective judgments. Similar to the 
neurobiological structure of plants, in which there are ‘brains’ in every root, local 
assemblies would operate as a bounded system, gathering information, processing it, and 
sending political signals through the network. And the same as a plant “decides” in 




environment from its sentient parts,2 the people-as-network would decide to initiate or 
oppose political actions based on local responses to domination spreading through the 
decentralized system; approved motions would work as a “signaling” mechanism to bring 
awareness of domination to the network and prompt a response to it.3   
Different from a federation, in which diverse units with specific interests operate 
under an alliance, assemblies in a network would not be stand-alone units but equal 
constitutive parts of a whole. Moreover, their collective decision would have legal power 
over representative government and its command structures, which would determine the 
plebeian nature of the mixed constitution. The people-as-network would constitute an 
institutional popular sovereign —and not an unorganized multitude in slumber4— with 
the strongest authority to judge the domination coming from the powerful few.  
While as a plebeian institution, the network of assemblies would be functional to 
check on systemic corruption and resist oligarchic domination, embodying the most 
proximate will of those who ‘do not rule,’ the internal organization of assemblies would 
need to be democratic and foster political action in order to achieve liberty for plebeians. 
Following Luxemburg’s insights on the need for the self-emancipation of the workers 
through political action, and Arendt’s argument for a space in which individuals can 
engage in action and new beginnings as a necessary condition for political liberty, each 
assembly would constitute a material political space, open to all those residents who do 
not rule. This realm of appearances, grounded on equality and aimed at the disclosure of 
opinions about life in common, would enable political discussions of what is just and 
unjust, what Plato and Aristotle deemed as the core of political rhetoric and action.5 
Given that political liberty is inherently limited, speech would need to be bounded within 
rules of engagement aimed at enabling the exchange of facts and opinions, and 
discouraging the use of discriminatory speech so to avoid bringing violence into the 
realm of appearances. Therefore, for political speech to be emancipatory and productive 
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of liberty and not a vehicle for supremacist ends, its exercise would need to be adequately 
limited by anti-discriminatory provisions (see II.E.2).  
Since political freedom is not only exercised by disclosing opinions, but also by 
acting together, individuals aggregated in the network of assemblies would have the 
power to decide collectively, not only to propose and repeal any decision from any 
branch of government they consider unjust and a means of domination, but also to 
exercise constituent power and revise the constitutional framework. Consequently, the 
juridical infrastructure of plebeian assemblies would need to enable not only ‘ordinary’ 
political action by plebeians, but also the possibility of new beginnings to renew the 
republic from the ground up. Therefore, the proposal contains specific provisions for a 
constituent process to be initiated and ratified by the network of assemblies (IV). 
Following Condorcet’s radical inclusiveness, every adult residing for one year in 
a particular district would be eligible to attend and vote in primary assemblies, without 
distinguishing between citizens and non-citizens. Since plebeians constitute a political 
subject determined by its ‘no-rule’ position in the constitutional structure, the 
institutionalization of plebeian power should not conform with current juridical 
boundaries but integrate newcomers through political equality instead of reserving 
politics only to citizens and in this way continue with the political apartheid between 
citizens and non-citizens. Against increasingly reifying the citizenship boundary between 
natives and non-natives, radical inclusiveness based on residence —the material 
occupancy of space— aims instead at redrawing the political boundary between the few 
and the many.  
If each assembly has in average 600 active members (Condorcet recommends 
between 450 and 900) this would mean that there would be several assemblies even in 
small towns, which would enable assemblies to effectively channel diversity even within 
specific communities, allowing for a more engaged, less polarized citizenry, especially in 
regions divided across ethnic and religious lines.6 If such a system of local assemblies 
were to be implemented in the state of New York, for example, in which there are 51.5 
                                                
6 Even if Jane Mansbridge has shown with her research on the town meetings in Shelby that there can also 
be intimidation and exclusion within consensus-building practices, and thus shattering the illusion of equal 
deliberation, these problems can be dealt with through adequate rules of engagement and material support. 
Moreover, the assemblies I am proposing are not aimed at consensus but at channeling conflict. Beyond 




million individuals of voting age, there would be about 85,800 assemblies in the entire 
state. Manhattan, one of the most populous counties, with about 1 million voting-age 
residents, would have about 1,660 assemblies. 
Where my proposal departs from Condorcet’s model is in the method he proposes 
for the assemblies’ self-governance: a Council with elected members. To avoid the 
corrupting effects associated with elections and campaign finance —which Condorcet 
was unable to foresee and are so ubiquitous today— I would argue the members of the 
self-governing structure of local assemblies should be selected by lottery. Following the 
experience of the Ancient Greek Boule (βουλή), the agenda-setting council for the 
sovereign assembly (ἐκκλησία), members to the self-government Councils would be 
selected by lot for a year, from a pool of volunteers, in a rotating basis to allow for 
institutional learning (II.C.5–10).7 The main task of these Councils would be to put 
together the agenda for meetings, effectively enable the exposition of topics, and enforce 
anti-discriminatory rules of engagement. Regarding the size of this council, Condorcet 
recommends one member every 50 active citizens. I would add this number would need 
to be an odd number to avoid gridlock. Councils thus would be composed of 9-19 
members depending on district size. One third of the Council would be renewed every 
four months to enable collective learning. After serving for one term, citizens may not 
volunteer again for this office for 15 years, which means that in one decade about 1/4 of 
assembly members would have served in the Council. This would allow every plebeian to 
serve in the Council 1–4 times in her lifetime. To allow for equal access, Council 
members would receive a salary equivalent to the mean annual income in the district and 
would have their jobs back after their service.  
Another departure from Condorcet’s plan is that assemblies should not be 
convoked in a reactive manner, triggered by a proposal coming from the citizens or the 
government. I would argue this reactive mode of assemblage would mean that meetings 
could be either overwhelmingly frequent or too sporadic to serve as a proper way to 
politically educate its members. Given the busy lifestyles of 21st century individuals, I 
                                                
7 For a historical analysis of these Greek institutions see Josiah Ober, Democracy and Knowledge: 
Innovation and Learning in Classical Athens (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 2010); 





would argue meetings should be periodic, prescribed by law, and convoked only three 
times per year. Meetings would be held in a national political holiday, attendance would 
be voluntary, and assembly goers would be paid on an hourly basis for their participation 
with a special tax levied for covering the operational costs of plebeian institutions.8  To 
assure gender equality, in addition to a civic payment for attendance, food and childcare 
must be provided.  
 “Signaling” among assemblies would also follow Condorcet’s proposal in which 
motions approved in one assembly would be considered in other assemblies in the 
district. If 1/3 of assemblies in a district agree to a motion, then the proposal would be 
considered by all the assemblies at the city/county level. If the issue were exclusively a 
city/county one, a decision by a majority of assemblies would constitute the will of the 
people at that level of political organization. This mechanism would be replicated at the 
state/region and national levels. In this way, political action aimed at resisting oppression 
and initiating change could arise in any part of the network of political judgment, giving 
individuals the material power to defend liberty against systemic corruption and 
oligarchic domination.  
If, for example, a county as Manhattan were to be divided into eight districts, 
containing about 200 assemblies each, it would take a motion passed in one assembly to 
prompt the other 199 other assemblies in the district to consider analyzing the issue in the 
next assembly meeting. If 1/3 of these assemblies agree with the motion, then it would be 
added to the agenda of all the assemblies in the Manhattan for the following meeting. If a 
majority of assemblies in Manhattan agrees to the motion, it is to be sent to the city 
Tribunate office, which would present it to the appropriate branch of city government and 
oversee its appropriate enforcement. The whole process to have a motion passed at every 
level of government could take as little as four months if enough assemblies begin the 
process of inquiry simultaneously in the first meeting, and then a majority of assemblies 
votes in favor of the motion during the second meeting, or 12 months if the motion 
begins in a single assembly and follows the ordinary signaling mechanism. If the motion 
                                                
8 The civic pay for attendance should be pegged to an hourly rate (e.g. minimum wage, or based on GDP 
per capita and 40-hour week, or portion of universal basic income). If the state is going to end up paying 
people a universal basic income, I would argue it would be better to link at least part of the UBI to active 




where one concerning state government, the motion would be put in the agenda of the all 
assemblies in every county, adding four months to the process. If the motion where one 
concerning the federal government, the motion would be put in the agenda of the 
assemblies in every state, adding at least four more months. Consequently, a motion 
under federal jurisdiction could be approved by a majority of assemblies in 4 to 20 
months.  
 
III. The Tribunate as Enforcer and Anti-Corruption Office 
The proposal also sketches a Tribunate office that would be subordinate to the 
network of assemblies, combining features of Machiavelli’s Provost office and 
Condorcet’s council of overseers, with the impeachment prerogative of McCormick’s 
Tribunate and public trials for political corruption. In its role of overseer and enforcer, the 
Tribunate would makes sure mandates coming out of the network of assemblies are 
properly and promptly carried out.9 In its anti-corruption function, the Tribunate would 
investigate complaints of political corruption, having the power to initiate impeachment 
and prosecution procedures according to the constitution, and recommending a penalty. If 
the verdict of the appropriate branch of government in charge of impeachment or 
prosecution were not in line with the recommendation of the Tribunate, then the case 
would be decided in a public trial in which all the members of the Tribunate would pass 
judgment. The decision by the Tribunate would be final. 
To enforce the will of assemblies and persecute political corruption at every level 
of government, there would be offices of the Tribunate at the city/county and state/region 
levels, as well as the national level. Offices at the city/county level would each have nine 
members selected by lot from plebeian residents, while the state/region and national 
offices would have 27 members. To allow for collective learning and avoid corruption, 
tribunes would serve for one year, and 1/3 of the posts would be renewed every four 
months. If such a plebeian institution were to be implemented in the state of New York, 
                                                
9 The same as Rousseau’s censorial tribunal, the plebeian Tribunate would only “declare” the judgment of 
assemblies. The radical difference is that while the censorial tribunal declares de opinion of the people, 
which is “derived from its constitution,” the Tribunate would declared the decisions reached in a majority 




there would be 62 county-level offices staffed with a total of 558 plebeian members, and 
one state office with 27 plebeian members, who would serve for one-year terms.  
Finally, following Machiavelli’s insight that for plebeians to live in liberty they 
need not only good laws, but also weapons to defend the republic against oligarchic 
takeover, the proposal reinforces the legal power of the Tribunate to command the 
different branches of government with the constitutional prerogative to direct the forces 
of order if necessary. While the Roman tribunes had only the threat of popular 
mobilization to force the Senate to enforce plebeian law, the modern Tribunate would 
have the constitutional power to command the state’s forces of order to back up plebeian 
decisions that the ruling elite would prefer to disregard. Instead of resolving a 
constitutional crisis in which a part of the government refuses to yield to the Tribunate 
with the complete disregard of plebeian authority and the killing of the tribunes like in 
Rome, the proposal attempts to resolve a potential crisis by transferring the command 
over the forces of order to the Tribunate in case the government decides to disregard 
plebeian authority.   
In what follows I provide a juridical sketch for a Plebeian Branch aimed at 
constitutionalizing the power of the people as way to adequately deal with systemic 
corruption and oligarchic domination. The sketch has four parts. Part I offers a preamble 
with general consideration framing the institutions. Part II establishes the network of 
primary assemblies and details their functions, membership, organization, and 
procedures. Part III established the office of the Tribunate and details its functions, 
membership, and organization. Finally, Part IV establishes the mechanisms to initiate 
constituent processes, and the procedures involved in revising and ratifying draft 
constitutions. As an Appendix I have included an example of how the veto power would 






The Plebeian Branch 
 
 
I. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS 
1.  
Plebeian institutions allowing for the direct participation of all adult residents in 
deliberation and public judgment are foundational to free government; equal liberty 
for all residents cannot be guaranteed without them. 
 
2.  
The Plebeian Branch is to be composed of two basic institutions:  
a) A decentralized network of Primary Assemblies —local assemblies of 
residents. See Section II. 
b) A Tribunate —an office aimed at enforcing motions approved by the 
network of Primary Assemblies, and fighting political corruption. See 
Section III. 
3.  
The total aggregation of Primary Assemblies is to be considered the sovereign subject 
of the republic; a decision reached in the majority of Primary Assemblies is to be 
considered the legitimate will of the people, and all branches of government must 
yield to it and properly enforce it.  
 
4.  
The Plebeian Branch is to be funded by a national tax collected for the sole and direct 
purpose of funding all the costs associated with the operations of Primary Assemblies 
and Tribunate offices, and their appropriate exercise of constitutional powers.  
 
5.  
All branches of government —Executive, Legislative, and Judicial— are to obey 
decisions reached by the Plebeian Branch.  
 
II. PRIMARY ASSEMBLIES 
A. Functions 
1.  
Residents meet in Primary Assemblies to deliberate on issues that affect the general 
interest of a district, city, county, or state, or the republic as a whole. 
 
2. Members vote to:  
a) Initiate, veto or repeal laws, policies, executive actions, judicial decisions, 
and appointments for public office. 
b) Initiate a constituent process;  
c) Propose amendments to the Constitution; 





B. Membership  
1.  
Any person 18 years of age may register to be a member of a Primary Assembly in 
any district if three conditions are fulfilled:  
a) One-year residence in the district without interruption;  
b) Must not occupy a position of political, judicial, cultural or religious 
authority —including all public officials serving in political posts and their 
staff, judges, and religious leaders; 
c) Must not occupy a position as lobbyist advocating for wealthy individuals 
or corporations.  
2.  
Membership in a Primary Assembly is to be temporarily lost by:  
a) Residence in another district for more than six months;  
b) Use of discriminatory speech or violent behavior in the assembly (see II.E.3);  
c) Occupying a position of political, judicial, cultural or religious authority; 
d) Becoming a lobbyist or advocate for wealthy individuals or corporations. 
 
3.  
Any person who is absent for more than a year from the district is to regain voting in 
that district after three months. 
 
4.  
All members have the right to vote in all resolutions passed in their respective 




No person is to vote for the same motion in more than one Primary Assembly. 
 
6.  
Members have the right to propose a motion to be voted in their Primary Assembly 




Primary Assemblies are to be established throughout the republic according to 
residential districts. Districts are to be set up in such a way that none of them have 
less than 450 eligible members, or more than 600.  
 
2.  
Primary Assemblies are to be grouped by neighborhood, city/county and state/region.  
 
3.  
Primary Assemblies are to meet three times a year in national political holidays for 
ordinary sessions. On the day of the meeting, communal meals as well as child-care 







Attendance to assembly meetings is voluntary and is to be compensated based on a 
predetermined hourly rate above the national minimum wage, using the public funds 
set aside for the operations of the Plebeian Branch. 
 
5.  
Each Primary Assembly is to be governed by a Council selected by lottery from a 
pool of volunteers taken from the registered members of the Primary Assembly. The 
Council is to be composed of one councilperson per every 50 registered members in 
the assembly rolls. To avoid gridlock, the number of Council members is to be an odd 
number. Councils thus are to be composed of 9-13 members depending on district 
size. Members are to serve as Council president, leading and mediating meetings, in a 
rotating basis.  
 
6.   
Members of the Council are to be compensated for their service with a salary 
equivalent to the median wage in their district using the public funds set aside for the 




Members of the Council are to serve in their posts for one year. To allow for 
collective learning, 1/3 of the Council is to be renewed every four months, before 
each general meeting of Primary Assemblies.  
 
8.  
After serving for one term, citizens may not volunteer again for serving in the 
Council for 10 years. 
 
9.   
Duties of the Council: 
a. Keep the register of members up to date; 
b. Convene the Primary Assembly in cases determined by the Constitution; 
c. Open and mediate member-exclusive fora in which members can raise 
concerns and proposals; 
d. Present an agenda for meetings based on the systematization of concerns 
and petitions coming from the members of the assembly, and motions 
passed in other assemblies; 
e. Gather and provide adequate information for deliberation; 
f. Enforce rules of engagement to enable adequate interaction in the 
assembly geared toward achieving a well-informed, deliberated decision; 
g. Present approved motions to other Primary Assemblies and register them 





10.   
Within the duration of their service, Council members must remain neutral during 
Primary Assembly meetings. Council members are not to use their office to offer 
publicly their own judgment on any issue. They shall exercise their individual right to 
vote according to their own judgment, regardless. 
 
 
D. Deliberation & Voting 
1.  
After Primary Assemblies are convened, their respective Councils are to introduce 
subjects for deliberation, reduced to simple propositions, asking members to decide if 
they merit further discussion. 
 
2.   
Primary Assemblies are to vote to accept or reject the further discussion of proposals. 
Proposals for deliberation are accepted with a simple majority of members present. 
 
3.  
If a proposal is accepted for further discussion, during the adjournment each Council 
is to enable deliberation by opening a member-exclusive media platform (such as a 
blog) and also enable an exchange of opinions among members once a week in the 
Primary Assemblies’ meeting spaces. Deliberation is to conform to basic rules of 
engagement. See I.E.2. 
 
4.  
Primary Assemblies’ meeting spaces are to be open every Sunday of the year for 
informal discussion. At least one Council member is to be present to enable 
discussion and maintain order. Food and child-care are to be provided, paid using the 
public funds set aside for the Plebeian Branch. 
 
5.  
Members interested in presenting their view to the Primary Assembly on the issue to 
be deliberated are to send statements to the Council, which is to aggregate these 
statements and structure a discussion to be held in the next meeting based on these 
statements. The structured discussion is to include as many different opinions as 
possible considering time constraints.  
  
6.  
To ensure adequate information, in the following ordinary assembly meeting the 
Council is to first recall the object of deliberation and then present facts, testimonies, 
and expert opinions whenever pertinent. 
 
7.  
After adequate information has been provided, the Council is to allot time for 






After the presentation of evidence and opinion, the Council is to present the issue as a 
simple proposition for members to vote yes/no.  
 
9.  
A break of no less than 15 minutes for informal discussion and caucusing is to 
precede every vote.  
 
10.  
All votes are public except for the ones directed at disciplining members because of 
their use of discriminatory speech or violent behavior (see II.E.3.). 
  
11.  
All motions approved in Primary Assemblies are decided by simple majority. 
 
12.  
If the result of the vote is to support a motion, the issue is to be considered in the next 
meeting by all Primary Assemblies in the city/county.  
 
13.   
If an issue is a city/county one, a simple majority of Primary Assemblies in support of 
a motion is to be understood as equivalent to the will of the people of that city/county. 
The decision is to be communicated to the local Tribunate office, which is to present 
it to the appropriate public office for enforcement. 
 
14.  
If an issue were under the jurisdiction of state/regional authority, 1/3 of Primary 
Assemblies in a city/county supporting a motion would put the issue for consideration 
in all assemblies in that state/region. If at the state/region level 1/3 of Primary 
Assemblies support the motion of a national concern, it is to be put for consideration 
in all Primary Assemblies in the republic. 
 
15.  
A simple majority of Primary Assemblies at the city/county and state/region is 
understood to be the will of the people at that particular level of organization.  
 
16.  
If a majority of Primary Assemblies in the republic approves a motion, this decision 
constitutes the will of the people, and the motion is to be presented by the Tribunate 
to the appropriate public office for enforcement. 
 
17.  
If a majority of Primary Assemblies in the republic approves to veto or repeal a law, 
the Legislative body is to be renewed: legislators who voted in favor of the vetoed or 
repealed law are to step down if still in office and their seats are to be up for election 





If a majority of Primary Assemblies in the republic approves to veto or repeal a 
policy, the elected public official(s) who approved that policy are to step down and 
their positions are to be filled according to the Constitution. 
 
19.  
If a majority of Primary Assemblies in the republic approves to veto a judicial 
decision, the judges who approved that decision are to step down and their positions 
filled according to the Constitution. 
 
20.  
If a majority of Primary Assemblies in the republic approves to veto an appointment 
for public office, the persons who approved that appointment are to step down and 
their positions filled according to the Constitution. 
 
21.  
The Executive and Legislative branches may consult Primary Assemblies on issues 
that interest the entire republic. If the issue is urgent, an extraordinary meeting of 




If there are concerns regarding the legitimacy of voting processes within Primary 
Assemblies, these are to be addressed to the national Tribunate office. 
 
E. Rules for Internal Order 
1.  
The enforcement of order in Primary Assemblies belongs essentially and exclusively 
to each assembly, and is to be exercised by the Council. 
 
2.  
The use of discriminatory speech, symbols, images, and actions aimed at demeaning 
individuals or groups based on their race, ethnicity, religion, gender, sexual 
orientation, disability, or place of birth is to be prohibited. 
 
3.   
The Council is to callback to order, give warnings, and censor members who engage 
in discriminatory speech or violent behavior. The Council is to recommend to the 
assembly in such cases a penalty of temporary exclusion. The Primary Assembly is to 
approve or reject the penalty with a simple majority. Ballots in cases of temporary 
exclusion are to be secret so to avoid personal retaliation.  
 
4.  
In the case of assault and serious excesses, the Council may, after authorization from 












As exclusive delegate of the people, the Tribunate is to oversee that the will of the 
people —equivalent to a decision by a majority of Primary Assemblies in a certain 
city/county, state/region, or in the whole republic— is carried out properly. 
 
2.     
As a surveillance office, the Tribunate is to oversee government to thwart corruption. 
 
3.  
Duties of the Tribunate: 
a) Present approved motions to initiate, veto, and repeal laws, policies, executive 
actions, judicial decisions, and appointments for public office to the 
appropriate branch of government;  
b) Scrutinize the enforcement of the will of the people; 
c) Investigate cases of political corruption and initiate prosecution proceedings;  
d) Initiate impeachment procedures of public officials; 
e) Give final judgment on cases of political corruption when required; 
f) Analyze procedural issues arising from primary assemblies; 
g) Initiate a constituent process by convoking Constituent Primary Assemblies. 
 
4.  
Members of Primary Assemblies have the right to present cases of abuse of power 
and violation of the law to the appropriate Tribunate office; cases are to be 
investigated and a report is to be sent back to the member(s) who submitted the case. 
If 2/3 of the pertinent Tribunate office agrees there is enough evidence on political 
corruption, the Tribunate is to recommend a penalty, and the case is to be prosecuted 
in open court or according to the Constitution. 
 
5.  
If the verdict reached by the courts or other institutions sanctioned by the Constitution 
contradict the Tribunate’s recommendation, the case would be decided in a public 
trial in which all members of the Tribunate are to participate in passing judgment. A 
2/3 majority decision by the Tribunate invalidates the previous judgment.  
 
6.  
If public officials disregard the mandates emanating from the Tribunate, they are to 
be stripped from their office and forced to resign their posts immediately. Any public 
official who is noncompliant is to be physically removed by the forces of order, put 






The Tribunate is to direct the national police if necessary to enforce decisions reached 
by the Plebeian Branch in cases of noncompliance. The Tribunate is to override the 






Any member person of a Primary Assembly is eligible to serve in the Tribunate. 
Selection is to be done by lottery from a pool of volunteer members.  
 
2.  
Members of the Tribunate are to serve in their posts for one year. To allow for 
collective learning and avoid corruption, 1/3 of the Tribunate is to be renewed every 
four months, before each general meeting of Primary Assemblies.  
 
3.  
After serving for one term, members are not eligible to serve in the Tribunate for 15 
years. 
 
4.   
Members of the Tribunate are to be compensated for their service with a salary 
equivalent to the median wage in their State using the public funds set aside for the 




Members serving in the Tribunate must give up their position immediately if any of 
the requirements for membership in primary assemblies prescribed in II. B 1 & 2 are 




Members of the Tribunate who have completed their term may be indicted on 




Tribunate offices are to be established at each level of government —city/county, 
state/region, and federal/national levels.  
 
2.  
Each office at city/county is to be composed of nine members selected by lottery from 






At each level, offices are to have jurisdiction over the corresponding government and 
public officials serving in that government at that level. 
 
4.  
Tribunate offices at the state and national levels are to be composed of 27 members 
each selected by lottery from a pool of volunteers. The offices are to be further 




IV. CONSTITUENT PROCESS 
 
A. General Considerations 
1.  




Modifications to the constitutional structure can neither eliminate the foundational 
network of primary assemblies nor go against the principle of equal liberty.  
 
3.  
Every generation has the right to analyze and improve the basic structure of the 
society in which they live. 
 
4.  
Any member of a primary assembly has the right to initiate a constituent process, 
after gathering 50 signatures from other members in the primary assembly supporting 
the motion. The process is the same as for any other motion initiated in primary 
assemblies. See II.D. 
 
5.  
The constituent process is to be funded by an extraordinary tax levied specifically for 
this purpose. Allocation of funding is to be managed by the Tribunate. 
 
B. Initiation and Processes 
1.  
The constituent process is to be initiated periodically, in the 17th year after the 
acceptance of the current constitution, or when a majority of Primary Assemblies in 
the republic demands it.  
 
2. The constituent process is to go through three basic stages: 
a) Propositional —Constituent Primary Assemblies are to be convoked by the 
Tribunate to review the Constitution and propose amendments.  




National Convention convoked by the Executive branch and elected by the 
people at large. 
c) Approval— amendments are voted in Constituent Primary Assemblies. 
 
3.  
After the last ordinary meeting of Primary Assemblies in the 17th year after the 
acceptance of the current constitution, or if a majority of Primary Assemblies 
approve, the Tribunate is to initiate a constituent process by convoking Constituent 
Primary Assemblies. Four meetings are to be scheduled, beginning in the first month 
of the 18th year after the acceptance of the current constitution. Meetings are to be 
held every three months within that year. 
 
4.  
Each Constituent Primary Assembly is to follow the basic organization of ordinary 
Primary Assemblies and be governed by a Council selected by lottery from a pool of 
volunteers taken from the registered members. The Council is to be composed of one 
councilperson per every 50 registered members in the Assembly rolls. To avoid 
gridlock, the number of council members is to be an odd number. Councils thus are to 
be composed of 9-13 members depending on district size. One of the members is to 
serve as president of the Council. 
 
5.   
Members of the Council are to be compensated for their service with a salary 
equivalent to the median wage in their State, using the public funds set aside for the 
operation of the Plebeian Branch.  
 
6.  




Duties of the Council: 
a. Open and moderate a member-exclusive forum for concerns and 
proposals; 
b. Prepare and present a presentation of current constitutional framework; 
c. Present a series of simple propositions for amendments based on concerns 
and proposals coming from members, or motions passed in other 
assemblies; 
d. Gather and provide adequate information for deliberation; 
e. Enforce rules of engagement to enable adequate interaction in the 
Assembly geared toward achieving a well-informed, deliberated decision; 
f. Present approved motions to other Primary Assemblies and register them 
with the Tribunate office. 
 
 




Within the duration of their service, Council members must remain neutral during 
Assembly meetings. Council members are not to use their office to offer publicly 
their own judgment on any issue. They shall exercise their individual right to vote 
according to their own judgment, regardless.  
 
9.  
The Executive branch is to convoke a National Convention in the first month of the 
19th year after the acceptance of the current constitution, or when prompted by the 
Tribunate after a motion is accepted by a majority of Primary Assemblies. 
 
10.   
Each state of the republic is to select by popular vote three individuals to the National 
Convention. 
 
11.   




All meetings of the National Convention are to be public, and detailed minutes are to 
be kept in a public record. 
 
13.  
Members elected to the National Convention are prohibited from incorporating new 




The National Convention is to present a draft constitution to the Tribunate in six 
months time.  
 
15.   
Upon receiving a draft constitution from the National Convention, composed 
according to the constituent process rules specified above, the Tribunate is to convoke 
a general meeting of Constituent Primary Assemblies to reflect and vote on the 
amended constitutional framework. 
 
16.  
A new constitution is to be approved or rejected in a general meeting of Constituent 
Primary Assemblies. The document is to be approved by a simple majority of Primary 
Assemblies in the republic. 
 
17.  
If the new constitution abolishes or disables Primary Assemblies, or contains 
provisions undermining the principle of equal liberty, even if approved by a majority 




republic.   
 
18.  
If the draft constitution is approved by a majority of Primary Assemblies, it is to be 




If the draft constitution is rejected, the National Convention has to present within one-
month time a revised draft to the Tribunate, which is to convoke an extraordinary 
meeting of Constituent Primary Assemblies to vote on the new draft.   
 
20.  
If the draft constitution is rejected a second time, the National Convention is to be 
immediately dissolved. The Executive is to call elections for a new National 
Convention, which is to present a new draft constitution to the Tribunate within three 
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